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Abstract
The long line of representation studies posits that proportional representation
systems, with larger electoral districts, have a representational advantage over
majoritarian systems. However, over the last decade, scholars have challenged
this longstanding finding (Blais & Bodet 2006, Golder & Stramski 2007). Addi-
tionally, Golder & Stramski (2007) initiated a debate over the conceptualization
and measurement of congruence, arguing that the most common practice of as-
sessing congruence is flawed. They call for an improved measure of congruence.
In the light of this recent debates, the purpose of this thesis is to inspect the
relationship between institutional designs and political representation in the Eu-
ropean context, using Voting Advice Application generated data. Three main
research questions are explored. The first question relates to institutional designs
such as district magnitude, and electoral system characteristics such as dispro-
portionality or polarization, investigating the conditions necessary for a country
to present high levels of congruence between its citizens and their representatives.
Looking at party level characteristics, I will investigate what are the effects of
niche party status and governmental status on issue congruence in European
democracies? Last but not least, what is the role of individual characteristics?
These questions will be addressed by studying the impact of different features
of electoral systems, party and individual characteristics have on political rep-
resentation conceptualized as issue congruence. Congruence is measured as the
degree of matching of the common policy preferences of citizens and parties as
indicated by the Voting Advice Applications EU Profiler 2009 and EUvox 2014.
The present work contributes to the stream of research on political representation
understood as congruence. The strength of this work lays in its comparative
approach, and the use of VAA generated data to measure congruence. While
most of the studies on political representation using congruence focus on the
Left-Right dimension, this thesis uses the concept of issue congruence. Based
on the 28 common statements of the VAA tool, the measure of congruence is
metric-free, allowing for cross-country comparisons. Although there is a wide
range of research on the effects of electoral systems on political representation,
most of these studies are limited in their use of comparative approaches. The
lack of extensive comparative research on issue congruence is due to insufficient
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data. The 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox address this issue, providing the
necessary framework for testing the predictors of congruence at a system, party
and individual level.
Political representation can be operationalized through congruence, as the dis-
tance between the citizen and the representative (Huber & Powell 1994, Powell
2004). Issue congruence is the correspondence between party electorates and
their representatives across a set of salient policy dimensions (Powell 2004). VAA
generated data provides a new means of measuring congruence. I propose two
new measures of congruence, based on the distance between the citizen and the
party the citizen intends to vote for. Unlike other comparative studies that mea-
sure congruence with the help of the Left-Right scale, the present work focuses
on issue policies. Issue congruence is the outcome of the match between the
citizen and the party she intends to vote for on a series of 28 and 22 politi-
cal statements.Additionally, the focus on issue congruence is important because
issue representation is mostly inferred from the alternative interpretations of
congruence. The measures of issue congruence therefore contribute to a better
understanding of political representation in the EU political space, tackling the
recurrent crisis of representation.
3
Contents
1 Introduction 13
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.2 About the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.1.3 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Studying political representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 Conceptualizing congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.2 Ideological versus issue congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 VAAs and their place in voting behaviour studies . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3.1 Issue voting and VAAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3.2 The research potential of VAAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.3.3 The representative deficit as a measure of issue congruence 36
1.3.4 Issue congruence assessed with the help of VAA data . . . 37
1.4 Voting Advice Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.4.1 What are Voting Advice Applications? . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.4.2 Who are the VAA users? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2 A theoretical approach to the study of issue congruence 42
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Why do we study political representation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.1 Main approaches to the study of political representation . 46
2.2.2 Main approaches to the study of issue congruence: from
positional to issue competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.3 Issue dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.4 State of the art and new challenges in congruence studies . 51
2.3 On the role of institutional designs on congruence . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4 Party characteristics and their influence on congruence . . . . . . 63
2.5 Placing the voter at the centre of the representation process . . . 68
3 Research design 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 The conceptualization and measurement of congruence . . . . . . 74
4
3.2.1 Conceptualizations of congruence: from one-to-one to many-
to-many . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.2 Different approaches to measuring congruence . . . . . . . 77
3.2.3 From ideological to issue congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 European parliamentary elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Levels of analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6 The limitations of VAA-generated data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.7 Modeling strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.8 Measuring congruence with VAA data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.8.1 Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.8.2 Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.9 Issue dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.10 Instrumentation and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.10.1 Country level predictors: election rules and party system
characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.10.2 Party level predictors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.10.3 Individual level predictors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 Congruence under different institutional designs 108
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.1.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 2009 EU Profiler data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3 2009 EU Profiler data - Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler data Absolute cit-
izen congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.2 Results - EU Profiler data Absolute citizen congruence . . 117
4.3.3 2009 EU Profiler data - Relative congruence . . . . . . . . 120
4.3.4 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler data Relative con-
gruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.3.5 Results - 2009 EU Profiler data Relative congruence . . . . 120
4.4 2014 EUvox data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.4.1 2014 EUvox data- Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . 124
5
4.4.2 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox data Absolute citizen
congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4.3 Results - 2014 EUvox data - Absolute citizen congruence . 126
4.4.4 2014 EUvox data - Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.4.5 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox data Relative congruence130
4.4.6 Results - 2014 EUvox data Relative congruence . . . . . . 130
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5 Party characteristics and issue congruence 138
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.1.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2 2009 EU Profiler data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2.2 2009 EU Profiler data - Absolute citizen congruence . . . . 147
5.2.3 Results - 2009 EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence . . 148
5.2.4 2009 EU Profiler data - Relative congruence . . . . . . . . 152
5.2.5 Results - 2009 EU Profiler Relative congruence . . . . . . . 153
5.3 2014 EUvox data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.2 2014 EUvox data - Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . 159
5.3.3 Results - 2014 EUvox Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . 160
5.3.4 2014 EUvox data - Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.3.5 Results - 2014 EUvox Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . 161
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6 Individual level predictors of congruence 171
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.1.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.2 2009 EU Profiler - Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.2.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6
6.2.2 Results - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.3 2014 EUvox - Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.3.2 Results - 2014 EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7 Conclusions 197
7.1 Revisiting the motivations behind this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7.2 Summarizing thesis contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.2.1 Comparative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.2.2 Issue congruence versus ideological congruence . . . . . . . 201
7.2.3 Issue dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2.4 A relative measure of congruence in addition to a absolute
citizen one . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.2.5 Niche party status and niche party supporters . . . . . . . 205
7.2.6 Focus on individual level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.3 Limitations and future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
8 Appendices 226
8.1 Appendices Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
8.2 Appendices Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.3 Appendices Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
8.4 Appendices Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
7
List of Figures
1 Conceptualization of Congruence, Golder and Stramski (2010) . . 24
2 Conceptualization of congruence, Golder & Stramski (2007) . . . 76
3 Predictors of congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4 Structure of congruence scores at individual, party and country
level, 2009 EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5 Structure of congruence scores at individual, party and country
level, 2014 EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6 Correlation plots - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence - Over-
all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7 Density plots - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8 Random country intercepts - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congru-
ence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
9 Correlation plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence - Overall . . . 122
10 Random country intercepts - EU Profiler Relative congruence . . 123
11 Density plots - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
12 Correlation plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence - Overall . 127
13 Random country intercepts - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence 129
14 Correlation plots - EUvox Relative congruence - Overall . . . . . . 132
15 Random country intercepts - EUvox Relative congruence . . . . . 134
16 EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence Niche vs Mainstream . . 145
17 Violin plots - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . 146
18 Violin plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . . . 146
19 Country intercepts - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence . . . 152
20 Country intercepts - EU Profiler Relative congruence . . . . . . . 155
21 EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1a . . . . . . . . 157
22 EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1b . . . . . . . . 158
23 Violin plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . . 159
24 Violin plots - EUvox Relative congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
25 Density plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . 161
26 Density plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . . 164
27 Individual level characteristics - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
28 Age - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8
29 Gender - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
30 Education - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
31 Political interest - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
32 Niche party supporters - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
33 Fixed effects - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
34 Individual level characteristics - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
35 Age - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
36 Gender - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
37 Education - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
38 Political interest - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
39 Niche party supporters - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
40 Fixed Effects - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
41 Marginal Effects - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence . . . . 233
42 Violin plots - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence . . . . . . . 247
43 Violin plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream248
44 Violin plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence Niche vs main-
stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
45 Violin plots - EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream . . 249
46 EU Profiler Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1a . . . . . 250
47 EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1b . . . . . . . . 251
48 EUvox Relative congruence niche vs mainstream 1b . . . . . . . . 252
49 Age - New democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
50 Age - Old democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
51 Gender - New democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
52 Gender - Old democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
53 Political interest- New democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . 256
54 Political interest - Old democracies - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . 256
55 Age - New democracies - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
56 Age - Old democracies - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
57 Education - New democracies - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
58 Education - Old democracies - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
9
List of Tables
1 2009 EU Profiler - 2009 European Voter Study . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 2009 EU Profiler - Country level congruence scores . . . . . . . . 112
5 Country level predictors - 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 Absolute citizen congruence EU Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7 Relative congruence EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8 2014 EUvox - Country level congruence scores . . . . . . . . . . . 125
9 Country level predictors - 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
10 Absolute citizen congruence - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
11 Relative congruence EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
12 Mixed effects regression models - EU Profiler Absolute citizen con-
gruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
13 Congruence scores on issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
14 Mixed effects regression models - EU Profiler Relative congruence 154
15 Mixed effects regression models - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence162
16 Mixed effects regression models - EUvox Relative congruence . . . 163
17 Mixed effects regression analysis - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . 182
18 Mixed Effects Models with individual level predictors - EUvox . . 191
19 Correlation Matrix - Absolute citizen congruence EUP . . . . . . 231
20 Summary of variation tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
21 Correlation Matrix - Relative congruence EUP . . . . . . . . . . . 232
22 Summary of variation tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
23 Correlation Matrix - Absolute citizen congruence EUvox . . . . . 234
24 Summary of variation tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
25 Summary of variation tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
26 Correlation Matrix - Relative congruence EUvox . . . . . . . . . . 235
27 Baseline models - Absolute citizen congruence EUP . . . . . . . . 235
28 Baseline models - Relative congruence EUP . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
29 Baseline models - Absolute citizen congruence EUvox . . . . . . . 235
30 Baseline models - Relative congruence EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . 236
31 Party level predictors - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
32 Congruence scores at party leve - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . . . 239
33 Party level predictors - 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
10
34 Congruence scores at party level - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
35 Cross tabulation Table - EU Profiler - Absolute citizen congruence 246
36 Cross tabulation Table - EU Profiler - Relative congruence . . . . 246
37 Crosstabulation Table - EUvox - Absolute citizen congruence . . 247
38 Crosstabulation Table - EUvox - Relative congruence . . . . . . . 247
39 Baseline and Individual level models - EU Profiler . . . . . . . . . 253
40 Baseline and Individual level models - EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . 257
41 Extended individual level models - Countries in both EU Profiler
and EUvox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
11
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor, Susan Banducci, for all the support she
offered me during this journey. Susan, you are my role model. I am very thankful
to my second supervisor, Travis Coan, who offered encouraging words when I
needed them most. I thank Andre Krouwel, who taught me to be assiduous
and perseverant. I would also like to thank the entire Exeter Q-step team, for
providing such a wonderful working environment. Claudia Zucca and Laszlo
Horvath, thank you for always being there.
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the European Commission
through the Seventh Framework Programme’s Marie Curie Industry and Doc-
toral Training in Vote Advice Applications, ”VOTEADVICE”.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for the love, support and above all,
understanding they have shown these past years. This thesis is dedicated to my
father.
12
11 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Congruence between citizens and their representatives is at the core of any demo-
cratic process. However, there is variation across democracies in terms of the
strength of the linkage between the public and political elites. Furthermore,
there is wide debate in the literature about the functioning of representation
processes and about the meaning of congruence for democratic representation.
While some scholars argue and present evidence in favour of a strong congruence
between citizens and representatives on the Left-Right dimension (Dalton, Far-
rell & McAllister 2011, Powell 2000), others argue that some of these findings
are due to decisions over measurement tools, depicting a slightly different reality
(Golder & Stramski 2007, 2010). Also, congruence is mostly inferred from the
Left-Right dimension, which may not reflect representation accurately, if we take
into account the transformations in the sphere of political parties over the last
years (Dalton 2017b).
Over the past decades there has been a decline in participation rates and an
increase in electoral volatility. At the same time, the structure of political com-
petition became more complex (Dalton 2017b). There are new issues entering
the political agenda and new parties emerging, that try to engage the floating
voters. Thomassen (2012) raises this issue of the blind corner of representation,
discussing how the new cultural and social issues are not properly represented
by the Left-Right dimension. While the link between parties and voters is me-
diated by partisan identifications, the issues on which parties are differentiating
themselves play an important role. If the party identification does not account
fully for the vote decision, we need a good assessment of what does. Assuming
that the new issues play this role, one needs to identify the issues that bear more
weight in the linkage between voters and parties.
This thesis examines whether a broader approach, one going beyond the under-
standing of the Left-Right dimension, can give a more complete understanding
of the contemporary process of representation, while accounting for institutional
designs, features of political parties, but also individual characteristics. This the-
sis looks at the general concept of political representation through the narrower
13
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term of issue congruence.
Societal transformations lead to the emergence of new issues. The new issues
that are pushed on the political agenda, such as the immigration or gender issues
(Dalton 1996), together with the new parties that bring them forward, are not
reflected on the Left-Right continuum. Taking these new issues into account, it
can tell a larger story and provide a better understanding of the representation
process. A cross-country comparison provides the right framework for analyzing
political representation based on issues. As Dalton (1985) points out, the results
of an analysis based on a single country would not be meaningful enough, because
there are too many issues and not enough parties.
One of the traditional approaches for measuring congruence require the citizens
to place themselves and the parties alongside an ideological continuum. Not
only is this a demanding exercise on the citizens’ part, but the positioning can
be inaccurate. Additionally, traditional surveys suffer from low response rates,
that affect the quality of the data they produce. Even more, young people
tend to be underrepresented, as well the supporters of small political parties.
Alternatively, political experts position the parties using party manifestos and
distribution of party votes. In a nutshell, data on parties’ and voters’ positions
are scarce and each approach has its limitations. The data generated through
two Voting Advice Applications for the election for the European Parliament
of 2009 and 2014, EU Profiler and EUvox, are advantageous to the study of
issue based congruence because the policy preferences of citizens and parties are
measured on the same scale, on a large set of issues.
However, the VAA data comes with a set of drawbacks, stemming from its online
nature. The data suffers from a self-selection bias; the profile of a VAA user
depicts a young, highly educated person who is also highly interested in politics.
As a result, the data is highly unrepresentative of the population at large and
any inferences must be treated with caution. The limitations of VAA data are
discussed extensively in section 3.6.
The effect of electoral systems on the number of parties, vote-seat disproportion-
ality, social representation and ideological congruence is well researched. The
matching of voters and parties on issues is mostly computed in analyses at sys-
14
1tem and party level, disregarding the processes at the individual level. VAA data
facilitates the study of individual level characteristics in relation to congruence.
This thesis contributes to the stream of research on political representation un-
derstood as congruence. There is an abundance of research on the consequences
of electoral systems on representation. Several authors discuss representation in
the context of congruence between the voters and parties. The broad literature
on representation makes use of different conceptualizations of congruence, based
on the underlying assumption of ideological distance between the citizen and
the representative. The measures of congruence vary from absolute to relative
measures (Golder & Stramski 2010). Few studies employ a relative measure of
congruence which provides, to some extent, a metric-free measure, allowing for
comparison between different units of analysis. Even fewer studies employ a
comparative perspective on congruence and electoral systems.
The strength of this work is that it draws upon the positions of both parties
and voters, instead of relying solely on voters’ perceptions regarding the party
positions. Furthermore, the nature of VAA generated data allows researchers to
measure congruence as a relative measure, which is one of the needed advances
in congruence studies. I will briefly touch upon this concept later in this intro-
ductory chapter, but a thorough explanation of the difference between absolute
and relative congruence will follow in chapter three. Issue congruence is defined
here as the degree of similarity between the preferences of prospective voters and
those of their most preferred party. Data for the degree of similarity is taken as
vote intention in the elections to the European Parliament of 2009 and 2014.
1.1.1 Contributions
The contributions made by this thesis are twofold: it addresses the ideological
versus issue congruence debate centered around measurement issues, and presents
a novel comparative approach to the study of representation focusing on the
individual level. The work stems from previous research on issue congruence in
a comparative context, carried out by Dalton (1985, 2017b). More specifically,
it employs the concept of congruence on issue dimensions on data generated
through VAAs.
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Comparative approach
While most studies on issue congruence focus on one or two countries, due to a
lack of data, this research takes a comparative approach, employing data from the
European Union member countries. The analysis conducted in this thesis offers a
comparative account of representation in European Union countries, offering two
snapshots of voter-party congruence, one in 2009 and the second in 2014. Due
to data constraints, most studies that look at representation as issue congruence
focus on one or two countries. One of the main limitations of using ideological
congruence is the lack of comparability, due to the fact that the political Left and
Right have different meanings across different electoral contexts (Belchior 2013).
Focusing on issue rather than ideological congruence allows for cross-country
comparisons, as the ambiguity of the Left-Right is no longer an issue.
Issue congruence
Rather then focusing on ideological congruence, I focus on issue congruence,
tackling the problem raised by Thomassen & Schmitt (1999), concerning the
blind spot of representation. They argue that the new societal changes are not
represented by the Left-Right dimension. An issue based approach addresses this
critique.
Issue dimensions
Furthermore, rather than investigating congruence issue by issue, measures of
congruence are created for policy dimensions, namely the economy, social issues
and the EU. Additionally, rather than measuring issue congruence issue by issue
(Lax & Phillips 2012), the issues are compiled into issue dimensions, which offers
a new perpective on representation. The decision to compile the issues follows
the work of Dalton (1985), Dalton et al. (2000). As Dalton (1985, 2017b) shown,
the voter party congruence varies not only across parties, but also across issue
domains.
Absolute citizen and relative measures of congruence
Another important contribution concerns the measure of congruence employed.
The most popular approach for assessing congruence is to compute it as an ab-
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1solute value, but recent studies show that employing a relative measure.1 yields
different results. For that reason, I use both an absolute and a relative measure,
contributing to the debate raised by Golder & Stramski (2010) Given the com-
parative nature of the analysis, a relative measure of congruence is the preferred
approach. Employing a relative measure helps to overcome one of the major
setbacks of the Left-Right dimension: the ambiguity of the concept and the dif-
ferent meanings it carries across different contexts, that causes serious problems
when cross-country comparisons are made.
Individual level predictors
Last but not least, this thesis focuses on an analysis of individual characteristics
as predictors of congruence. With the exception of one study (Walgrave & Lefe-
vere 2013), studies of political representation focus on system and party level
determinants, neglecting the characteristics of individuals.
With most of the studies focusing on a single level of explanation, such as the
features of parties or party systems, there is a lack of scholarly literature on
congruence dealing with voter characteristics with the exception of Walgrave
& Lefevere (2013). This thesis concentrates on the individual level, as it is
an understudied area in congruence studies. As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013)
correctly point out, tackling the puzzle of representation at the voter level may
represent the best strategy, because it is the voter who tries to match her policy
preferences to a particular party.
The research is carried out by analyzing the impact of predictors at three levels of
analysis. At the political system level, I study the features of the electoral system,
such as polarization, the effective number of parties, district magnitude, dispro-
portionality and the status of the democracy, as an old or new one, in relation to
issue congruence. At the party level, the focus switches to the status of the party
as centrist, niche or mainstream, governmental or non-governmental, whilst ac-
counting for the election cycle. At the individual level, level of political interest,
education and demographic information such as age and gender is analyzed. I
hypothesize that countries with a higher degree of proportional representation,
polarization, number of political parties and higher district magnitudes possess
1Argued as being superior
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higher levels of congruence (see chapter 5). Furthermore, I will test whether
centrist, niche and high governmental status parties have higher levels of con-
gruence with their supporters, while controlling for the election cycle(see chapter
6). Finally, the expectation is that increased education and interest in politics
are positively associated with congruence (see chapter 7).
These hypotheses are tested using data generated by the 2009 EU Profiler and
2014 EUvox, two voting advice applications (VAAs) developed for European
parliament elections. These data are ideal for the measurement and comparison
of congruence in relation to issue policies across European democracies. Unlike
most comparative studies that assess congruence with the help of Left-Right
scale, this thesis employs a proximity-oriented logic and calculates the match
between the citizens and their most preferred party based on a series of 28,
respectively 22 political statements. VAAs generate large amounts of data on
their users’ political preferences, data that can be then used in tackling questions
regarding the quality of representation beyond ideological congruence, having
users and parties measured on the same scale.
1.1.2 About the data
Traditional survey methods, such as RDD (random digit dialing), have experi-
enced an increasingly steep decline in response rates, due to the public’s reluc-
tance to answer phone surveys and new methods of screening unsolicited calls
(Wang et al. 2014). The low response rates in the traditional survey meth-
ods means that even if the original pool of respondents was representative of
the population at large, those who end up participating in the survey might
not be (Wang et al. 2014) and the data would need post-stratification adjust-
ments. Consequently, it will not come as a surprise that the popularity of online
samples has increased over the last years. With proper statistical adjustments,
non-representative data can resemble a representative sample. As a consequnece,
researchers can turn to other sources of data, often times non-representative ones,
such as the VAA.
VAA generated data is best suited for the analysis of political preferences. It
is the only source of data that has citizens and parties expressing their political
preferences across the same items, on the same scale. VAA generated data of-
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1fers information on 30 policy issues, including the economic issues that usually
belong to the Left-Right dimension. Additionally, it includes GAL-TAN issues.
Therefore, it is possible to measure congruence on a wider range of issues, con-
tributing to a more reliable measure of issue congruence. Another major benefit
of this approach is that while citizens place themselves on the issues, they do not
place the parties. The parties are coded by a team of political experts, which
potentially adds more validity to party placements. Rather than considering
the representation only from the perspective of individual citizens, this approach
tries to eliminate some of the bias inherent in congruence studies.
The data on which this research is based was generated by two Voting Advice
Applications, developed for the elections to the European Parliament of 2009 and
2014, EU Profiler and EUvox. As briefly stated above, VAA data provides an
excellent ground for the study of political representation understood as congru-
ence. While previous work largly dealt with a single level of explanation, system
or party level, VAA data brings an important contribution, by recording individ-
ual characteristics. Therefore, in addition to testing for the effect of predictors
at the electoral system and party level, we are able to test for individual level
predictors.
Although VAA generated data suffers from socio-demographic bias, being con-
centrated on young, highly educated individuals, living in urban areas, it holds a
significant advantage, having a high number of users. The large amount of users
allow researchers to systematically study small social groups. Furthermore, it
reaches groups such as young people or niche party supporters, who are not
easily accessible through traditional surveys.
An additional bias produced by VAA respondents is the high level of political
interest. Being more interested in politics, it is very likely they are more knowl-
edgeable about politics and therefore more likely to be familiar with the party
they intend to vote for. High levels of congruence in a certain electoral setting
may not reflect the truth, due to the fact that the analysis focuses on individuals
with high levels of education and political interest, from urban areas. The bias
inherent in the VAA data will be tackled in the research design chapter.
In a nutshell, this thesis offers a cross-country analysis of political representation
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in the European Union democracies. The analyses will be carried out at political
system, party and individual levels respectively.
1.1.3 Structure of the thesis
The introductory chapter continues the literature review of approaches to the
study of political representation, and on assessing political representation through
congruence. This is followed by a section on Voting Advice Application, in which
the potential held by VAA data is discussed. The chapter ends with a section
on assessing issue congruence with VAA generated data.
The second chapter develops the ideas laid out in the introductory chapter, refer-
ring to the recent debates in congruence studies on which this thesis is built, then
proceeds by presenting the main theoretical approaches to the study of political
representation, such as the focus on citizen’s votes versus citizens’ preferences,
and the ideological versus issue congruence debate. The last three sections focus
on electoral system, party characteristics and individual level predictors of con-
gruence. Each section includes a review of the most relevant studies in the field
of issue congruence, the context to the current research, and finally the working
hypotheses are explained.
The third chapter discusses the research design. I discuss the methods employed
and the data used. The most substantial part of this chapter is dedicated to
the central element of the thesis - issue congruence, with subsections explaining
the conceptualization and measurement of congruence in representation studies.
This is followed by a description of the conceptualization and measurement of
congruence using VAA data. The approaches taken to measure congruence, the
absolute citizen and the relative one are presented, emphasizing the advantages
and disadvantages of each. After introducing the measures of congruence, I clus-
ter the issues into issue dimensions. The next section focuses on instrumentation
and measures, where the predictors used to test the hypothesis are explained.
The chapter ends by addressing the validity and limitations of VAA data, briefly
touched upon in the introductory chapter. The fourth chapter is the first of three
empirical chapters, focusing on system level predictors of congruence. The fifth
chapter is centered around party characteristics in relation to issue congruence.
The third and last empirical chapter addresses individual level characteristics,
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1furthering the discussion about the importance of issue congruence and issue di-
mensions. The seventh chapter is dedicated to conclusions, limitations and plans
for further research.
1.2 Studying political representation
Political representation lays at the heart of any democratic process (Dalton 1985).
To assess the well functioning of a democracy, we need to have a good under-
standing of the underpinnings of the representation process.
Huber & Powell (1994) provide an overview of political representation, empha-
sizing the distinction between the popular (Dahl 2000) and elitist (Schumpeter
1942) views of democracy. The former argues that one the main objectives of
a democratic system is the accurate representation of citizens’ interests. The
role of representatives is to facilitate citizens’ demands as much as possible. On
the contrary, the elitist viewpoint argues that political representation is a means
for selecting and controlling politicians (Peffley & Rohrschneider 2007). Popu-
lar control is restricted, in order to allow expert politicians to make competent
decisions. Accordingly, citizen control is restricted to selecting representatives,
without a say in agenda setting or the policy implementation process. This
thesis supports the popular view of democracy, in which politicians follow citi-
zens’ preferences, contributing to the improvement of the quality of democratic
performance.
Dyadic versus collective representations
The vast literature on political representation accommodates a series of ap-
proaches for studying the matching between citizens and political elites. Early
research on political representation focused on the dyadic opinion-policy rela-
tionship (Miller & Stokes 1963), which assessed congruence as the relationship
between the mean constituency opinion and a single representatives. Later, the
focus shifted to collective representation, where congruence was measured as
the relationship between the mean constituency opinion and multiple legislators
(Weissberg 1978, Dalton 1985).
Static versus dynamic
Up until this point, the studies of political representation presented a rather static
21
Introduction
perspective; later studies identified a dynamic in the relationship between public
opinion and policy (Stimson et al. 1995, Wlezien 1995, 1996). The dynamic
approach is based on the idea that the responsiveness of policy makers to the
public demands lays at the core of representation. Easton (1979) argues that
the government’s policy responsiveness is marked by change and therefore what
one should look at is dynamic representation rather than static, measured at one
point in time. Responsiveness has been defined as representatives acting in the
benefit of the represented (Pitkin 1967), when governments form and implement
the policies citizens want, creating a chain of responsiveness (Powell 2004).
Institutional dimensions versus roll call studies
Another tradition in representation studies focuses on institutional dimensions
and roll call behaviour studies. Institutional design features such as electoral
formulae, the size of the parliament and the frequency of elections are scruti-
nized as influencing political representation at the institutional level (Cox 1997,
Lijphart 1990, Rae 1967). More recent studies adopted a comparative approach
in studying political representation, revealing that government responsiveness is
moderated by institutional designs (Golder & Stramski 2010, Huber & Powell
1994, Powell 2006, Bingham Powell Jr 2009, Blais & Bodet 2006).
The other stream of research relies on the translation of citizens’ preferences
into laws (Clinton 2006, Weissberg 1978, Converse & Pierce 1986, Barabas et al.
2011). The roll call behavior studies cover the area of political representation
dealing with which types of laws are voted for, what the representative does inside
the parliament (voted in support or against a law), and what the representative
stands for. These studies touch upon the social and symbolic dimensions of
representation.
As Golder & Stramski (2007) argue, it is possible to think of representation
as having two components, responsiveness and congruence. Responsiveness de-
scribes dynamic representation, while congruence is a static concept. This thesis
follows a static representation approach, investigating how parties match their
stances on issues with the political preferences of their supporters. As mentioned
earlier, I analyze two snapshots of representation in European Union countries,
one in 2009 and another in 2014. To some extent, this allows to observe change
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1in the patterns of political representation.
Golder & Stramski (2007) make a salient point about the conceptualization of
congruence. They argue that to a large extent, existing studies of representation
‘fail to address how ideological congruence is most appropriately conceptualized
given their research goals’. They identify that often times, the conceptualization
of congruence is driven by data availability and convention (Golder & Stramski
2007). In this thesis, congruence is a measure of how accurately the voters’
preferences are mirrored by the political parties they intend to vote for. There
are multiple ways of looking at representation. In what follows, I will present
different conceptualizations of congruence and the arguments for the approach
used in this thesis.
1.2.1 Conceptualizing congruence
In its most basic form, congruence can be assessed as the distance between
a citizen and her representative (Dalton 1985, Thomassen & Andeweg 2004),
where the representative can be a candidate, a political party, a member of the
parliament or a member of the government. For explanatory purposes only, the
term ‘representative’ is used to illustrate all of the above. In what follows, the
types of congruence identified in the scholarly literature are discussed, which will
help to build the argument around conceptualizing congruence as a many-to-one
relationship.
To start with, it is important to distance congruence from the dyadic and collec-
tive representation. These types of representation look at the mean constituency
opinion, with dyadic representation looking at the relationship between the mean
constituency opinion and a single representative. Contrastingly, collective rep-
resentation assesses the mean constituency opinion on one side, and multiple
representatives on the other side.
In accordance with Golder & Stramski (2010, p. 90), one can think about con-
gruence in the following ways: as the relationship between a single citizen and
a single representative (a one-to-one relationship), many citizens and a single
representative (many-to-one relationship), and finally, many citizens and many
representatives (many-to-many relationship) (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Conceptualization of Congruence, Golder and Stramski (2010)
One-to-one
A one-to-one relationship illustrates the most simple type of congruence, as the
absolute distance between the positions of the citizen and of the representative.
Being a proximity measure, as the distance between the two gets smaller, the
congruence increases. Although from the citizen’s perspective this is the most
important type of congruence, Golder & Stramski (2010, p. 44) argue that this
way of conceptualizing congruence is not very useful, because the representative
has to mirror the preferences of more than one citizen, aiming for the democratic
ideal of equal representation. However, as Golder & Stramski (2007) say, it is a
great building block for the next conceptualization of congruence.
Many-to-one
A many-to-one relationship is the most popular method of assessing ideolog-
ical congruence in American and comparative studies of representation. This
relationship can be interpreted as a relationship between many citizens and one
representative, for example between many citizens and a government. This type
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1of congruence can be conceptualized in three different ways: as absolute median
citizen congruence, absolute citizen congruence, and relative citizen congruence.
The absolute median citizen congruence focuses on the most preferred policy
position among citizens. It minimizes the sum of absolute distances between
citizens, and in a one dimensional space, it is the median, not the mean position.
The disadvantage of this approach is that by focusing on the median citizen, the
information about the distribution of the citizens preferences is ignored.
The absolute citizen congruence looks at the average absolute distance between
all citizens and the representative. It takes into account the ideological positions
of all the citizens, not just the median citizen. Currently, only two studies, Blais
& Bodet (2006) and Golder & Stramski (2010) use this conceptualization that
has origins in the work of Achen (1977). Although there are sources of data
that could enable the application of this conceptualization, (such as World Value
Survey, European Value Survey, Eurobarometer), the most common practice is
to use the information on citizens’ political attitudes solely for assessing the
position of the median citizen.
Lastly, relative citizen congruence looks at the distance between citizens and
the representative.2 relative to the dispersion of citizen preferences (Golder &
Stramski 2010) The conceptualization of relative citizen congruence is most ap-
propriate when comparing congruence across different units of analysis, such as
countries. While absolute citizen congruence is appropriately used only when
the Left-Right dimension is perceived in the same manner across the units of
analysis, relative congruence is a metric free concept, discarding the use of an
abstract Left-Right scale. Most of the comparative studies on congruence, with
the exception of Blais & Bodet (2006), Golder & Stramski (2007), which focus
on the position of the median citizen, do not capture substantive differences
within the Left-Right scale across different countries. Golder & Stramski (2010)
make a good case for the use of a relative measure of congruence, compared to
absolute median citizen and absolute citizen congruence, while concluding that
scholars need to justify the conceptualizations they use, and to provide robust-
ness checks by testing alternative conceptualizations. More recently, Giger &
Lefkofridi (2014) used Golder & Stramski’s (2010) conceptualization, building
2Which can be a government or a political party
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a salience-based measure of congruence to represent the individual distance be-
tween a citizen and the party the citizen voted for, measured on the Left-Right
dimension.
Many-to-many
Many-to-many is the relationship between many citizens and many representa-
tives. While the previous two types of relationships centered on one actor, the
legislator or the government, here the focus is on the collective body of repre-
sentatives. To my knowledge, this approach was employed only by Golder &
Stramski (2007).
Golder & Stramski (2010) offer an exhaustive conceptualization of congruence,
presenting the advantages and disadvantages of every approach. After reviewing
different conceptualizations, I argue for the measure put forward in this thesis,
which is a many-to-one measure of congruence. As shown above, under the many-
to-one conceptualization there are three different ways of measuring congruence.
In this thesis, I will use both the absolute citizen and the relative approaches of
measuring congruence. Although the different conceptualizations of congruence
presented above focus on ideological congruence, the reasoning behind them can
be applied to issue congruence as well. The methodological chapter has a section
dedicated to the measure of congruence, where I review the main approaches
of assessing congruence and reiterate the choice for an absolute citizen and a
relative congruence measure, conceptualized as a many-to-one relationship.
The VAA generated data offers information on the political preferences of cit-
izens and the positions of parties measured on the same policy issues, on the
same scale. This allows one to employ absolute citizen and relative congruence
measures. By using issues, and not positioning on an ideological continuum,
the limitations associated with the the Left-Right dimension are avoided. While
scholars of ideological congruence looked at the position of the government or of
the legislators during the electoral cycle, in this study the focus is on the polit-
ical parties. The analyses in this study are based on an individual measure of
congruence: the distance between each VAA user and its most preferred party.
These analyses employ both absolute citizen and a relative congruenceapproach.
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11.2.2 Ideological versus issue congruence
Powell (2000) argues that the electoral choices are not accurate reflections of
voters’ preferences. This is due to the fact that electoral choices are shaped and
constrained by the electoral system. When casting a vote for a particular party,
there is no credible way to say whether the party represents the voter’s political
preferences. The voter may vote for the party only because it is “the best of
unpalatable alternatives or as a nearly random pick among equally desirable
parties” (Powell 2000, p. 161). Furthermore, voting choices do not indicate how
a voter relates to the other parties competing in a election. In the absence of
this information, even in majoritarian systems, the representatives should be
skeptical about their representativeness upon the plurality.
In the pursuit of a more direct measure of citizens’ preferences, a “substantive
correspondence”, Powell (2000) uses the concept of “representational congru-
ence”, measured as the self-placement on the Left-Right scale. The decision to
use the Left-Right scale is based on the assumption that in most modern democ-
racies, the Left and Right represent a unidimensional discourse, familiar to voters
and elites. The Left-Right continuum proved to be effective in assimilating the
political stances and reducing them to a single dimension, transforming it into
the most widely available method for measuring citizens’ preferences (Powell
2000, p. 162). This concept, however, has a series of shortcomings, which I will
address in section ”From ideological to issue congruence”, in chapter three. In
Powell’s concept of “representational congruence”, elections are efficient tools for
democracy when the governing parties are close to the citizens on the Left-Right
dimension. Conversely, the further away from the positions of citizens, the less
efficient elections are in generating representational congruence.
Focusing on the role of political parties, Dalton (1985) examined the process of
political representation, looking for evidence of voter-party agreement. While
the best single measure of voter-party correspondence proved to be based on the
comparison of self-placements on the Left-Right scale, his results give a more
complex story. Comparing the opinions of parties and voters on 40 party dyads,
Dalton (1985) found out that in some instances the correspondence is stronger
than in other. For example, voters and parties were closer on matters related to
economic and security issues, but further apart on the topic of foreign policy. Re-
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examining the hypotheses developed in his earlier work, (Dalton 1985), Dalton
(2017b) has shown that while being closer to their voters on economic issues,
parties do less well when it comes to cultural issues, such as immigration and
gender policy.
While both studies presented above discuss congruence between citizens and their
representatives, the approaches they take are different. Powell (2000) focuses on
ideological congruence, while Dalton (1985) focuses on issue congruence. In what
follows, I will focus on the differentiation between the two, building the argument
for the approach I follow, namely issue congruence.
In the long line of representation studies, scholars have used two methods to as-
sess the similarities between the political preferences of citizens and those of their
representatives. One approach requires that the policy preferences of citizens and
elites are being summarized by ideology scores. Alternatively, this relationship is
assessed by comparing the citizens’ views and the representatives’ positions issue
by issue. Most often, issue congruence is assessed as a distance measure between
the position of the voter and that of the representative. In line with Broockman
(2015), I argue that the former approach is fundamentally flawed. Broockman
(2015) builds his critique around the idea that ideology scores are misinterpreted
as summaries of policy preferences, when in fact they measure consistency.
Another caveat of using ideology in representation studies is that one does not
know the latent mapping from the diffuse measure represented by ideology to
the actual policy choice (Lax & Phillips 2012). The wide use of ideology in
responsiveness studies is explained by the scholarly assumption that asking voters
to define policy preferences is too demanding, but also because of the lack of
comparable data on voters’ preferences. The section on VAA data in the research
design chapter touches upon this issue.
The first approach employs a measure of ideology (Broockman 2015), which mis-
interprets the ideological positioning as a summary of policy preferences. More
exactly, the issue positions are summarized by a point on a scale (i.e. Left-Right,
liberal-conservative) (Bafumi & Herron 2010, Bonica 2013, Caughey & Warshaw
2014, Rogowski & Tucker 2014). In the second approach, the relationship is as-
sessed on multiple issues, one issue at a time (Lax & Phillips 2012, Canes-Wrone
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1& Shotts 2004, Gilens & Page 2014). The main challenge to the ideological ap-
proach is that in reality, it captures the ‘degree of ideological consistency across
policy domains [...] but says little about citizens’ views within domains, on issue
themselves’ (Broockman 2015, p. 2).
For a better understanding of consistency of views within and across resdomains,
one can imagine the use of an ideological scale. Usually, the scale is constructed
from multiple binary answers to survey questions for voters, and roll call be-
haviour for elites; an extreme position can be achieved if the voter (representa-
tive) gives extreme answers, on the same extremity (i.e. only leftist positions).
When the answers are extreme on both sides (i.e. both on extreme left and
extreme right), the voter (representative) receives a score at the middle of the
ideological scale. Therefore, someone with extreme views is labeled as a moder-
ate, a representation which is far from reality (for a more detailed explanation,
see Broockman 2015). However, a voter or representative who takes extreme po-
sitions is not ideologically extreme, she is ideologically consistent. Accordingly,
a voter or representative who gives answers on both extremes is not ideologically
moderate, she is ideologically mixed (Broockman 2015). Therefore, what one
measures with this approach is ideological consistency rather than ideology per
se.
Based on the ideological approach, it is assumed that voters do not have distinct
views on distinct policies other than what their ideologies prescribe. Accordingly,
inferences about a voter or a representative can be drawn using a score attained
from an ideological scale. Broockman (2015) shows that most of the studies
of political representation use this measure of ideology, which in fact measures
ideological consistency. His main argument is that, as illustrated above, an ideo-
logical scale does not capture accurately views on individual policies. Following
this line of reasoning, the results of the studies on political representation can
be significantly distorted (Broockman 2015, p. 29).
To date, the correlation between voter ideology and aggregated state policy is
the dominant approach in the studies of policy responsiveness (Lax & Phillips
2012). Erikson et al. (1993) were the first to argue that policy and ideology
lack a common metric. Consequently, one cannot know exactly how preferences
should ideally translate into policies. Furthermore, the focus on ideology-policy
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correlation does not allow for insights into whether representatives are responsive
on specific policies, not only at the aggregated level. Although policy responsive-
ness and congruence are both forms of political representation, they represent
different dimensions of democratic performance (Lax & Phillips 2012). All these
aspects need to be carefully considered when dealing with issue congruence as a
means to assess political representation.
A differentiation between responsiveness and congruence is necessary. Although
both are forms of policy representation, they refer to slightly different phenom-
ena. According to Lax & Phillips (2012), responsiveness captures a positive cor-
relation between opinion and policy, while congruence reflects whether policies
match the opinion of the majority. More importantly, the presence of respon-
siveness does not necessarily imply congruence.
The last argument I present that supports my choice to use issue congruence,
and probably the most important one, was put forward by Thomassen (2012).
He cautioned the representation scholars about the so called ‘blind corner’ of
representation. He argues that the assumption on which most of the congruence
studies are based is flawed, assuming that ‘representativeness on the Left-Right
dimension automatically implies representativeness on a range of other issues’.
The evidence for this argument derives from the emergence of new issues, cultural
and social, that do not follow Left-Right lines. Thomassen’s (2012) argument
complements one of the arguments brought as a motivation for this study: namely
that as the political spectrum expands, with new issues brought up by societal
changes, these issues do not fit into the Left-Right dimension.
The congruence studies in the tradition of Miller & Stokes (1963), Converse
& Pierce (1986), Kitschelt (1999) look at the similarities between the values
and preferences of citizens and those of their representatives. Here, political
representation is seen as a mirroring of citizens’ preferences. With one noticeable
exception (Converse & Pierce 1986), most research focuses on one dimension of
political representation, acknowledging that one component cannot characterize
the whole process of representation.
This thesis adopts a similar position. Although political representation cannot
be fully captured in the comparison between citizens’ and representatives’ prefer-
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1ences, it tells us something about the quality of democracy and the way in which
citizens’ preferences are mirrored by the political agenda (Kitschelt 1999, Roberts
2009). Assessing political representation through issue congruence creates an im-
age that reflects citizens’ preferences, rather than limiting representation at the
effects of institutional designs. Nonetheless, it offers a more substantive and
transparent measure. Kitschelt (2000) brings an important critique to this ap-
proach, arguing that the focus on issues implies a programmatic assessment of
political parties that citizens may find difficult to make. However, the data used
in this thesis, solves this critique because citizens do not place the parties on
policies, experts do.
In this thesis, congruence is used as a means of assessing political representa-
tion, as a many-to-one type of relationship. This is issue congruence and not
ideological congruence. Additionally, congruence is assessed by using two ap-
proaches, influenced by a debate in the recent studies of representation (Golder
& Stramski 2010). In addition to assessing an absolute measure of congruence, a
relative measured is also used. Golder & Stramski (2010) argue that while abso-
lute congruence can be assessed only when the Left-Right dimension is perceived
similarly across all contexts, the measure of relative congruence avoids the use
of an abstract scale (i.e. the Left-Right scale), providing a metric-free measure
of congruence (Golder & Stramski 2010). However, given that it is an issue con-
gruence I focus on rather an ideological one, and because the issues are the same
across countries, the the decision to use an absolute measure in a comparative
analysis does not compromise the results of this research.
Eulau & Wahlke (1978) warned the scholars of political representation that the
concept of representation should not be reduced to issue congruence. The concept
of political representation is more complex than a simple comparison between the
preferences of citizens and those of their representatives. While acknowledging
and subscribing to this view, I argue that the snapshots of congruence selected in
this research tell us something about the quality of representation and the quality
of democracy. Furthermore, by looking at issue congruence on issue domains we
get insights into how on citizens receive an unbalanced amount of representation
on different issues.
In addition to the arguments brought forward above, that make a strong case for
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the use of issue congruence over ideological congruence, timeliness needs to be
considered. With new issues entering the political agenda, we ought to pay more
attention to the extent to which issues are mirrored by the policies on offer.
I will revisit this argument in the next chapter of the thesis. Before addressing
this, VAAs will be introduced, not only as the source of data used in this work,
but as an imminent integrated part of the election process, and as an aid for
finding representation. Or at least an aid in identifying the party that matches
the voter’s political preferences.
1.3 VAAs and their place in voting behaviour studies
One of the reasons for the success of VAAs over recent years identified by Mair
(2002) is the increased number of floating voters who need guidance throughout
the electoral process, together with the increased political offer. Contemporary
electoral research, which is “increasingly eclectic and opportunistic” (Bartels
2008, p. 29) accommodates VAAs, in an effort of gaining a better understanding
of voters’ behaviour. In what follows, I will discuss how VAAs fit in within
the issue voting approach and how they are an appropriate tool to study issue
congruence.
1.3.1 Issue voting and VAAs
Issue competition depicts party competition on the issues which dominate the
political agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007). The decline in social-structural vot-
ing, mainly class voting (Thomassen 2005) and an increase in electoral volatility
(Mair 2002) are two recurring findings of recent voting literature on Western
Europe. Issue voting was identified as a replacement for social-structural vot-
ing (Mair 2002). Issue competition is characterized by political parties that put
an emphasis on certain issues, with the ultimate goal of dominating the elec-
toral competition, on topics such as economic, environment or migration issues.
Nevertheless, issue competition does not mean that political parties select a par-
ticular issue and put emphasis solely on that issue, at the expense of other issues.
Rather, each party aims to bring their most salient issue to the middle of the
electoral competition, in the aim of forcing their political opponents to take a
stance in regard to those particular issues. Furthermore, the proponents of VAAs
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1argue that these tools affect political parties, by ‘forcing’ them to adopt positions
on issues previously ignored or even avoided (De Graaf 2010).
Before issue competition, the positional competition dominated the electoral
competition. Positional competition implies that parties take different positions
alongside a pre-given policy dimension, such as the Left-Right scale dimension,
dominated by economic issues (Downs 1957). Positional and issue competition
may be closely related, but despite their possible connections, one must treat
them separately (Green-Pedersen 2007).
Together with party identification, policy preferences are among the most studied
determinants of vote choice (Highton 2011). In order for citizens’ policy prefer-
ences to influence their vote decision, there is a need for variation in the policy
alternatives offered (Campbell 1969). Furthermore, larger policy and ideological
divides increase the likelihood that policy preferences are expected to count in
determining the vote choice (Highton 2011). In other words, issue voting implies
that citizens’ vote are determined by the proximity between their own position
and the positions of the parties that compete in the electoral contest.
Issue voting requires that voters have well defined policy preferences, that parties
offer policy alternatives, but also have the ability to link their position to the po-
sition of the parties standing for elections (Garzia 2010). The recommendations
provided by VAA tool cover the last part, which is the most difficult for voters.
More specifically, the algorithms incorporated in the VAA tool calculates the
distance between the issue position of both the user and the parties, providing
the link between the two.
During election times, voters are faced with the difficult task of weighting parties’
stances on different policy issues in order to reach a decision. The difficulty in
decision making is due to the fact that most of the voters are ill-informed about
the exact positions of parties on political matters. As a consequence, voters as
bounded rational citizens (Simon 1985) rely on information which is offered by
mass media through agenda setting (Bartels 1993). VAAs are campaigning tools
that eliminate the cost of information, and offer a tailored advice, simulating
the context of full information. The growing importance of issue voting (Dalton
1996, Franklin et al. 2009) following Downs’s (1957) spatial model, where every
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policy can be placed on a Left-Right continuum, is accommodated by VAAs
(Cedroni & Garzia 2010).
As stressed above, in order for issue voting to be meaningful, voters need to
have clear issue preferences, parties need to compete over the same policy issues
(Petrocik & Verba 1979) and voters have to be able to identify their position
relative to the position of parties (Butler & Stoke 1974). VAAs help voters to
make more informed political decisions. It also lowers the costs of information,
by presenting to the voter the parties’ position on salient policy positions. This
is achieved by comparing the position of the user with the position of the parties,
and presenting the user with a rank-order list of parties, following an algorithm
and proximity logic (Cedroni & Garzia 2010).
A great part of research on the effects of campaign information on vote choice
deals with how the information is received and processed by the voter during
electoral campaigns. There are two categories of actors involved: the supply
side, including political parties and candidates; and the demand side, represent-
ing the voters. Information is generated by the supply side, directly, through
political campaigns, party platforms, political programs, and indirectly, for ex-
ample through mass media and social interactions. Processing this information
can help the voter to make an informed vote choice.
VAAs belong to the latter category, generating information through indirect
mechanisms. The novelty of VAAs is lays in the type of information they provide,
which is tailored made for each VAA user (Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil
2014). In summary, VAAs produce a customized portrayal of the political supply,
generating information that is easy to process, lowering the costs of information.
1.3.2 The research potential of VAAs
The field of VAA research is dominated by case studies (Cedroni & Garzia 2010).
Although offering valuable insights and detailed analyses of specific electoral con-
texts, the empirical findings of these case studies are limited to the particularities
of different national settings.The case studies are also limited by the varying VAA
usage patterns and a range of methodological settings. The expansion of VAAs
as campaigning tools generated a new area of research, but the growing field
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1of VAA literature does not benefit from a well structured corpus. Triga et al.
(2012) and Marschall & Garzia (2014) identified two major axes around which
the VAA literature is clustered, one related to the design of the tool, the second
one related to the effects that VAAs have on their users.
The first axis focuses on issues related to the design of VAAs. Among the method-
ological aspects there are statement selection (Baka et al. 2012, Gemenis 2012,
Nuytemans et al. 2010, Walgrave, Nuytemans & Pepermans 2009), methods used
for coding the parties (Gemenis 2013, Krouwel et al. 2012, Krouwel & van El-
frinkhof 2014, Trechsel & Mair 2011, Wagner & Ruusuvirta 2009). The design of
VAAs also involves further methodological considerations such as the type and
scales used in answer categories, calculation methods used (Louwerse & Rosema
2014, Mendez 2012) and the organization of media campaigns (C¸arkog˘lu et al.
2012).
The second axis concerns the analysis of VAA-generated data, which includes
an analysis of the following: profile of VAA users (Hooghe & Teepe 2007, Wall
et al. 2009), the effects on information, mobilization and participation of users
(Gemenis & Rosema 2014, Marschall & Schmidt 2010), the effects on the process
of opinion formation and impact on vote choice (Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil
2014, Andreadis et al. 2013, Ladner, Fivaz & Pianzola 2010, Ladner et al. 2012,
Pianzola & Ladner 2011, Marschall & Schultze 2012, Ruusuvirta & Rosema 2009,
Wall et al. 2014), the ideological profile of the parties or candidates and party
mapping (Wagner & Ruusuvirta 2012, Wheatley 2012) and the logic of electoral
competition (Ramonaite 2010).
More recently, the proliferation of these campaigning tools led scholars towards a
new approach VAA research, focusing on their potential as data sources (Garzia
& Marschall 2016), which entails a third stream of research. This stream of
work follows a twofold categorization, with studies focusing on political parties,
more generally, and other studies focusing on political representation. The first
category includes literature which focuses on identifying political dimensions in
various party systems (Wheatley 2012, Burean & Popp 2015). The second cat-
egory includes studies that use VAA generated data to look at representation,
starting with Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil’s (2014) ‘representative deficit’.
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This thesis fits into the second category and complements recent work of Al-
varez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil (2014), Garzia et al. (2014), Bright et al. (2014)
on political representation. In the next section I will present the concept of rep-
resentative deficit, followed by a brief introduction to the measures of absolute
citizen and relative congruence that forms the subject of this research.
1.3.3 The representative deficit as a measure of issue congruence
Employing data collected through EU Profiler, the first pan-European VAA,
developed for the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, Alvarez, Levin,
Trechsel & Vassil (2014) introduced the concept of “representative deficit”. Al-
varez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil (2014) assess representative deficit as the differ-
ence between the user’s issue position and the highest VAA-ranked party, on a
100 point scale (lower the deficit, higher the representation).
The representative deficit captures the part of a user’s political preferences which
are not reflected by any party in the electoral contest. It can also be interpreted
as a measure of satisfaction with the political system and its offerings.
The concept of representative deficit gained momentum in the VAA field (Al-
varez, Levin, Mair & Trechsel 2014, Bright et al. 2014, Dinas et al. 2014, Garzia
et al. 2014). Garzia et al. (2014, p. 32) point out that the representative deficit
theory “does not only help to explain the switching of party preferences after
exposure to VAAs, but can also account for changing patterns of mobilization
at the individual level”. Therefore, representative deficit can help answer some
important questions about the political behavior of VAA users. The main ad-
vantage of the measure of representative deficit is the overview on the quality of
representation it provides, as the overlap between the demand and supply side
of the electoral market (Alvarez, Levin, Mair & Trechsel 2014).
The studies mentioned above make use of the concept of representative deficit
in different ways, namely as an overview on the quality of representation, or
as a predictor of the effects VAA tools have on their users. The concept of
representative deficit is by all means, a measure of congruence, or more precisely
of incongruence.
Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil (2014) tested whether the effect of VAAs on
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1users’ behaviour is dependent on representative deficit. More specifically, they
hypothesize that in a two-party system, the probability for an overlap between
the propensity-to-vote (PTV) and the VAA output is higher. In a multi-party
system, it is posited that the probability of a mismatch between the PTV and
the VAA output increases. Their results suggest that there is a strong relation-
ship between the number of parties and the probability of a congruent outcome.
The logic applied is a numeric one; a small number of parties create higher
probabilities that the PTV will match the VAA advice.
Contrary to Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil (2014), I argue that what matters
is the number of viable options the user possessed to match her preferences with.
A higher number of options would ensure that voters find a party that best
represents their political preferences.
In order to introduce the concept of congruence measured with the help of VAA
generated data, this section offered an introduction to VAA tools and their users.
The concept of representative deficit was a starting point in developing the mea-
sures of congruence used in this work, but the approach I take is rather different,
as it will be explained in the next section.
1.3.4 Issue congruence assessed with the help of VAA data
The present study is accommodated by the third and newest stream of VAA
research, that treats VAAs as data sources. In what follows, I will briefly present
the measures of absolute citizen and relative congruence, which is the focus of
this thesis.
VAA data is the perfect data source for the study of political representation.
It is the only data source that assesses the political preferences of parties and
citizens on the same scale. As (Achen 1977) stated, the most important challenge
faced by congruence studies is the need to estimate the positions of citizens
and those of the representatives on the same scale. Bingham Powell Jr (2009)
takes this argument further, stressing the magnitude of the problem in cross-
national analyses of ideological congruence. The criticisms raised by both Achen
(1977) and Bingham Powell Jr (2009) do not represent a problem for the current
study, as the positions of VAA users and parties are assessed on the same scale
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and issue policies are similar across countries (28 for the 2009 EU Profiler and
22 for the 2014 EUvox). Even if different translations could lead to slightly
different meanings of the policy statements, congruence is assessed as a distance
measure, which addresses the potential problem of different meanings across
different contexts.
Congruence is assessed as the degree of matching of the political preferences
of citizens and the party they intend to vote for. The recent debate in the
representation studies in relation to measurement, stand behind the decision
to create both an absolute citizen and a relative measure of congruence. The
recent studies of Golder & Stramski (2010) and Blais & Bodet (2006) argue that
longstanding findings in the representation studies are due to methodological
decisions on measurement, and not all of these results hold when tested using
new measures of congruence.
The measure of absolute citizen congruence assesses congruence as the degree of
matching between a voter and the party she intends to vote for. The measure is
assessed at individual level, on a series of 28 and 22 policy statements, common
across European countries. Party and country congruence scores are obtained
by averaging over individual scores.
Relative congruence is measured based on the same principle, but takes into
account the distribution of scores for the whole base of party supporters. This
measure is assessed at the party level, then at the country level by averaging
party scores. A more detailed explanation on the measures of congruence is to
be found in the chapter on research design.
This chapter introduced the study that I will carry out in this thesis, its place
within the literature, and emphasized the scholarly debates that it tries to ad-
dress, together with the contribution it makes to the representation studies.
During the chapter, I highlighted the choice for issue congruence over ideological
congruence, together with the methodological considerations that contributed to
this decision. Voting Advice Applications were briefly introduced, as providing
a means to study issue congruence.
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11.4 Voting Advice Applications
1.4.1 What are Voting Advice Applications?
In the previous section I explained how VAA data can be used to tackle questions
about political representation, and more precisely, issue congruence. In this
section, I will provide a very brief outline on the development of VAAs. The
section starts with a description of VAAs and their users, followed by a discussion
about the role VAAs have as election tools, explaining how their role may differ
across countries and electoral systems.
Alongside with the development of the Internet, new communication and partic-
ipation tools have arisen. VAAs emerged in Western European democracies and
changed the patterns of political participation. VAAs appeared as paper-and-
pencil tests for first time voters, in the late 1980s (Ruusuvirta 2010, Gemenis
& Rosema 2014), but the online revolution boosted their usage, making them
available worldwide. In the last decade, millions of users accessed VAA sites
during elections. Initially implemented in the Netherlands, then Switzerland
and Germany, VAAs have taken Europe by storm. Nowadays, there is hardly a
European country without a VAA (exceptions are Malta and Slovenia (Garzia &
Marschall 2012). Their increased popularity transcended to European level, in
second-order elections, with the EU Profiler in 2009, euandi and EUvox in 2014
in the elections to the European parliament.
According to Walgrave et al. (2008), in 2007 there was at least one VAA in 15
countries out of the 22 they surveyed. In some countries, the number of VAA
users reached millions, with 4.7 million advice given by the Dutch StemWijzer
in 2006, and 6.7 million advices given by the German Wahl-O-Mat in 2009,
accounting for approximately 40 percent of the voting age population in the
Dutch case and 12 percent in the German one (Garzia 2010). Another successful
VAA example is represented by the Swiss smartvote, launched as an alternative
to Politarena, offering almost one million advices in 2007. Finland is another
example of the expansion of VAAs (Marschall & Garzia 2014). In 2007, 20
VAAs were available to Finish voters, with the most popular one giving over a
million advices (Ruusuvirta 2010). In light of these developments, almost all
European countries have VAA experience (Garzia & Marschall 2012). The VAA
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success transcended across the European borders, with election tools in the USA,
Egypt, Morocco or Iran, to mention just a few.
The increased popularity of VAAs is associated with the increasing number of
floating voters (Dalton et al. 2000, Mair 2002) as they need guidance throughout
the electoral process. The Netherlands is the best example of the transformation
from a ‘pillarized society’ (Lijphart 1968) to a volatile democracy (Mair 2002,
Van der Meer & Dekker 2011), which fostered the use of VAAs. In an elec-
toral system where the voting options available are increasing, the vote decision
becomes more difficult. It is in these systems where VAAs thrive.
1.4.2 Who are the VAA users?
The proliferation of the Internet led to significant changes in patterns of political
participation, making some political activities more readily available. Aided
by the Internet, political engagement and some forms of political participation
have known an increase (Norris 2000). This is true particularly for the younger
generation, who very regularly use the Internet. As mentioned above, high usage
of VAAs prompted many researchers to turn their attention towards these tools,
discovering the potential the VAA data holds. Naturally, much of VAA research
deals with the users and the characteristics they bear. The typical VAA user
tends to to be young, male, highly interested in politics and highly educated
(Marschall & Garzia 2014). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that VAA
users are better informed, therefore more likely to vote in elections, compared to
non-users Schultze (2014).
It comes at no surprise that VAA users are not representative of the electorate at
large. The bias in VAA data is explored in the sixth chapter of this thesis. VAA
scholars have devoted a lot of time and energy into adjusting the VAA sample
in order to resemble a nationally representative one (Andreadis 2014), but up to
date, there is no clear solution. Table 1 shows a crude comparison of demographic
information, comparing the 2009 EU Profiler with the 2009 European Voter
Study (part of the European Election Study). The latter contains representative
samples of voters from EU countries.
While part of the scholarship on electoral behavior continued the race after causal
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1Table 1: 2009 EU Profiler - 2009 European Voter Study
2009 EUP 2009 EES
Age 18-29 (%) 21.82 13.78
Male (%) 69.70 44.12
Higher education (%) 68.42 29.22
modeling initiated during the 1960s and 1970s (Page & Jones 1979), others chose
to change the subject. This lead to contemporary electoral research that is “in-
creasingly eclectic and opportunistic” (Bartels 2008, p. 29). It is this eclectic
and opportunistic field of research that accommodates VAAs, as campaigning
tools, as a way of helping voters make informed political choices, and to gain a
better understanding of contemporary electoral behavior. The success of VAAs
in certain countries raises questions about the conditions they need thrive; sec-
tion A of the Appendices contains a discussion of the factors that potentially
contribute to the success of VAAs, starting with Internet usage, the role of mass
media, social capital and the features of the electoral system, as well as factors
strictly related to the the design of the tool. More than offering an explana-
tion for the success of VAAs, the discussion aims to give an understanding of
the sources of bias inherent in VAA data. This chapter introduced the research
questions that will be tackled in the thesis. I situated this research in congruence
studies, emphasizing the approach I will follow, and brought arguments for the
conceptualization of congruence as a many-to-one approach, following the work
of Golder & Stramski (2007). A substantial part of this chapter was dedicated
to VAAs, as data source.
The next chapter will present the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, starting
with the importance of studying political representation and the role of issue
congruence within representation studies. I will then highlight the advantages
of assessing congruence on issue dimensions, following Dalton (1985, 2017b).
The last three sections of the chapter will focus on electoral system, party and
individual level predictors of issue congruence.
41
A theoretical approach to the study of issue congruence
2 A theoretical approach to the study of issue
congruence
2.1 Introduction
This chapter starts by emphasizing the importance of studying issue congruence
and places this research in the field of representation studies. I will discuss the
relevance of studying issue congruence in a time when new issues regularly appear
on the political agenda. New issues, societal changes and the structure of party
competition is in a continuous change, coupled with new parties attempting to
gain popular support. Next, the importance of studying congruence where it
is formed, namely at individual level, will be discussed. The vast majority of
representation studies focus on electoral design setting and party characteristics,
ignoring the individual level, which may be the most important. One can argue
that all the decisions about party choice start at the individual level, and the
argument in its purest form is that ultimately, the voter matches her preferences
with the policy stances of political parties.
The first section answers the question of why are we studying political represen-
tation, laying down the motivation behind this thesis. The section is structured
into four subsections. In the first subsection, I will present the main approaches
to the study of political representation, dealing with citizens’ votes versus cit-
izens’ preferences approaches and dyadic versus collective representation. The
next subsection is centered around the main approaches to the study of issue
congruence, introducing issue competition and issue voting, followed by a sub-
section on issue domains. In the last part of this section, I review the current
challenges to representation studies, focusing on the issues that form the subject
of this research. The second, third and forth sections of this chapter introduce
the structure of the empirical chapters of the thesis.
The second section of this chapter focuses on institutional designs and their in-
fluence on issue congruence. Some of the most studied predictors of congruence
at the level of electoral system are district magnitude, proportionality and polar-
ization. Attempting to solve the puzzle of representation at an even lower level,
the next section focuses on party characteristics, such as the type of party, niche
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2or mainstream and on its governmental status. In the light of the recent find-
ings in congruence studies, the last section looks at individual level predictors of
congruence, such as interest in politics and education.
2.2 Why do we study political representation?
Sartori (1976) argued that parties are channels of expression and their most im-
portant role is the representation of citizens’ demands. State of the art research
suggests that political representation is the ultimate goal in the relationship
between citizens and their representatives (Sartori 1976, Dalton et al. 2000). Ac-
cordingly, assessing representation creates an important overview on the state
of democracy in a country; for example, a higher degree of representation be-
tween citizens and their representatives would ensure that their policy preferences
are better represented, leading to higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.
Therefore, it is important to have a clear notion of political representation, ac-
counting for different institutional designs, encompassing features of the electoral
and party system, as well as those of political parties and individual level charac-
teristics. Ultimately, we look at political representation as a quality assessment
of how well a democracy functions.
Besides the long academic tradition of studying representation, the latest societal
changes require a closer inspection of the relationship between citizens and rep-
resentatives. Congruence research has taught us that the most important factor
in a vote decision is party identification (Inglehart & Klingemann 1976). How-
ever, the societal changes previously mentioned have brought new issues onto the
political agenda. Cultural issues such as immigration have been brought to the
forefront of political competition, becoming valence issues (Dalton 2013). These
rapid changes forced parties to take ownership of these issues, in their quest
to keep their supporters and to attract new ones. The rise of new issues has
been accompanied by an increase in electoral volatility, as observed by Dalton
et al. (2000). Simply put, we need to know if and how these changes are affect-
ing the strength of the relationship between citizens and their representatives.
Looking at congruence between citizens and the parties they vote for on the
unidimensional Left-Right scale, studies have consistently found high levels of
agreement, as identified by Huber & Powell (1994), Rohrschneider & Whitefield
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(2012), Budge (2012) and others.
As Dalton (1985, 2017b) argues, European elections provide the context for
studying how people vote in second-order elections, and the role EU issues have
in the process leading to vote choice, as well as support for the EU. But similarly
to Dalton (2017b) European elections are treated here as ‘an event when a large
number of nations simultaneously hold elections in which voters think about their
policy priorities and make a party choice’. For the purposes of this study, the
problem of second order elections (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999) is not a problem
per se. Clark & Rohrschneider (2009) has shown that the choices voters make
in second order elections are mostly based on the national context, rather than
on the European one. In other words, the voters weight in the parties on their
national politics, rather than on their stances on EU issues (Clark & Rohrschnei-
der 2009). The data generated by VAA tools developed for the election to the
European Parliament, EU Profiler and EUvox, fulfill the role outlined by Dalton
(2017b) and provide the framework for a cross-country comparison.
In a meta-analysis of representation studies, Powell Jr (2004) showed that al-
though single case studies were the norm in the study of the linkage between
citizens and representatives, the 2000s have seen an explosion in cross-national
analyses. By adopting a comparative perspective, these studies were forced to
deal with methodological challenges related to measurement and specification
(Powell Jr 2004).
Scholars of electoral democracy argue that while in plurality/majoritarian sys-
tems the representation of majority is enhanced, in proportional representa-
tion systems (PR), groups whose policy preferences are neglected in plural-
ity/majority systems (eg. minorities, women) gain representation. As a result,
PR systems produce better representation. This represents a reductionist view
of the relationship between electoral systems and political representation, but is
one of the pillars of a longstanding scholarly debate on the effects of institutional
designs.
Because political parties are the central element of a political system, there is a
long tradition of examining the role of political parties in representation studies.
Party features such as elite/mass party, ideology (Dalton 1985) and governing
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2experience (Rose & Mackie 1983, Janda 1980) have been studied in relation to
congruence. But as the patterns of political competition changed, there are new
features of political parties that have scholars turned their attention to, such as
the niche/mass party dichotomy (Belchior 2013, Ezrow 2010).
As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) point out, research on congruence has system-
atically overlooked the features of individual voters. Most studies focus on a
single level, party or system level. In studying congruence, one should start with
the voter, because it is the voter who matches her preferences with those of the
parties. This thesis supports the argument put forward by Walgrave & Lefevere
(2013) and Steenbergen et al. (2007), that more attention should be paid to the
features of individuals.
In a nutshell, we study representation because it lays at the foundation of democ-
racy. The concept of representation has the political parties and voters at its
heart, where voters are trying to match their preferences with those of the par-
ties. However, there are questions that remain unanswered. This research tries
to tackle some of these questions, as briefly outlined in the introductory chapter.
Although representation studies have a long research tradition, recent societal
and political developments raise new questions about the linkage between citi-
zens and their representatives. Besides the substantive questions related to the
strength of this linkage within certain institutional designs (Blais & Bodet 2006),
there are also methodological questions brought up by recent scholarly debates,
such as the issue of measurement, which have serious implications for compara-
tive studies (Golder & Stramski 2010).
Looking at issues and issue dimensions offers a new perspective and a better
understanding about how the democratic process functions. The need to study
issues and issue dimensions is given by the new cultural issues, such as immigra-
tion and gender issues, that appeared on the political agenda over the last years.
The next section presents a summary of the main approaches and findings in the
representation studies.
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2.2.1 Main approaches to the study of political representation
The vast literature on political representation encompasses different ways of as-
sessing the match between voters and representatives. On one side there are
the studies where representation is seen as an input, such as that of vote-seat
proportionality. On the other hand are the studies which focus on clarity of re-
sponsibility, accountability, policy responsiveness, whereby representation is seen
as an output. This thesis focuses on the former category, dealing with congruence
as a way of grasping political representation. It looks at the issue preferences of
citizens and those of the parties. In what follows, I will present the foundations
of representation studies.
The seminal work of Miller & Stokes (1963) introduced the study of MP-voter
congruence, which was further used in studies of democratic representation. One
important aspect of their work that was highly emphasized in the representation
studies that followed was the idea that the empirical implementation of straight-
forward MP-voter congruence is impossible (Thomassen & Schmitt 1999). Fur-
thermore, the implementation of congruence as a sole means of measuring demo-
cratic representation is incorrect, because democratic representation encompasses
more than a match between the policy preferences of voters and representatives
(Thomassen 1994). In a nutshell, MP-voter congruence should not be interpreted
“as evidence of a normatively superior expression of democratic representation,
but rather as a means of looking at representation” (Belchior 2013, p.354), a
view that is strongly supported in this thesis.
Citizens’ votes vs citizens’ preferences
As briefly stated above, the study of the connections between citizens and their
representatives can be split into two traditions. In the first approach, studies
of vote-seat representation, follow the tradition of Rae (1967) and look at how
election laws, the geographic distribution of votes or the number of parties impact
representation. The second approach, in the tradition of Miller & Stokes (1963)
looks at the relationship between citizens’ issue preferences and the preferences
of their representatives. It is also called substantive representation, because it
focuses on the citizens’ preferences rather then their votes.
The first approach deals with citizen preferences by assuming that ‘all we need to
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2know about those partisan preferences is the partisan votes that citizens cast in
competitive elections’ (Powell Jr 2004, p.275). As Powell Jr (2004) emphasizes,
one of the problems of this approach is related to the meaning of ‘political party’.
More precisely, with the assumption that the same party has the same meaning
to citizens from different districts within a country. Furthermore, this approach
does not differentiate between parties in any other way but on the basis of votes
received.
The studies in the tradition of Miller & Stokes (1963) teach us that the political
preferences of citizens translate into policies through the process of selecting
representatives. This translation process is far from simple; in fact, the process
is dependent on institutions and parties. The responsible party model is the
most used theoretical framework in studies of political representation (Miller &
Stokes 1963, Dalton 1985, Converse & Pierce 1986, Miller 1999, Belchior 2013).
According to this model, parties are instruments of representation. The voters
base their electoral decision on parties’ policy stances, at the same time rewarding
the incumbents based on their performance. Therefore, citizens indirectly control
the parties, while parties have to offer distinct policy positions and to fulfill their
pledges (Belchior 2013). The model is built on the strong assumption that parties
have a coherent policy position and that citizens have clearly defined political
preferences (Mair 2002, Schmitt & Thomassen 1999, Arnold & Franklin 2012).
Responsible party model
The ideal voter would base her vote decision after a careful weighting of the
parties’ political stances, followed by the matching with her own political pref-
erences. In this ideal situation, the voter is fully informed; in the real word, the
cost of gathering information is too high, compared to the utility of the vote
(Downs 1957). Accordingly, the voter has to determine her political decision
based on the available information on political parties. The responsible party
model is based on the idea that parties offer clear policies to voters, that voters
vote on these policies and parties responsibly, once elected, act on these promises.
This work follows the responsible party model approach, because it focuses on
the political preferences of the voters that are reflected in the policy positions
of parties, rather than on policy representation and public responsiveness, seen
as an outcome of the democratic process in the work built around the dynamic
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representation approach.
Dyadic versus collective
While Miller & Stokes (1963) looked at dyadic representation, the comparative
studies focusing on European democracies moved to a collective measure. The
combination of multi-member districts and cohesive party behavior Barnes (1977)
noticed in Italy, led subsequent scholars to focus on ‘a collective legislative party
as the appropriate agent of party voters, who are its principals’ (Powell Jr 2004,
p.284).
In an analysis of data from the 1979 elections to the European Parliament, Dalton
(1985) studied the degree to which the candidates were representative of their
voters. The study provides multiple measures of issue representation, focusing on
four issue domains (economic issues, foreign aid, security issues and new politics).
The results show that while in some cases there was close correspondence between
party elites and voters, on issue domains such as economic and security issues, in
other cases, such as new politics issues, this correspondence was weaker. Dalton
(1985) provides a great example of using multiple measures of issue congruence,
focusing on collective correspondence between voters and candidates. Last but
not least, it provides a comparative account on representation, which inspired
subsequent research, such as the present one. Building on his previous work,
Dalton (2017b) tested the relationship between voters and parties, focusing on
voter-party issue agreement in the context of 2009 European Elections, finding
that the linkage between voters and parties is stronger on socio-economic issues,
but weaker on newer issues, such as immigration and gender issues. In a similar
manner, I am looking at the preferences of voters, not at their votes.
2.2.2 Main approaches to the study of issue congruence: from posi-
tional to issue competition
Prior to issue competition, elections were dominated by positional competition.
Positional competition implies that parties take different positions alongside a
pre-given policy dimension, as the Left-Right scale dimension, dominated by
economic issues (Downs 1957). The positional and issue competition may be
closely related, but regardless of these possible connections, they need to be
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2treated separately (Green-Pedersen 2007).
Issue competition describes party competition whereby issues dominate the po-
litical agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007). The decline in social-structural voting,
class voting in particular (Thomassen 2005) and the increase in electoral volatil-
ity (Mair 2002) are two main consistent findings in recent voting literature on
Western Europe. Issue voting was identified as a replacement for the social-
structural voting. Issue competition is characterized by political parties that put
emphasis on issues they would like to dominate in electoral competitions, such
as economic, environmental or migration policy. Nevertheless, issue competition
does not mean that political parties will select a particular issue and put empha-
sis on that issue only, ignoring the rest. Rather, each party aims to bring ‘their’
issue in the middle of the electoral competition, in order to force their political
opponents to take a stance. Furthermore, the proponents of VAAs argue that
these tools ‘force’ political parties to adopt positions on issues previously ignored
or even avoided (De Graaf 2010), therefore enhancing issue competition.
Together with party identification, policy preferences are among the most studied
determinants of vote choice (Highton 2011). In order for citizens’ policy pref-
erences to influence their vote decision, there is need for variation between the
policy alternatives (Campbell 1969). Furthermore, the larger the policy divide
and ideological divide, the more the policy preferences are expected to count in
determining the vote choice (Highton 2011). In other words, issue voting implies
that citizens’ votes are determined based on the proximity between their own po-
sition on an ideological continuum and the positions of the parties that compete
in the electoral contest. Issue voting requires that voters have well defined policy
preferences, that parties offer policy alternatives and voters own the means to
link their position to the position of parties standing for election (Garzia 2010).
The recommendations provided by the VAA tool addresses the link between the
preferences of voters and parties, which represents the most difficult task for the
voter. More specifically, it calculates the distance between her positions on issues
and parties’ positions.
During elections, voters are faced with the difficult task of weighting parties’
stances on different policy issues, in order to reach a decision. The difficulty
of decision making is greatly influenced by the fact that most of the voters are
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ill-informed about the exact positions of parties on political matters. As a con-
sequence, voters as bounded rational citizens (Simon 1985) rely on information
which is offered by mass media through agenda setting (Bartels 1993). From
this perspective, VAAs are campaigning tools that eliminate the cost of infor-
mation, offering a tailored advice, simulating the context of full information. To
conclude, the growing importance of issue voting (Dalton 1996, Franklin et al.
2009) following Downs’s (1957) spatial model, where every policy can be placed
on a Left-Right continuum is accommodated by VAAs (Cedroni & Garzia 2010).
As mentioned above, in order for issue voting to be meaningful, voters need to
have clear issue preferences, parties have to compete over the same policy issues
(Petrocik & Verba 1979) and voters need to be able to identify their position
relative to the position of parties running for election (Butler & Stoke 1974).
VAAs help voters to make more informed political decisions and lowers the costs
of information, by presenting to the voter the parties’ position on salient policy
positions. This works by using an algorithm to compare the position of the user
with the position of the parties, and presenting the user with a rank-order list of
parties using a proximity logic (Cedroni & Garzia 2010).
2.2.3 Issue dimensions
In an early study of citizen-party elite dyads in Western democracies, Dalton
(1985) argues that while in some cases there is close correspondence between cit-
izens and parties, in the other instances these linkages are weaker. For example,
while citizens and party elites seem to be in stronger agreement on economic
and security issues, the relationship weakens when it comes to issues such as for-
eign policy. Dalton’s (1985) analysis was based on data from the first elections
to the European Parliament, in 1979. Testing the same hypotheses over three
decades later, Dalton (2017b) found that while the linkage between citizens and
representatives is strong on economic issues, the strength of the linkage decreases
significantly for cultural issues, such as immigration and gender issues.
The relevance of issue domains such as the EU is highlighted in research showing
that as a party leans to towards the ideological extremes, Left or Right, the less
likely it is to favour European integration Hooghe et al. (2002). Furthermore,
it has been showed that incumbent parties are more likely to be in favour of
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thesis makes, highlighted in the introductory chapter, is the focus on issue areas.
Being able to look at issue areas, we are able to answer specific questions, that go
beyond a general understanding of congruence between citizens and the parties
they vote for.
Most representation studies centered on policy issues make use of a limited num-
ber of policies. For example, Holmberg (2000) uses 13 issues in 5 Nordic countries
and Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) use 50 policy statements, but they focus solely
on Belgium. The unique opportunity presented by VAA generated data allows
one to look at the correspondence between citizens and parties on a series of
issue policies, usually 30, covering a wide range of issues. The issue statements
included in the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox tools can be split among three
categories, Economy, Social and EU. Rather than focusing on a single measure
of congruence, which brings all issues together, the data presents the possibility
of looking at congruence on issue domains. By focusing on issue areas rather
than on a single measure of congruence, this research builds on previous work
conducted by Dalton (1985, 2017b).
Furthermore, previous work has found differences in congruence levels across dif-
ferent issue areas (Dalton 1985, 2017b). With one notable exception (Walgrave
& Lefevere 2013), there are no studies on the source of these differences. This
gap in the literature will be addressed in chapters four to six. Finally, as Rovny
& Edwards (2012) observe, politics is fundamentally a struggle over dimensional
issue competition. Furthermore, the increasing use of ‘political space’ over ‘po-
litical dimension’ adds weight to the notion that the ideological Left-Right does
not capture the variation in the range of issues displayed on the political agenda.
2.2.4 State of the art and new challenges in congruence studies
The scholarly consensus on the advantage presented by PR systems over plural-
ity systems has been recently challenged by two empirical studies (Blais & Bodet
2006, Golder & Stramski 2007). Making use of the cross sectional data called the
Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES), they argue that their measure
of congruence is superior. Their study shows that PR systems do not hold a con-
sistent advantage in promoting congruence between citizens and representatives.
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Bingham Powell Jr (2009) delved into this inconsistency, with a similar result.
The findings proved to be robust when tested against different datasets, using
slightly different approaches for measuring ideological congruence. Furthermore,
Bingham Powell Jr (2009) argues that the association between election rules and
congruence has declined over the past years (1996-2004) due to the tendency of
parties in plurality systems to converge towards the median voter. What mat-
ters most is the polarization of the party system. Also, while the average levels
of ideological congruence are roughly constant in PR systems, they vary over
time in plurality systems (Bingham Powell Jr 2009). In line with Blais & Bodet
(2006), Golder & Stramski (2007), Bingham Powell Jr (2009), Louwerse (2012)
found no differences in terms of issue congruence when looking at party mandate
fulfillment between Great Britain, a majoritarian system and The Netherlands,
a consensus democracy. In the light of these recent findings, this thesis addresses
the relationship between institutional designs and congruence, employing recent
election data from 2009 and 2014, in the context of elections to the European
Parliament.
There are three different approaches used in cross-national congruence studies:
the citizen survey/expert survey approach, the party vote/party manifesto ap-
proach and the citizen identification/citizen perception approach. The last ap-
proach was employed by Blais & Bodet (2006) and Golder & Stramski (2007) and
led them to doubt the advantage PR holds over majoritarian systems. Challeng-
ing the results of Blais & Bodet (2006) and Golder & Stramski (2007), Bingham
Powell Jr (2009) tested the model using all three measuring approaches. While
the results proved to be robust, Bingham Powell Jr (2009) argues that although
it is possible to identify strong and weak points of both types of electoral systems,
there is no unified theory that would help predict congruence across different elec-
toral systems. The use of a range of measurement approaches allows researchers
to delve into particularities of electoral systems and the effects they may have
on congruence, as the position of the median legislative party, of the largest plu-
rality party and of the median voter (Bingham Powell Jr 2009). As mentioned
above, these studies use ideological congruence. The different approaches to the
study of congruence is discussed in chapter three; but for the time being, it is
important to stress that although this work focuses on issue congruence, the
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This section served as an introduction for the three main sections to follow, that
will focus on country, party and individual predictors of issue congruence. It
laid out the reasoning behind using issue congruence and issue domains. It also
highlighted the recent debate over one of the longstanding findings in represen-
tation studies and the advantage held by proportional representations systems
over majoriatarian ones, based on methodological considerations.
2.3 On the role of institutional designs on congruence
The research question put forward in this section deals with the way in which
institutional designs affect political representation. The concept of institutional
designs refers to the characteristics of electoral systems and of party systems.
Although an electoral system greatly influences the shape of a party system,
the party system also influences the evolution of the electoral system, based on
the assumption that parties are unlikely to support changes that could affect
them negatively. Given these considerations, it is difficult to treat their effect
separately. Therefore, characteristics of both electoral and party systems are
used to explore the effects on political representation.
Although the data used in this research was collected during the 2009 and 2014
elections to the European Parliament, these thesis focuses on the structure of
national electoral systems. The electoral setting for elections to the European
Parliament (EP) follow proportional representation rules, which are homoge-
neous, with the exception of Ireland and Malta (Farrell & Scully 2007, Dalton
2017b). Due to this homogeneity, the effects of PR versus majoritarian systems
cannot be examined in EP elections. Instead, I rely on the features of the national
electoral systems.
Traditionally, some features of PR systems are seen as advantageous. First of
all, proportional systems are associated with a larger number of political parties,
which creates a richer political offer. Additionally, PR systems make it easier
for new and small parties to emerge. The wider the political offer is, a greater
number of political issues covered, that can lead to an improved mirroring of
the political offer in the political preferences of the electorate. Popular wisdom
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suggests that PR systems experience higher levels of turnout due to a higher
number of parties under PR rules and a richer selection of electoral choices (Karp
& Banducci 1999).
This thesis builds on the stream of literature which argues that PR systems are
associated with a larger number of political parties which create a richer offer
in terms of political issues. I therefore argue that the more diverse the electoral
options are, higher the chances the user will find a party who will match her
preferences, hence contributing to higher congruence. Therefore, in a multi-party
system, the average degree of congruence should be higher than in an electoral
system with a small number of parties. This follows the standard hypothesis
in representation studies, that holds PR systems as having a representational
advantage over majoritarian systems (Dalton 1985, 2017b).
Under the single-member district rule, the winning candidate is the one who
receives the majority of votes. Plurality systems, also named disproportional
systems, employing the “first-past-the-post” and “winner-takes-it-all” formula
often create single-party majorities in the lower houses of parliaments.3 The
plurality systems create a disproportionate allocations of votes to seats in the
legislature. Furthermore, these systems tend to reward larger parties and hurt
smaller ones. On the other hand, the proportional representation systems create
a proportional allocation of votes to seats, which translates into multi-party
coalitions within the legislature.
PR systems are prevalent in more developed democracies, and one of the reasons
may be that “they are more appealing in terms of their “representativeness”
than plurality systems” (Ezrow 2010, p.8). More precisely, the interests of
minorities are more likely to get represented in the legislature, depending on
their level of support in the electorate. The critics of the PR systems argue
that the mechanism that is at work in these kind of systems allow too many
political parties to gain power, which compromises the efficiency and stability of
the electoral system (Farrell 2011).
The varying thresholds used in different electoral systems also affect the number
3Examples of countries under plurality voting rule are New Zealand before 1993, Great
Britain, Canada and the United States.
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2of parties; in countries with higher thresholds, small parties are disadvantaged.
It also encourages strategic voting, because citizens are motivated to cast their
vote for a party with real chances. Alongside the increased levels of satisfaction
with democracy, electoral turnout is higher in PR systems, compared to plurality
systems (Lijphart 1999a).
Studies on vote-seat representation portray PR systems as holding a represen-
tational advantage over majoritarian ones, empirical studies on ideological con-
gruence show a similar pattern of findings. PR systems are shown to posses a
better fit between voters, median legislators and governments on the Left-Right
dimension (Huber & Powell 1994, Klingemann et al. 2006, Powell 2000, 2006).
Belchior’s (2013) work on party congruence across European party systems tests
three theoretical models, exploring causality at an individual level, at meso4,
and macro5 level. She uses three explanatory models, which provide the most
important contributions to the existing literature. This is the Downs-May, the
Przeworski-Sprague and the Huber-Powell-Wessels model. Reviewing the litera-
ture on representation, she argues that most of the research focuses on theoretical
matters or it is largely descriptive.
Building on the work of Dalton (1985), Huber & Powell (1994) and Wessels
(1999), Belchior (2013) argues that despite some controversy, there is a general
trend in the literature which supports the idea that PR systems are more likely
to generate high levels of political representation, compared to majoritarian sys-
tems. According to the Huber-Powell-Wessels model, representation increases
especially in large constituencies, when the party systems are polarized and pos-
sess a large number of parties. These characteristics provide the voter with
multiple alternatives, and increases her chances of finding a party with similar
political stances, therefore exhibiting higher levels of congruence (Belchior 2013).
Tested against data from the 2009 elections to the European parliament in the
PIREDEU project, the results indicate that system level characteristics, such
as the proportionality of the electoral system and the level of fractionalization
does not determine congruence between voters and members of parliament. The
results of the study emphasize the relevance of political parties’ characteristics
4Party level
5System level
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and their electoral strategies, indicating that larger centrist parties present the
lowest levels of Left-Right congruence between members of parliament and vot-
ers. Belchior’s (2013) study also suggests that the electorate is situated at the
centre of the ideological spectrum, while parties take more extreme positions,
especially extreme right wing parties.
Studies looking at the effects of electoral system design on political representation
treat PR and majoritarian systems separately. The universe of cases that make
the subject of this research is within the boundaries of the European Union.
Given that the number of plurality systems is too low, I will not differentiate
between countries based on the PR/majoritarian divide. The differences between
the two are encompassed by the district magnitude (which will be 1 in plurality
systems) and by the disproportionality of the system. As Golder & Stramski
(2010) suggest, measuring electoral systems along a disproportionality continuum
avoids this problem.
In a nutshell, scholars of comparative democracy often argue that electoral
systems are the principal factor in explaining cross-country differences in pat-
terns of political representation (Farrell 2011, Katz 1997, Arend 1994, Rae 1967,
Taagepera & Shugart 1989). The divide is drawn between systems allocating
seats in legislature (plurality voting) and via proportional representation elec-
toral formulae. The differences between the electoral systems are attributed
to the following four characteristics: the number of parties, disproportionality,
district magnitude and polarization.
EFNP or party fractionalization
One of the most examined characteristics of a party system is the counting
amount of parties. A significant number of representation studies deal with the
merits of a two party versus a multi-party system, focusing on the relationship
between the number of parties and representation, social cleavages, electoral
turnout and different aspects of electoral behaviour (Dalton 2008). There are
two different methods to count political parties, and neither looks at the absolute
number. Both give weight according to the size of the parties. The first one is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is an index of industrial concentration,
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2calculated as follows
Herhindahl −Hirschman =
∑
(party seat share in legislaturei)
2,
ranging from 0 to 1, and where i represents individual parties. The index, devel-
oped in the US context, is widely used in economics, as a measure of industrial
and market concentration. It employs measures of dispersion, the mean and
the standard deviation. Inspired from the Herhindahl-Hirschman, Rae (1967)
introduced his index of party fractionalization, as
F = 1−Herhindahl −Hirschmanindex
He pointed out that the Herhindahl-Hirschman index is also a probability mea-
sure, illustrating the frequency with which a pair of voters would agree to vote
for the same party. Accordingly, Rae’s (1967) measure represents the frequency
with which the voters would disagree over their party choice, in a electorate with
randomly paired voters.
Alternatively, and the most widely used measure in comparative research on
party systems, is the measure developed by Laakso & Taagepera (1979), which
is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. It counts the number of the
parties weighted by the size, to account for the reduced relevance of the small
parties. The main advantage it holds over the previous indexes is that it can
be interpreted as ‘the number of equal-sized parties to which the unequal-sized
parties is equivalent’ (Golosov 2009). Taagepera (2002) emphasizes how the in-
dex he developed has a more straightforward interpretation, as a value of 3.2
gives the image of a party system with approximately 3 parties, while the cor-
responding Herhindahl-Hirschman index = 0.31 and Rae’s F index = 0.69 offers
a less clear perspective, by comparison (Taagepera & Shugart (1989) in Golosov
(2009)). Although easier to interpret, the Laakso and Taagepera index is not a
probability measure, but this caveat has not prevented researchers to use it over
the Herhindahl-Hirschman or F indexes.
As briefly explained above, Laakso and Taagepera’s index weights the parties
acoording to their own size, giving larger weights to larger parties. THis therefore
makes it possible to discount the small parties. The Herhindahl-Hirschman and
Laakso and Taagepera indexes are used interchangeably. As Dalton (2008) shows,
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for the 62 elections included in the CSES database, the two scores are highly
correlated, at r = .92.
Prior studies imply that having more party choices translates into higher levels of
citizen satisfaction, as the number of channels through which citizens can express
their political preferences increases. Therefore, I hypothesize that countries with
a more fragmented electoral system present higher levels of congruencee (H1).
Disproportionality
From the 1990 onwards, studies on vote-seat representation, focusing on estab-
lished democracies (Arend 1994) have shown that PR, multi-member district
election rules hold a substantial representational advantage over the various forms
of single member district election rules (Bingham Powell Jr 2009). Reiterating
a point made in the beginning of this section, based on a rational choice under-
standing, electoral systems influence the shape of party systems in consolidated
democracies.
According to Duverger’s law, single-member plurality elections tend to constrain
the number of political parties to a greater extent than PR systems. Under
single-member district plurality rule, the country is divided into geographic con-
stituencies, and in each constituency the parties compete to win a single repre-
sentative position (Powell 2000, p. 23). Applying the first past the post rule, the
candidate who wins more votes than any other candidate, in other words a plural-
ity, wins the district. Following the same logic, in a single member district, only
the two leading candidates have real chances of winning. In a district with three
or four representatives, the chances of the fifth, sixth and seventh candidate are
negligible. Therefore, the expectation is that in a single-member district system,
only two candidates will compete in each district, reaching an equilibrium. As
the district magnitude increases, the number of candidates also increase (Powell
2000, p. 24). In a nutshell, a a single-member district vote leads to a two-party
system, while PR translates to a multi-party system. This is of course, a reduc-
tionist view; in reality, there is a large variation on the majoritarian - PR system
dichotomy.
Scholars have proven that greater diversification in a party system leads to greater
congruence at the mass-elite level (Dalton 1985, Wessels 1999). More specifically,
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2systems which are more proportional differentiated offer better political represen-
tation of citizens’ preferences at the EU level (Dalton 1985), in (Belchior 2013).
In a party system with a higher number of parties, voters are more likely to find a
party which will match their political preferences. The congruence between vot-
ers and their representatives has been the focus of a long line of studies, initially
arguing that PR systems do better in terms of representing citizens’ political
preferences (Bingham Powell Jr 2009). Although challenged by Blais & Bodet
(2006) and Golder & Stramski (2007), I hypothesize that countries with a more
proportional electoral system present higher levels of congruence (H2)6
District magnitude
One of the most important determinants of proportionality, from an institutional
design perspective, is represented by district magnitude (Sartori 1976, Taagepera
& Shugart 1989). Rae (1967) emphasized for the first time the role of district
magnitude, defined as “the number of seats assigned to the district”.
According to Powell (2000), the variation among the single-member districts may
due to the multi round run-offs, when candidates are unable to reach a threshold,
or can use a preference ordering system among the candidates. When it comes to
proportional representation systems, the district magnitudes can in various ways:
multiple tiers for candidates who are chosen according to different rules, ordinal
preferences possibilities, different formulas used for calculating the unused votes,
and different thresholds for voter support, necessary for achieving representation
(Powell 2000, p. 25).
Larger district magnitudes lead to increased proportionality, therefore in a system
with more parties. But, as suggested by Blais & Carty (1990) and Taagepera
& Shugart (1989), greater district magnitude leads to increased proportionality
only in PR systems, while in plurality systems it leads to a decrease. However,
the findings about the effects of district magnitude are mixed; while Lijphart
(1999b), Blais & Carty (1987) show that higher district magnitude leads to higher
disproportionality in plurality systems, Benoit (2001), Niemi et al. (1991) prove
exactly the opposite. Investigating into these mixed results, Eggers & Fouirnaies
6As mentioned above, the small number of majoritarian systems within the EU prohibits
me from using that divide, therefore as Golder & Stramski (2007) suggest, I am using the
measure of disproportionality.
59
A theoretical approach to the study of issue congruence
(2014) show that the increased district magnitude decreases proportionality in
plurality systems only when it is accompanied by a reduction in the number of
districts. They blame the controversy about the effects which district magnitude
has on representation on the different levels of analysis used (system-level or
district-level) Eggers & Fouirnaies (2014).
District magnitude represents the central element of electoral system design, with
a direct impact on the proportionality and the fragmentation of the party system
(Taagepera & Shugart 1989, Carey & Hix 2011) and others. In accordance with
this line of thought, while accounting for district magnitude, one has to account
for party system fragmentation7 and the degree of proportionality of the electoral
system, which was addressed above.8.
Moreover, in PR systems with larger electoral districts the voters face an in-
creased number of political options, contributing to higher levels of congruence.
Therefore, countries with large district magnitude present higher levels of con-
gruence (H3).
Polarization
Often overlooked in favour of a measure of the quantity of parties in an electoral
system, polarization deals with the quality of party competition. Polarization is,
as some would argue, more important in the sense that it influences ideological
voting (Dalton 2008). The polarization of a party system reflects ‘the degree of
ideological differentiation among political parties’ (Dalton 2008, p. 900). The
concept was inspired by Downs’s (1957) work, whereby he introduced the concept
of a spatial model of party systems, where parties are spread along a Left-Right
continuum. In a two party system the parties would converge towards the centre,
while in a multi-party system they would be situated alongside the Left-Right
dimension. Although the focus is primarily on the number of parties, Downs
7Operationalized as the effective number of parties, electoral or legislative
8Given the particularities of electoral systems, the greater the magnitude of the electoral dis-
tricts, the more candidates (Powell 2000) In PR systems, greater district magnitude increases
proportionality, but in plurality systems leads to a decrease (Blais & Carty 1990, Taagepera
& Shugart 1989). Therefore, between the district magnitude and proportionality (where pro-
portionality equals a higher number of parties) the relationship is not linear; it is a different
relationship for PR and for plurality systems. This is why I test both the effects of district
magnitude and proportionality.
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2(1957) emphasized that in a multi-party system voters benefit from a wide range
of ideological options. With parties focusing on their doctrine, more precisely on
the differences among them, the voting decisions are more rational.
Following Downs (1957), Sartori (1976) identified that the location of parties on
the Left-Right continuuum is affected by both centripetal and centrifugal forces.
Most of the time, in multi-party systems, these centrifugal forces produce a
pattern of polarized pluralism Sartori (1976). For a long time, it was thought that
the number of parties was a reflection of polarization, and was used as a surrogate
measure. However, Dalton (2008, p. 902) argues that party system polarization
has a more direct influence both in terms of the patterns of electoral behaviour, as
well as the characteristics of the electoral systems under consideration. Although
more difficult to measure than its surrogate, the discrete number of parties,
polarization should not be overlooked. Illustrating how parties are dispersed
along an ideological scale, polarization also portrays the range of ideological
choices. It is possible that an even more important aspect is that polarization
and fractionalization can vary almost independently of one another (Dalton 2008,
Gross & Sigelman 1984).
Comparing party systems on their degree of polarization requires not only the
measurement of the ideological position of parties but also their vote shares.
The polarization was estimated from direct and indirect indicators, such as the
number of political parties, the vote share of the extremist parties or the size of
the extremist parties (Powell 1982). Dalton (2008) developed a new measure of
polarization, focusing on the the perceptions of the electorate within a nation,
using CSES data. The measure is based on the positioning of the parties in their
respective countries by their citizens. The polarization index follows the formula
:
P =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
v1(
pi − p¯
5
)2 (1)
where i represents individual parties, v is vote share, p is party position and n
is the number of parties. If all the parties ocuupy the same position, it has the
value of 0, and the value of 10 when all the parties are split between the two
extremes of the scale (Dalton 2008). Countriess with higher polarization present
higher levels of congruence (H4)
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Old versus new democracies
Probably the most obvious factor influencing congruence has to do with the dif-
ferences between the post-communist democracies of Eastern Europe and the
established democracies of the West (Dalton 2017b, Rohrschneider & Whitefield
2012). Levels of party identification and the effects of partisanship on voting are
weaker in the developing democracies of Eastern Europe, due to the fact that
political elites needed to learn new procedures in organizing and sustaining polit-
ical parties, and additionally in organizing and carrying out electoral procedures.
The post-communist democracies present higher levels of electoral volatility and
fragmentation.
Conversely, the party systems of Western Europe are institutionalized and more
stable. Having a longer history, therefore a longer experience with the parties,
voters can learn and trust the policies presented by their parties. Accordingly,
one would expect a higher congruence in the old democracies within Western
Europe compared to the post-communist democracies of Eastern Europe (H5).
However, the results of recent studies yield mixed results on the contrast between
the East and West in relation to congruence (Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011,
Dalton 2017b, Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012). It is important to note is that
most of the studies on this topic employ a measure of Left-Right congruence.9
and an aggregate measure of the position of citizens
Preeminent presentation studies stress the the incomparability of political com-
petition between the Eastern and Western Europe. Challenging these results,
Rovny & Edwards (2012) show that while the structure of competition remains
distinct, the axes of competition in the East mimic those of the West. Their
findings target niche parties, that tend to emphasize the social dimension over
the economic one. I will delve into these findings in the next section, which
focuses on the features of political parties as predictors of congruence.
As shown by the mixed results of the studies mentioned throughout this section,
there is scope for a more careful and detailed analysis of the relationship between
the characteristics of the electoral systems and political representation. Having
discussed different system level characteristics and their potential effects on con-
9Except Dalton (2017b)
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2gruence, the next section sets out the prerequisites needed to explore the effect
of party level characteristics on congruence.
2.4 Party characteristics and their influence on congru-
ence
Previous studies tend to treat systemic and party level predictors of political
representation under the same concept, called institutional factors. While the
electoral system influences the party system, the reverse is equally true, making
it difficult to discern between the two. However, these characteristics do not vary
within a country, so for that reason they were placed under the same category.
The discussion now turns towards party characteristics, where the most used
predictors of congruence are the ideological position, party family and size of the
party (Dalton 1985, Powell 2000).
Belchior (2013) argues that the ambiguity in the literature regarding the sig-
nificance of electoral and party systems may be solved by using substantive
policy variables, rather then the Left-Right dimension. Furthermore, she rec-
ommends the use of other independent variables, such as the type of govern-
ment10, the number and salience of political cleavages, and the importance of
being in government or in opposition. Following the results and recommenda-
tions of recent studies, this section focuses on the way in which specific party
level features encourage voter-party congruence, such as governmental status11,
the niche/mainstream party differentiation, as well as the ideological leaning of
a party.
Parties are the central element of a political system and therefore the focus of rep-
resentation studies. Early works on political representation as congruence tested
the effect of party level predictors such as the mass/catch all party dichotomy, the
centralization of parties12, governing experience and ideology Dalton (1985). Al-
though the relevance of some of these predictors can be questioned today, such
as the mass/catch all party dichotomy, most of them are highly relevant and
10Single or a multi-party government
11Regarding the nature and extent of a party’s involvement in national politics, while ac-
counting for election cycle
12Referring to its internal structure
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intensely studied. Other party characteristics studied in relationship with con-
gruence are incumbency status, ideological position (Hooghe et al. 2002, Belchior
2013) and party size (Dalton 1985).
Although it possesses a socio-demographic bias towards the young and better
educated, the large number of VAA users incorporate groups who are not easily
accessible through traditional surveying tools, such as niche party supporters.
Therefore, the opportunity to test for the effects of the niche/mainstream party
dichotomy on congruence is one the main advantages presented by VAA data
- a point that will become recurrent in the empirical chapters. The following
section describes the party level characteristics which are hypothesized to in-
fluence congruence. These characteristics include, but are not limited to, the
niche/mainstream party dichotomy, governmental status of the party, the elec-
tion cycle and ideological leaning of the party.
The centrist party position
As mentioned above, most congruence studies tend to place the predictors under
the same umbrella of institutional factors. The reason for this is that there is a
fine line between systemic and party level features, most of it having to do with
the electoral system. An important differentiation between electoral systems lay
in the pattern of competition, where centrifugal incentives are attributed to PR
systems, and centripetal incentives to plurality systems. Studies of multi-party
competition conclude that the proximity to the mean voter position matters. In
other words, the parties benefit when placing themselves around the mean voter
position. According to Downs’s (1957) spatial theory, parties competing in a
two-party system will gain electoral support by converging towards the center of
the citizen distribution.
Despite this fact, studies on electoral competition offer conflicting results. When
assuming deterministic policy voting, the optimal strategy for parties would be to
adopt non-centrist positions (Adams 2001a, Cox 1990). In the models focusing on
probabilistic voting, the results suggest that parties increase their support when
shifting towards the mean voter position (Lin et al. 1999). However, more re-
cent work (Schofield 2003, Schofield & Sened 2005) brought evidence against this
view, suggesting that additional models of deterministic voting that add valence
64
2dimensions to voters’ evaluations indicate that parties should take non centrist
or extreme positions. The valence dimension represents a non-policy influence on
voting and includes voters’ evaluations about the party leaders and their compe-
tence, integrity and charisma. Similarly, Adams & Merrill (1999, 2000) suggest
that when non-policy related influences are introduced to the probabilistic model,
the parties are expected to shift from the center of the voter distribution, in order
to enhance their vote share.
Belchior (2013) tested the predictors of ideological congruence at a micro, meso
and macro level, following the main approaches in the political representation
literature. The research uses data to the 2009 elections to the European Parlia-
ment, collected through the PIREDEU project. While the results indicate that
system level characteristics, such as the proportionality of the electoral system
and the level of fractionalization do not determine the level of MP-voter congru-
ence, Belchior (2013) emphasizes the relevance of political parties’ characteristics
and their electoral strategies, indicating that larger centrist parties present higher
levels of Left-Right congruence between their MPs and voters. In other words,
the congruence increases with the party size. This contradicts earlier findings,
whereby centrist parties present less agreement with citizens, due to the lack of
distinct positions on issues (Dalton 1985).
The centrist party hypothesis argues that when parties position themselves on
the Right, or the the Left, or on singular issues, they do better in terms of
representing their supporters. Consequently, I hypothesize that parties at the
centre of the ideological spectrum are less congruent with their supporters (H6).
Niche parties
Following the same line of studies as Belchior (2013), Ezrow (2010) analyzes
whether it is advantageous for parties to take centrist positions. They also ad-
dress the question of whether electoral systems affect the diversity of policy
alternatives that parties offer to citizens. Ezrow (2010) argues that electoral sys-
tems matter for political representation, but not in the ways that are commonly
accepted. His central argument is that electoral systems play an important role
for political representation due to their influence on the balance between main-
stream and niche parties. The niche parties have tremendous implications for
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political representation and affect the electoral competition. All in all, the elec-
toral systems matter because they exert influence on the level of niche party
competition (Ezrow 2010, p. 17).
In his work on the linkages between citizens and parties, Ezrow (2010) develops
four models of political representation: the general electorate, the party proxim-
ity, the partisan constituency and party distinctiveness models. He argues that
plurality systems lack the niche party competition, meaning that these systems
are deprived of alternative channels of citizen representation. As a consequence,
the citizens in plurality systems cannot reward their parties for policy distinc-
tiveness (Ezrow 2010, p. 121). Furthermore, parties in plurality systems respond
only to changes in the mean voter position, while in PR systems niche parties
respond to the changes in the mean constituency position. In a nutshell, while
the PR systems present four models of political representation: partisan con-
stituency, general electorate, party distinctiveness and party proximity models,
the disproportional systems enclose only two - the general electorate and party
proximity models.
While (Ezrow 2010) suggests that by their presence, niche parties improve the
degree of representation in a party system, Belchior (2013) argues that by moving
away from the centre, parties lose congruence. The more radical parties tend
to locate themselves towards the margins of the voter distribution, away from
the centrist voters, therefore losing congruence. Furthermore, her findings show
that the electorate is situated at the centre of the ideological spectrum, while
parties take more extreme positions, especially win the context of extreme right
wing parties (Belchior 2013). If niche parties position themselves towards the
extreme ends of the ideological continuum, to get closer to potential supporters
(Ezrow 2010) one can argue that niche parties present higher levels of congruence
with their supporters, compared to mainstream parties (H7) and following Ezrow
(2010), that niche parties will present higher congruence with their voters on the
in systems with higher proportionality (H7a).
Dividing policy issues into economic and social dimensions, Rovny & Edwards
(2012) argue that mainstream parties are competing mostly on the primary di-
mension by emphasizing economic issues. Niche parties, seen as systematically
disadvantaged, compete on a secondary dimension, emphasizing social issues.
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2Accordingly, I hypothesize that mainstream parties will present higher congru-
ence with their voters on the Economic issue dimensions (H7b).
Furthermore, because there are less niche parties in Eastern Europe, I expect
that Eastern European democracies will present lower levels of congruence on
Social issues (H7c). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that because
there are less niche parties in Eastern Europe compared to the West, there is an
absence of parties with the ability to push social issues onto the political agenda;
consequently, the political competition revolves around economic issues, where
mainstream parties are in closer agreement with their supporters.
Governmental status
Another variable of interest is governmental status, which refers to the nature
and the extent of a party’s participation in national politics. It is similar, but
not to be mistaken with ”governing experience”, which is a record of the length
of government participation (Dalton 1985, Rose & Mackie 1983). A party is
considered “high” on governmental status if it holds cabinet positions, holds a
majority of seats in the legislature, receives strong electoral support in elections
and is identified with the chief of executive (Janda 1980). In its simplest form, the
distinction is between opposition and government parties. Government parties
tend to be larger, situated at the center of the political spectrum. The centrist
tendency is explained by the compromises that must be made for government
participation (Walgrave & Lefevere 2013). Based on the centrist tendency, it
becomes unclear for voters to discern the real stances of government parties.
Being in the government or part of a government coalition may lead the parties
to loose some of their ideological edge (Blais & Bodet 2006, Walgrave & Lefevere
2013). Accordingly, parties with high governmental status present lower levels of
congruence with their supporters (H8).
Accounting for governmental status alone is not enough, as the time of the elec-
tions also matters. Reif (1984) brought up the concept of electoral cycle, which
accounts for the period of time between national and European elections. The
expectation is that if the European elections are closer to the national ones,
the parties with high governmental status will present lower congruence levels
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(H8a).13
Looking at the positions of the parties on the topic of European integration,
Hooghe et al. (2002) show that as a party leans to the Right, it is more likely to
favour European integration, which therefore highlights the importance of ideol-
ogy. Focusing on party characteristics which are not captured by the Left-Right
continuum, both Hooghe et al. (2002) and Arnold & Franklin (2012) hypothesize
that the further from the centre a party’s ideological position is, the less likely
that it will favour European integration. Incumbency status, otherwise known
as governmental status is another characteristic tested in relation to attitudes
towards European integration (Arnold & Franklin 2012) or governmental status,
as I referred to it earlier on. It was hypothesized that incumbent parties are
more likely to be in favour of European integration (Arnold & Franklin 2012).
All these aspects can be looked at when focusing on the EU issue domain. I hy-
pothesize that on EU issue area, parties with high governmental status will tend
to present higher levels of congruence (H8b). The general hypothesis is that high
governmental status leads to less congruence, because the parties in government
have to accommodate more views and make themselves appealing to the median
voter.
The next section deals with individual level characteristics that shape congru-
ence. The vast scholarly literature on political representation focuses on system
or party level predictors, neglecting the individual level, with one notable excep-
tion in the work of Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) and to a lesser extent, Belchior
(2013).
2.5 Placing the voter at the centre of the representation
process
The vast scholarly literature on political representation provides explanation for
congruence on a single, system or party level. With two notable exceptions
Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) and to a smaller extent Steenbergen et al. (2007),
research on congruence has overlooked the individual characteristics. As Wal-
13The election cycle variable will be used in interaction with the variable measuring govern-
mental status.
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2grave & Lefevere (2013) point out, in studying congruence, one should start with
the voter. Ultimately, it is the voter who matches her political preferences with
those of the parties. As the review of congruence studies shown, the vast liter-
ature offers mixed results, that may be due to the various conceptualizations of
congruence, but also to the different determinants tested. Looking at the lowest
level of analysis may be the best solution. In this section, the focus is on the
individual voter and her characteristics, such as political interest, educational
attainment and other demographic characteristics.
There are two possible explanations to the question of what is responsible for
the lack of congruence between parties and voters Walgrave & Lefevere (2013).
Parties can be blamed for hiding their less popular positions, while emphasizing
their more popular policies, or being ambivalent. Alternatively, a lack of in-
terest, motivation and capacity to process political information amongst voters
is the main explanation. The strong effects of education and political interest
led Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) to argue that the policy incongruence points in
the direction of voter deficiencies. These arguments will be put to test in the
empirical chapter.
Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) argue that the lack of detailed data on the political
preferences of voters and parties is responsible for the lack of research that con-
siders the individual level characteristics in addition to party and systemic level
predictors.
Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) were the first to pose the question of determinants
of policy incongruence between a voter and her preferred party. They argue
that the individual policy incongruence is an area that was previously ignored,
due to the lack of an analytical framework, or lack of data. They emphasize that
previous work dealt mostly with a single level of analysis, and it did not take into
account the possible interactions between different levels. Focusing on ideology,
salience and complexity, their results show that voters’ ideological inconsistency
is a determinant of incongruent voting. Additionally, political sophistication
measured as the level of education and political interest has a strong effect on
voter incongruence. Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) assess congruence as whether a
voter agrees or disagrees with a political party on a certain matter, and not in
terms of the distance between a voter and a party on a particular dimension (Left-
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Right, liberal-conservative) as widely employed in studies of proximity voting.
One possible limitation of their study is the single country focus. Nonetheless, it
offers important insights into how individual level characteristics are relevant for
the study of party-voter congruence. Most importantly, it provides an avenue to
further research.
In the seminal work of Luskin (1990), it is argued that only a small part of
the electorate can participate in the politics to the fullest; an idea previously
presented by Campbell et al. (1966) and Converse (2006). Firstly, ‘participation
is a variable’ (Luskin 1990, p. 331), meaning that not everyone votes, and
even fewer people participate in political campaigns. Secondly, the quality of
the participation varies. Voting represents the easiest, most common, but also
‘capricious’ (Luskin 1990, p. 332) form of political participation. Voters are
receptive and respond to the personal characteristics of the candidates as well as
to the policy issues. Citizens’ perceptions of politicians’ personal characteristics
and stances on policy issues vary, resulting in erroneous choices on their behalf.
The citizens’ performance in assessing political candidates reflects variations in
cognition. While some people know little about politics, others know and think
more about politics (Campbell et al. 1966).
Political sophistication, measured as political knowledge, is one of the prerequi-
sites of legitimate political representation (Boonen et al. 2014). It is also essen-
tial, because a citizen with limited political knowledge is less likely to make a
vote decision consistent with its own political preferences (Howe 2011). However,
the empirical results on the relationship between political sophistication and con-
gruence are mixed. Some studies have found that more politically sophisticated
voters tend to vote for the party which is ideologically closest to them (Lau et al.
2014, Boonen et al. 2014), and those highly educated and politically interested
are less likely to be incongruent with their preferred party (Walgrave & Lefevere
2013). However, Simas (2013) found no significant relationship between political
knowledge and proximity voting. A caveat to Simas’s (2013) study is that the
results are limited to the US context (Boonen et al. 2014).
Building upon the assumption that political knowledge is necessary for legitimate
representation and for a correct vote decision, and that political knowledge can
be expressed through educational attainment and political interest, I hypothesize
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2that those with high education are more congruent with their most preferred party
(H9) and those with higher levels of interest in politics are more congruent with
their most preferred party (H10). By most preferred party, I refer to the party
reported as vote intention in the upcoming European elections.
I will control for the socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender and
education. These variables are included in order to remove the variance that
is due to different demographic composition of electorates. This rests on the
assumption that different parties have different electorates. For example, some
parties may have better educated electorates. As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013)
shown, these educated electorates are more congruent with their preferred party.
Following Steenbergen et al. (2007) and Walgrave & Lefevere (2013), this thesis
includes political interest to account for the fact that more interested voters may
be more knowledgeable about party positions and they are more likely to choose
the party that is closest to them.
Another important individual characteristic is represented by the type of party
the voter supports, be it mainstream or niche. Following the logic developed in
the previous chapter, where niche parties were discussed extensively, I will focus
now on the potential effect that being a niche party supporter has on congruence.
Following Ezrow (2010), niche parties improve representation by offering more
channels of representation. His argument is follows a numerical logic, where
a larger number of parties translates into a wider range of political choices on
offer. A large variety of parties increases the chances that a voter finds a party
that matches her political preferences. Studying the link between salient policy
issues and congruence, Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) show that congruence is higher
between niche parties and their supporters.
Given the results of previous studies and the theoretical expectations about niche
parties set in the previous section, I hypothesize that Niche party supporters are
more congruent with their most preferred party, compared to mainstream party
supporters (H11).
Last but not least, because issues are compiled into issue domains, one can
observe whether voter characteristics weigh more from one issue area to another.
Before ending this section, I would like to return to a point introduced at the end
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of the previous chapter, highlighting the advantages of assessing congruence with
the help of VAA data. Signaling the very limited use of individual level attributes
in investigating the link between voters and their representatives. Walgrave &
Lefevere (2013) bring up the problem of data scarcity that has citizens and parties
measured on the same scale. Achen (1977) was the first to touch upon the most
important aspect in studying congruence, namely estimating the positions of the
citizens and the positions of their representatives on the same scale, i.e. Left-
Right scale. Employing VAA data, congruence can be assessed on a series of
political issues, including economic issues that usually represent the Left-Right
dimension. As emphasized before, the main advantage of VAA data is having
both citizens and voters express their preferences on the same issues, on the same
scale.
This chapter has laid out the theoretical foundations of the thesis, structured
along systemic, party and individual level predictors and their associated hy-
potheses. In the next chapter I will present the research design of this thesis.
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3.1 Introduction
In order to test the central hypotheses of this thesis, data from the European
Union member states is employed. Because this thesis explores issue congruence,
I am using data on voters’ and parties’ political preferences from the 2009 and
2014 European Parliamentary elections. In this chapter, I develop the central
element of this thesis, issue congruence and explain why the elections to the
European parliament are a good testing ground for the hypotheses formulated
in the second chapter. I proceed by introducing the levels of analysis, the data
sources, together with the limitations of VAA data. I then discuss the modeling
strategy, followed by the main element of the thesis, namely issue congruence. I
explain how the measure of congruence is constructed and provide a snippet of
descriptive statistics on issue congruence across issue dimensions. The chapter
ends with the operationalization of the variables used in the empirical chapters
of the thesis.
One of the early studies of citizen-party elites congruence was conducted by
Dalton (1985) in a rather novel setting. The data he used was collected in the
period preceding the first elections to the European Parliament of 1979. Rather
than focusing on the elections per se, Dalton (1985) used the citizen survey (the
Eurobarometer 11) and linked it to the study of MEPs to look at how well parties
perform their representation role. More than three decades later, he re-tested
the hypotheses, on data collected in the context of 2009 European Parliament
elections (Dalton 2017b). He focused on the relationship between voter and party
elites, searching for congruence between the two. In a similar fashion, the two
Voting Advice Applications, 2009 EUProfiler and 2014 EUvox provide a perfect
setting and a rather unique opportunity to look at the relationship between
parties and citizens in the context of two European elections.
In a similar fashion to Dalton (1985, 2017b) in this thesis I investigate the rela-
tionship between citizens and their most preferred political parties, understood
as issue congruence. I also explore the way this relationship is shaped by dif-
ferent features of the electoral system, party type features and the individual
characteristics of voters. The scholarly literature on political representation and
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its predictors is vast, due to the numerous approaches to assess the match be-
tween citizens and their representatives. While most studies focus on ideological
congruence, this work uses issue congruence. Furthermore, it contributes to the
scholarly literature on issue congruence by offering a cross-country analysis, us-
ing VAA generated data collected in the context of 2009 and 2014 elections to
the European Parliament.
3.2 The conceptualization and measurement of congru-
ence
In order to address the research questions formulated in the previous chapter and
their subsequent hypotheses, one has to delve into its central element, namely
issue congruence. As illustrated in the previous chapters, political representation
is a broad concept, incorporating policy responsiveness, accountability, vote-seat
disproportionality and congruence, among others. Given the complexity of the
concept, congruence represents one way of assessing political representation, and
does not explain it entirely. Congruence is seen as the mirroring of the political
preferences of voters to the political stances of parties. In this work, the focus is
on congruence as an indicator of the degree of matching of policy preferences of
users and their most preferred political party.
Most representation studies that focus on congruence refer to ideological con-
gruence (Huber & Powell 1994, Powell 2004, Blais & Bodet 2006, Golder &
Stramski 2007, Bingham Powell Jr 2009, Belchior 2013). In contrast, the present
work focuses on issue congruence. While there is an important distinction be-
tween ideological and issue congruence, the ontology and epistemology of the two
concepts are somewhat similar. In what follows, I will introduce the concept of
congruence, encompassing both ideological and issue congruence. Although the
former is not the focus of this work, it will help to build the argument around
issue congruence, assessed with the help of VAA generated data. Later on, I will
differentiate between the two, making the case in favour of issue congruence.
As stated above, political representation can be operationalized through congru-
ence, as the distance between the citizen and the representative (Huber & Powell
1994, Powell 2004). Issue congruence is the correspondence between party elec-
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3torates and their representatives across a set of salient policy dimensions (Powell
2004). VAA generated data provides a new means of measuring congruence.
Departing from the concept of representative deficit (Alvarez, Levin, Mair &
Trechsel 2014), that mirrors the political preferences of users’ that are not in-
corporated and represented by the political offer, I propose a new measure of
congruence. This measure is based on the distance between the citizen and the
party the citizen intends to vote for in the upcoming European elections on
a series of 28, respectively 22 political statements. Furthermore, although the
effect of electoral systems on the number of political parties, social representa-
tion, vote-seat disproportionality, and ideological congruence is well researched,
representation on issues is mostly inferred from alternative interpretations of
congruence. The measure of issue congruence created with the use of VAA gen-
erated data contributes to a better understanding of political representation in
the EU political space.
3.2.1 Conceptualizations of congruence: from one-to-one to many-
to-many
In most simple terms, congruence can be explained as the distance between
a citizen and its representative (Dalton 1985, Thomassen & Andeweg 2004),
where the representative can be a candidate, a political party, a member of the
parliament or a member of government. In the introductory chapter I discussed
how congruence can be conceptualized as a one-to-one, many-to-one and many-
to-many relationship. The many-to-one relationship can be interpreted as one
between many citizens and one representative, and is the approach I follow in
this thesis, where many are the supporters of a particular party and one is the
political party. The many-to-one relationship can be further assessed as absolute
median citizen, absolute citizen and relative congruence.
As argued in the introductory chapter, the conceptualization of congruence as a
relative measure is the most appropriate when one compares congruence across
different units of analysis, such as the European Union member states. Com-
pared to absolute citizen congruence, which looks at the distance between the
median citizen and the party the citizen intends to vote for, relative congruence
encompasses information about the distribution of citizens’ preferences. More
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precisely, in calculating the congruence score of a citizen with its most preferred
party, information about the congruence scores of all the supporters of the respec-
tive party are included. The idea behind Golder & Stramski’s (2010) measure of
relative congruence is that their new conceptualization reflects the presence of a
legislature that ‘accurately reflects the ideological preferences of the citizenry as
a whole’. In a similar fashion, I look at the whole supporter base of a party.
Although one of the most popular approaches, the conceptualization of congru-
ence as absolute median citizen is not appropriate for cross-country comparisons.
This is because the Left-Right dimension is not perceived similarly across con-
texts. However, because in this work congruence is assessed on policies, which
are similar across countries and use the same metric, I will make use of this
absolute median citizen approach, in addition to a relative one.
Figure 2: Conceptualization of congruence, Golder & Stramski (2007)
The decision to employ two different approaches to assess congruence is based
on methodological considerations. The main reasons is to support the debate
initiated by Blais & Bodet (2006), Golder & Stramski (2010), who argue that
the measure of congruence employed has a great impact on results. Accordingly,
different measures of congruence can offer different portrayals of representation.
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3The second reason has to do with the levels of analysis on which this work is
built. As stated before, this thesis investigates the match between the voter
and her representative, while controlling for predictors at the country, party and
individual level. While only the absolute median citizen can be assessed at an
individual level, both approaches can be used to assess congruence at the party
and country level. Because the aim is to investigate the effect of individual level
characteristics, a measure of congruence at individual level is needed.
The conceptualization of congruence presented above is based on studies that
conduct cross-national analyses (Achen 1977, Blais & Bodet 2006, Golder &
Stramski 2010). Although there are other relevant studies dealing with the con-
ceptualization of congruence, they have been overlooked, because this study fol-
lows a comparative approach. It is important to mention that in this work,
congruence is defined as the distance between prospective voters and the parties
that competed in the elections to the European Parliament in 2009 and 2014.
More precisely, it assesses the proximity between the citizen and the party she
intends to vote for.
Before proceeding to develop the measures of congruence, I will first discuss the
different approaches and the types of data used for assessing congruence. I will
also build the argument for the approach used in this thesis, the citizen sur-
vey/expert survey approach. The discussion follows the classification developed
by Bingham Powell Jr (2009).
3.2.2 Different approaches to measuring congruence
This section presents the approaches used in measuring congruence and the type
of data used in each approach. The measure of congruence used in this thesis is
assessed through VAA generated data, that fits under the citizen survey/expert
survey approach, with minor changes.
In his work on the ideological congruence controversy Bingham Powell Jr (2009)
develops a classification of approaches used in measuring congruence that is ex-
tremely relevant for a proper understanding of congruence, both ideological and
issue based. Bingham Powell Jr (2009) identifies three different approaches to
estimating the distance between citizens and the government. The common el-
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ement of these approaches is the procedure used to assess the government or
median legislator’s position. This is ‘based on the separately estimated positions
of the political parties which form the government, weighted either by the per-
centage of legislative seats or their percentage of cabinet portfolios’ (Bingham
Powell Jr 2009, p. 1477). In what follows, the approaches to measuring congru-
ence, the citizen survey/expert survey approach, party vote/party manifesto ap-
proach, and the citizen identification/citizen perception approach are presented,
together with their advantages and disadvantages.
The citizen survey/expert survey approach uses surveys in which citizens are
asked to place themselves on the Left-Right continuum. The self-placement is
then used to identify the position of the median citizen. The positions of parties
are identified using expert surveys, where political experts place the parties on the
Left-Right scale. The government’s or median legislator’s position is estimated
from the party positions. Also, it is assumed that all legislators within a party
mirror the party position. Finally, congruence is assessed as the distance between
the median legislator/government and the median citizen.
This approach was extensively used in early work on political representation
(Huber & Powell 1994, Powell 2000, 2006). The strengths and critiques of this
approach lay both in the method of data collection used, namely expert surveys.
While the experts may have the best knowledge regarding the positions of the
parties, expert surveys are scarce. Furthermore, expert surveys are done in long
time intervals, whereas it is possible that the positions of the parties change in
the meantime.
As Bingham Powell Jr (2009) points out, one cannot be sure that experts and
citizens have the same things in mind when they place the parties, by themselves
on the Left-Right scale, therefore affecting the comparability of each position.
Another critique of expert surveys is that while experts place all parties on the
Left-Right scale, they know better the positions of largest parties, and not so
much the political stances of niche parties, leading to errors in coding (Bingham
Powell Jr 2009). Furthermore, party placements and citizen surveys are not
done concomitantly. Expert surveys do not account for changes in the parties’
political stances from the timing of the expert survey to the citizen survey, which
can affect the reliability of comparisons.
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3The second approach, party vote/party manifesto, is based on the work built
around the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge 2001). This project coded
elections manifestos on 56 different topics, along many elections and many coun-
tries, starting from 1946. The positions of the parties on a Left-Right scale are
estimated based on the mentions of various topics in election manifestos. The
position of the median voter is estimated using the parties’ positions and the
distribution of party votes, based on the assumption that the voter will give her
vote for the party which is ideologically close to her. Similar to the previous
approach, congruence is measured as the distance between the median voter and
government or median legislator.
The strength of this method lays in the nature of the data. Manifestos contain the
promises made by the political parties themselves. The votes are believed to be
a more accurate representation of a political position, compared to the answer
of a survey question. The main critique of this approach is the estimation of
the median voter’s position. One cannot assume that votes represent the true
political beliefs of citizens. As exemplified by Bingham Powell Jr (2009), if a
voter supports a political party just to punish the incumbent, the vote does
not reflect the voter’s true preferences. This is true for other forms of insincere
voting, as well.
The third approach, citizen identification/citizen perception, is based on citizen
surveys, where respondents are asked to place themselves and political parties
on the Left-Right scale. This approach uses data from the Comparative Study
of Electoral Systems project, started in 1996. Congruence is measured in the
same way, as the distance between the citizen and the legislator/government.
The main advantage of this method is that it allows citizens to place themselves
on the Left-Right scale, and to place the parties as well. Recent studies that
challenge the representational advantage of PR over majoritarian systems (Blais
& Bodet 2006, Golder & Stramski 2007) made slight changes to this method.
Because the positions of the citizens were individually measured, they build a
measure of congruence as an average distance. Furthermore, Golder & Stramski
(2007) weigh the average distance to take into account the variance in voters’
positions.14
14In Golder & Stramski’s (2007) measure of congruence, the position of the government
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While this method addresses one important caveat of the previous approaches,
namely the positioning of voters and parties on different scales, it assumes that
citizens are well informed about the positions of the parties. But as the levels of
political interest vary between citizens, political knowledge varies as well, raising
questions about the validity of this assumption.
The measure of congruence developed in this thesis, based on VAA generated
data can be accommodated by the citizen survey/expert survey approach, with
some differentiations, that I subsequently tackle. First of all, while the citizen
survey/expert survey approach uses the Left-Right dimension, VAAs use a series
of political statements, usually 30, which encompass GAL-TAN issues alongside
economic ones. However, due to data limitations, for the 2009 elections there are
28 common policy issues across countries and respectively 22 common policies
for 2014 data.
Second, respondents differ; VAA users differ from ordinary survey respondents
(citizens), by presenting higher levels of political interest and higher levels of
education.
Third, in addition to the political experts who code parties on policy issues, in
some instances political parties collaborate with VAA developers, corroborating
their allocation of positions. This aspect represents an advantage compared to
Golder & Stramski’s (2007) measure of congruence, where the position of the
government is based on citizens’ estimates. All these make VAAs a reliable and
valuable source of data on party positions and citizen preferences.
3.2.3 From ideological to issue congruence
The studies of ideological congruence assume the dominance of a unidimensional
issue space (Bingham Powell Jr 2009, p. 1483), which is usually the Left-Right
scale. It is assumed that the wide range of issues can be accommodated by an
ideological continuum. But as more issues become salient, we need to consider
a high dimensionality. As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the
concept of congruence was presented as a general concept, without differentiating
between the ideological and issue based types of congruence. In this subsection
is assessed by looking only at the positions of parties as indicated by the top 40 percent of
citizens, ranked by their levels of political knowledge
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3I will discuss how the two differ on a number of aspects.
First of all, as previously mentioned, congruence is measured as the distance
between the positions of the representatives and the represented (Dalton 1985,
Thomassen & Andeweg 2004). Most congruence studies compute a simple mea-
sure of mean Left-Right distances between the positions. When the distance
between the position of the representative and the represented equals zero, the
congruence appears. Computing congruence using the Left-Right dimension is
not as clear cut as it appears. Because the Left-Right dimension self-placement is
an ideological exercise, its results can differ from using positioning on substantive
policies (Belchior 2013).
Second, although it is widely used, Left-Right positioning says little about the
meaning of the positions. The magnitude of this problem amplifies when cross-
country comparisons are made, because the meaning of the Left-Right dimension
is different across countries (Benoit & Laver 2006). Furthermore, the positions
of the voters have different meanings, since they are a larger entity than the
legislators; consequently, high correlations between the positions of legislators
and citizens do not necessarily mean high congruence (Belchior 2013).
Third, Thomassen (2012) argues that there is a blind corner in representation
studies, because most of the work focuses on ideological Left-Right congruence,
rather than on issue congruence. The Left-Right dimension has certain limita-
tions, one of them being that certain issues are not included in the unidimensional
issue space that is represented by the Left-Right continuum. Furthermore, he
argues that scholars work on the assumption that representativeness on the Left-
Right dimension automatically implies representativeness on other issues, which
is a faulty assumption (Thomassen 2012, p. 13).
Another critique of ideological congruence is made by Dalton (1985, 2017b),
who shows that voter-party congruence varies across issue dimensions and par-
ties. He calls for more attention to be devoted to the problem of congruence
measurement, and attributes the ‘supremacy’ of Left-Right congruence to the
‘over-responsiveness of party elites to voter positions on the Left-Right scale,
the limited ability of citizens’ issue positions to predict party elites’ Left-Right
positions and the lack of relationship for the representation gap on separate issue
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dimensions’ (Dalton 2017b, p. 10).
Taking the argument against ideological congruence a step further, Giger &
Lefkofridi (2014) argue that there is a lacuna in the studies of political represen-
tation, related to the limited use of issue voting. More specifically, they argue
that by incorporating salience into the conceptualization and measurement of
policy congruence, there is an important contribution to the scholarly literature
put forward. Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) base their choice on the assumption that
people present more accessible attitudes towards issues that are highly impor-
tant to them, and are more likely to be better informed on these issues. Using
data from 2007 Swiss elections, they create a novel measure of congruence that
encompasses both the individual citizens’ positions on policies, understood as
proximity, as well as their priorities, understood as salience.
Giger & Lefkofridi’s (2014) study is a perfect example of the use of VAA data
in congruence studies. Following Golder & Stramski’s (2010) conceptualization,
Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) have built congruence as the individual distance be-
tween a citizen and the party the citizen voted for. In addition to seven policy
issues on which both citizens and parties are placed, they include a measure
of issue salience. The novelty of Giger & Lefkofridi’s (2014) study lays in the
measure of congruence used, which is salience-based congruence. In addition to
using a citizen and expert survey, they also incorporate data from smartvote,
a Swiss VAA. Giger & Lefkofridi’s (2014) study makes a good case for the use
of VAA data in studying representation. What this study yielded in terms of
novelty for issue congruence studies is the focus on issue salience, as well as the
use of VAA data. By integrating salience in the measure of congruence, their re-
search presented a different picture of congruence, compared to previous studies,
showing that niche parties seem to perform better than mainstream ones. I do
not incorporate salience into the measures of congruence developed in this thesis
due to data limitations, but I address this issue in the chapter seven.
The last argument, mentioned throughout the thesis, is that most of the research
on political representation uses a Left-Right dimension for estimating the posi-
tions of citizens and parties. In doing so, one important requirement is that the
placements of both citizens and parties must be done on the same metric; but
due to data limitations this is most often impossible. As Erickson (2006) pointed
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3out, the inability to place citizens and representatives on the same metric contin-
ues to be a ‘limitation that frustrates the contemporary work on representation’.
As emphasized by (Thomassen 2012) there is a blind corner of representation,
where voter-party congruence is attributed to the Left-Right dimension, while
other issue areas are neglected - an idea also supported by Dalton (2017b). Given
the limitations of the Left-Right dimension, as presented above, measuring con-
gruence with VAA generated data offers a valuable alternative. Making the
transition from ideological to issue congruence may offer more insights into the
functioning of the representation process.
3.3 European parliamentary elections
The scholarly literature on European Parliamentary elections classifies them as
second order, suggesting that there is less at stake, because the elections do not
lead to government formation (Hix et al. 2006). However, they were first called
second order elections by Reif (1984) exactly because they resemble national
elections.1516 European elections provide the perfect context to study how people
vote in second-order elections, to measure the level of support for the EU, and
to identify the role played by EU issues in the process leading to a vote decision
(Dalton 1985, 2017b). Following Dalton (2017b), the European parliamentary
elections are treated here as an event where multiple countries held elections
simultaneously and in which voters think about their policy preferences in order
to decide their vote.
Briefly touched upon in the introductory chapter, ‘the problem of second or-
der elections’ (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999) is not entirely a problem. Clark &
Rohrschneider (2009) show that the choices voters make in second order elec-
tions are mostly based on the national context, while the European context
weighs less.17 What matters to voters are the stances of the political parties in
15In terms of the parties competing for votes
16The resemblance of national politics is extremely important for this thesis, because I am
focusing on national parties, not European party families
17Because the political competition at the level of European Union resembles the national
one, the parties that compete in the EP and national elections are more or less the same.
However, not all national parties compete in the EP elections; as a consequence, the analysis
developed in this thesis is limited to the parties that chose to partake in this competition. This
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their national context, rather than their positioning on EU issues.
To sum up, for the purpose of this work, the second order nature of these two
elections is not problematic. I am using the data generated during the 2009
and 2014 EP elections to study the linkage between the citizens and their most
preferred party, while taking into account the features of each country’s electoral
system. EP elections are used here as a great research avenue, because as Far-
rell (2011) says, it presents the opportunity to ‘craft powerful research design
incorporating an unusual, indeed probably unique comparison, between mem-
bers of the same political institution chosen under a range of different electoral
arrangements (Farrell 2011, p36)’.
3.4 Levels of analysis
In order to capture the concept of congruence and to test its predictors as outlined
in the previous chapter, employing a mixture of methods is necessary. The
analysis is carried out at three levels of analysis, at the electoral system (or
country) level, the party level and at the individual level. The universe of cases is
within the boundaries of European Union. A many-country comparison approach
is suited for the number of cases. The observational units are countries, political
parties, and individuals.
Absolute citizen congruence is assessed at an individual level and it will allow
me to test theoretical and data driven hypotheses focused on the individual
level. Furthermore, an individual measure of congruence can be aggregated into
congruence scores at the party, and then country level. The relative congruence
is assessed at the party level, then aggregated at country level.18
The empirical chapter, with sections focusing on congruence at a country, party
and individual level utilizes predictors at each of the three levels. Although
the effect of institutional factors (country level) is widely researched, there is
relatively less focus on party type and individual level characteristics. Recent
research asks the puzzle of representation to be explained at these lower levels
limits the choices a voter has; if its most preferred party is not competing in the EP elections,
the vote will go to her second preferred party, overestimating the support this party receives.
18The averages are country level are not used in the regression models, they are used solely
for descriptive purposes
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3(Belchior 2013, Walgrave & Lefevere 2013). Figure 3 presents an illustration of
the levels of analysis.
Figure 3: Predictors of congruence
The participants are VAA users who consulted EU Profiler and EUvox tools
in the campaigning period of the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elec-
tions. Data was collected through the VAA platforms www.euprofiler.eu and
www.euvox2014.eu. As explained in the introductory section, the participants
went through a self-selection process to use the VAA tool, which was available
online in the six weeks prior to the elections.
In what follows, I will present the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox, the two
pan-European Voting Advice Applications that generated the data employed in
this thesis. I will also emphasize the advantages of using VAA data, compared
to more conventional survey data. Although severely criticized for a lack of
representativeness, VAA tools reach those unlikely to participate in traditional
surveys, such as young people or those with more extreme political views. Given
that some population categories are over-represented in the data, the results will
be biased towards these demographic categories. I will address this bias in the
next section.
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3.5 Data sources
Data generated by VAA tools contributes to a better understanding of electoral
behavior, at relatively low costs, but with serious limitations regarding the repre-
sentativeness of the results. The increasing number of VAA platforms and VAA
users generate large amounts of data, granting access to users’ political prefer-
ences and political parties’ stances on policy issues. These data can be used to
answer questions about voting patterns and political representation, but most
importantly, it allows researchers to investigate the electoral behaviour of young
people, or of niche party supporters, who are not easily reached by standard
surveying tools. The bias associated with VAA data presents a big drawback,
but VAA researchers are in the process of finding proper statistical adjustments,
such as post-stratification, that will fix the problem of representativeness.
Besides providing large amounts of data on users’ political preferences at low
costs, VAA tools present an important advantage compared to conventional sur-
veying tools. While the political preferences of the respondents are usually cap-
tured through propensity-to-vote questions (PTV) and the placement preferences
on the Left-Right scale, the VAA tool uses placement on a series of policy issues.
Among the critiques brought against VAA data is the varying response rates
across countries. While some countries, such as the Netherlands or Switzerland
have millions of users, others, such as Romania or Bulgaria have only a several
thousands. For the purpose of this research, these differences can translate into
overestimating congruence in the countries with low response rates. The reason
for this is that the bias in a small VAA sample is likely to be exacerbated. In
what follows, I will present the two sources of data, the 2009 EU Profiler and
2014 EUvox.
EU Profiler is the first pan-European Voting Advice Application, that ran in the
2009 campaign election for the European parliament. The VAA was set by The
European Union Democracy Center (EUDO) at European University Institute,
together with the Dutch VAA provider, Kieskompas and the University of Zurich
based Smartvote. The application ran in 30 countries, 24 languages, the 6 weeks
previous to the elections, generating 2.5 million unique visitors, and 900.000 user
profiles. The positions of 274 political parties in Europe were documented by
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3approximatively 130 collaborators (Trechsel & Mair 2011). Among the issue
statements, 28 were identical across countries, while 2 were country specific.
The application also allowed users to indicate the salience of issue (Alvarez,
Levin, Trechsel & Vassil 2014). Besides the political preferences, the VAA cap-
tured the user’s party preferences through the propensity-to-vote (PTV) ques-
tion, asked before the VAA advice was presented to the user. A second PTV
question was addressed after the user was presented with a VAA recommenda-
tion. 600.000 users filled out the application up until this point. 20.000 users also
filled out the extra questionnaire, comprising information on socio-demographic
variables, political attitudes and a second PTV question. For the purpose of this
thesis, which is a cross-national study, from 30 issue statements in the VAA, I
will use only 28 questions that were identical across countries, discarding the 2
country-specific questions. In creating the measure of congruence, I will use the
positioning of users on each of the 28 common policies, the position of parties
on the same policies, and the information about vote intention. I will use the
demographic information provided by users as control variables.
EUvox is another pan-European VAA, developed for the 2014 European Parlia-
ment elections. As with the EU Profiler, the purpose of the application was to
advise citizens in selecting the political party that best matches their political
preferences. The project was set by the Kieskompas and PreferenceMatcher, two
experienced organizations in the field of VAAs. Similar to EU Profiler, the ques-
tionnaire included European-wide topics, issues that are important to voters of
a particular region, and country-specific issues. The VAA was launched 4 weeks
prior to election date and gathered a total of 2 million users across 27 European
countries. Following the logic of EU Profiler, the questionnaire comprised of 22
statements that were common to all EU countries, and 8 country-specific ques-
tions. Similar to the first data source, I will use the position of users on policies,
party placements, vote intention and demographic information.
VAAs are based on a rational logic of voting, also called issue voting, as em-
phasized in previous chapters. Some VAAs, such as EU Profiler and EUvox use
spatial modeling techniques for placing a party in its appropriate political space.
The Dutch Kieskompas was the first one to use spatial models, based on the
assumption that the political competition is structured alongside a limited set
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of dimensions (Krouwel & Fiers 2008). Following the spatial theory of electoral
choice, a voter will choose the candidate/or party which is in her closest proxim-
ity on policy positions (Garzia & Marschall 2016, p. 50). Parties are positioned
on 30 policies, on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from fully disagree to fully agree.
Each policy statement is assigned to one of the dimensions. The political space is
represented by two, sometimes three dimensions. The parties are placed within
dimensions by averaging their position on all issues pertaining to a dimension
(Otjes & Louwerse 2014). The user is then placed within the political space,
on the basis of his position on 30 policies. The advice she receives is about her
position in the political landscape among the position of parties.
As mentioned above, in the positioning of political parties and users, VAA tools
use the logic of Likert scaling (Gemenis 2013). The assumption behind the
Likert scales is that each item is an imperfect indicator of the latent concept.
By combining the responses on multiple items, the latent concept, ideology or
party policy, would be fully captured. Before the increase in VAA research, there
was a limited use of Likert scales in measuring parties’ positions, most research
making use of interval scales to place the parties.
Although it generates large amounts of data at a relatively low cost, VAA data
has its flaws. A pertinent flaw is the lack of representativeness, due to the self-
selection mechanism through which the users access the tool. I will discuss the
statistical adjustments that can be applied to VAA data in the data limitations
section.
The additional data used in the analysis, such as country and party level predic-
tors, will be presented in the last section of this chapter, called instrumentation
and measures.
3.6 The limitations of VAA-generated data
This section addressed the limitations of VAA data, mainly the lack of repre-
sentativeness. I will start by presenting the main critiques brought against VAA
data, most of them associated with web surveys, such as coverage error, sampling
error and non-response rates.
A good survey sample is a representative one. However, survey sampling often
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3faces selection biases such as under-coverage (or coverage error), non-response
bias and voluntary response bias. When under-coverage bias occurs, segments
of the population are under-represented in the sample. An historical example
is the Literary Digest voter survey that predicted the victory of Alfred London
over Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential elections (Weisberg 2009, Wilson
et al. 2011). The bias was a result of convenience sampling, where the low-income
voters, who were mostly Democrats, were under-represented in the sample. Non-
response bias occurs when respondents are unable or unwilling to take part in
the survey, and the non-respondents differ from respondents in meaningful ways,
such as income, as it was the case in the Literary Digest example mentioned
above. Voluntary samples are biased by their nature, because respondents self-
select themselves for the survey. Usually, in voluntary samples individuals with
strong opinions are over-sampled, while those who do not have strong opinions
about the topic of the survey will be under-sampled.
In voluntary surveys on political topics, those more interested in politics are
more likely to participate. As voluntary sample, VAAs suffer from voluntary
response bias, with most of the respondents self-selecting themselves into the
samples based on their high levels of political interest. While this bias generates
major setbacks in terms of the results being representative, it also makes VAA
data unique, allowing researchers to address specific questions about the political
preferences of those with high levels of interest in politics.
VAA sites attract millions of users, generating large datasets on their political
preferences. Additionally, after they receive the vote advice, users can fill out
a follow-up questionnaire, which asks for socio-demographic information such
as age, gender, occupation, as well as party affiliation. More recently, VAA
generated data have been used more and more as a substitute for survey data,
in trying to explain political phenomena such as the positioning of parties and
voters, as well as voting behavior (Garzia & Marschall 2016). Although extremely
cost effective, the use of this type of data is highly controversial, due to the
bias that accompanies VAA data. The most important caveat is that the data
is not representative of the population at large. More precisely, the data is
biased towards the young and better educated (Marschall & Schultze 2012), from
urban areas, with a more Left-wing orientation (Mendez & Wheatley 2014). An
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additional bias is represented by gender, with two-thirds of the users being male
(Wheatley & Germann 2014).
As a web survey tool, the quality of VAA data suffers from an overall survey error,
made out of coverage error, sampling error, non-response error and measurement
error (Andreadis et al. 2013). Coverage error occurs when part of the population
cannot be included in the sample; in the case of VAAs, this is to do with Internet
usage, more specifically with the Internet penetration rate and Internet literacy,
discussed in the introductory chapter. Sampling error represents the inaccuracy
in estimating a certain quantity based on the sample, when the entire population
is not available; here, the sampling error has to do with the self-selection bias of
people into using the tool. Non-response error occurs when users do not respond
to questions, and this pattern can be discerned when compared to the answers of
other users. Measurement error occurs when the answers provided by the users
are wrong or inaccurate (Andreadis 2014).
Among the survey errors associated with web surveys, the VAA generated data
suffers greatly from lack of representativeness due to limited coverage and mea-
surement error, caused by users who are just testing the tool19, or trying to
manipulate the outcome (Andreadis 2014). Alongside self-selection bias into the
VAA sample, there is an additional self-selection bias, because not all the VAA
users proceed in filling out the follow-up questionnaire. In the 2009 EU Profiler
for example, out of the 600.000 users who filled out the application up until they
received the VAA recommendation, only 20.000 filled out the extra question-
naire, providing information of socio-demographic and political orientation. The
double selection bias brings with it people with higher levels of political interest,
who cannot be compared with the population at large.
The lack of a systematic sampling method cautions VAA scholars to draw in-
19The free availability of the tool opens the VAA application to anyone with Internet access,
allowing users to fill it out more than once, generating random responses. This type of behavior
was identified as ‘rogue’ responses (Djouvas et al. 2014). The rogue responses are due to the
fact that VAA tools offer incentives to their users, to record different answers in order to see
how the final result is affected, such as the spider output (Djouvas et al. 2014). This behaviour
results in over-reporting the number of users; more than that, it affects the inferences drawn
from VAA data. Because this type of responses cannot be fully explained as measurement
error, there are other ways to ‘weed out the rogues’ (Djouvas et al. 2014)
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3ferences from these data. However, the increased popularity of VAAs, together
with the large datasets they generate, led researchers to look for solutions to
overcome the problem of representativeness. To start with, it is believed that
the digital divide becomes smaller, reducing the bias induced by non-coverage.
Also, the increased popularity of VAAs suggests that the differences between
the VAA users and the general population becomes smaller. However, this as-
sumption stands only for the countries where VAAs are widely known and used,
such as Switzerland or the Netherlands. As a solution to this problem, weighting
techniques can be used to adjust for the lack of representativeness, together with
post-stratification and propensity score matching techniques (Duffy et al. 2005).
Using only the data from the VAA opt-in samples20 brings a third layer of bias,
because those who fill out the extra questionnaire tend to be highly motivated.
To date, response latency timers are the most used methods for cleaning VAA
data. 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox data have been cleaned using response
latency timers. Also, congruence scores are calculated only for the users who
provided socio-demographic information, in addition to their VAA profile.
After delving into the particularities of VAA data and its related limitations,
I want to shortly touch upon variation in the sample biases across countries.
In the first chapter, while introducing VAAs, I discussed how variation in their
usage across countries can be attributed to Internet penetration rates, which
are lower in countries from Eastern Europe. In countries with low VAA usage,
the expectation is that the biases inherent in VAA data are exacerbated. More
precisely, I am referring here to interest in politics and education.
Even if VAA generated data suffers from the bias induced by its users, most of
them presenting high levels of political interest and high education, this does
not necessarily represent a major setback. There are studies that rely on cit-
izens’ placements of parties on the Left-Right dimension that select only the
top percent of respondents, focusing on those with high political interest and
knowledge. Acknowledging the external validity problems associated with VAA
generated data that stem from a lack of representativeness, they remain a pow-
erful resource of generating data on users’ political preferences, party affiliation
and demographic information. Without any statistical adjustments, the results
20The follow-up questionnaire
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of the analyses carried out in this thesis have low external validity, and inferences
can be made only about the population of VAA users. In the next subsection I
will address the modeling strategy used to analyze VAA generated data.
3.7 Modeling strategy
As stated before, one of the contributions this thesis makes lays in its compar-
ative approach. Due to the nesting in the data, a multi-level approach is best
suited. The small number of comparative studies on issue congruence have in
common the simplicity of the methods used, limited to OLS (Dalton 2017b).
This approach disregards the variation across countries (Belchior 2013) or even
to correlation analysis (Luna & Zechmeister 2005).
Given the nature of the hypotheses and the levels of measurement of the vari-
ables included, multilevel analysis is recommended. The multilevel regression is
the most popular quantitative approach when one wants to compare and explain
differences across countries (Bryan & Jenkins 2013). Multilevel analysis uses
data from multiple countries, in which individual data is modeled as a function
of both individual level and country level characteristics (Bryan & Jenkins 2013).
VAA generated data is individual level data, where individuals are nested within
political parties and within countries. Although multivariate regression analysis
is suitable for testing the predictors of congruence at the individual level, it can-
not capture the characteristics individuals share based on their party affiliation
or by being from the same country. Using multilevel modeling, shared charac-
teristics can be accounted for. A more detailed description of the method will
proceed within the empirical analysis.
Over seven decades of electoral research helped set some prerequisites for study-
ing political preferences and voting behaviour. In order for the analysis of polit-
ical preferences to be meaningful, there are certain conditions to be met (Adams
2001b). First of all, parties must have distinct policy positions on issues. Sec-
ond, voters should have crystallized and stable preferences. Third, the voters
have to vote according to their preferences. In the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014
EUvox universe of cases the first condition is met, given that the positions of
political parties on issues are decided by a team of experts. More than that,
in some cases, the positions are checked with the political parties. None of the
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3available manifesto coding and expert data presents this quality, giving the VAA
data a consistent advantage (Garzia et al. 2014). Regarding the second criteria,
that voters should have clear political preferences, the VAA tool asks its users to
answer a vote intention question. Throughout the thesis, I mention that congru-
ence is assessed as the distance between the voter and the party the user intends
to vote for, and sometimes I refer to the party as the user’s most preferred party.
Although the party reported as vote intention and a voter’s most preferred party
are not necessarily the same, I argue that the vote intention is closely aligned
with the most preferred party.
The so-called ‘dependent’ variables in electoral studies are the propensity to
vote (PTV) and vote choice questions. Propensity to vote for a party and vote
choice are two different phenomena. A high propensity score does not necessarily
mean that a voter will cast their vote for that party, if we take into account
possible strategic considerations the voter faces. However, the electoral behaviour
literature treats vote choice and propensity scores interchangeably (Van der Brug
& Mughan 2007). In this thesis, I use the vote intention question to identify the
user’s most preferred party. The congruence score is calculated as the match with
the party indicated by the user. In the VAA questionnaire, the vote intention
questions use the following wording: ‘If you intend to participate, which party
would you vote for in the EP elections in June of this year?’ in the 2009 EU
Profiler and ‘In the European elections, which party do you intend to vote for?’
in the 2014 EUvox.
3.8 Measuring congruence with VAA data
VAA generated data allows a measurement of congruence as conceptualized by
Golder & Stramski (2010), a many-to-one type of relationship. Within this type
of relationship, congruence can be assessed as absolute citizen congruence and
as relative congruence. The strength of this work lays with the measures of
congruence employed, drawing on both positions of the users and of political
parties, not solely on the perception of users of party positions. An advance
to congruence studies is made by creating a relative measure of congruence. As
Golder & Stramski (2010) point out, few studies employ a relative measure, which
allows for cross-country comparisons to be made.
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The growing importance of issue preferences in the vote decision studies (Dalton
1996, Franklin et al. 2009) follows Downs’ (1957) spatial model, where every
policy can be placed on a Left-Right continuum. In order for issue voting to be
meaningful, voters need to have clear issue preferences, parties have to compete
over the same policy issues (Petrocik & Verba 1979) and voters have to be able
to identify their position relative to the position of parties (Butler & Stoke 1974).
The VAA generated data meets these conditions, having the parties coded over
the same political issues, and aiding the users to identify their positions relative
to the position of political parties.
Compared to traditional approaches of measuring congruence, where the re-
spondents are asked to place the parties on the Left-Right scale, the VAA data
presents the advantage of capturing the objective position of parties, rather than
the perceived ones. The party placements are made by a team of political experts
from each country, and in some cases the political parties collaborate with the
VAA developers, offering their own position on issues. The citizens are not asked
to place themselves alongside a political dimension, they are asked to express
policy preferences, from which their position is further assessed. This way, the
citizens’ positioning is more reliable, compared to an ideological self-placement.
The measures of congruence put forward in this thesis, based on VAA generated
data, are the direct counterpart of the representative deficit, which was presented
in the introductory chapter. The concept of representative deficit illustrates
the citizen political preferences that are not mirrored by the policies on offer.
Introduced by (Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil 2014), the concept is used in
recent work that makes use of VAA generated data (Dinas et al. 2014, Bright
et al. 2014, Garzia et al. 2014) to look at representation within the boundaries
of the European Union.
Similar to representative deficit, the measures of congruence developed in this
work are calculated using the agreement scores of the VAA user with the party
she intends to vote for, as detailed in the methodology developed for the 2009
EU Profiler (Trechsel & Mair 2011). Both the 2009 EU Profiler and the 2014
EUvox comprise a set of 30 statements on policies. 2009 EU Profiler includes 28
statements identical across EU countries, and two country-specific statements.
2014 EUVox incorporates 22 common issue statements, and 8 that vary from
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3one country to another. Because the aim is a cross-country comparison, I will
take into account only common policy statements, for both data sets. In what
follows, I will present the two ways of assessing congruence, the absolute citizen
and relative measures, both under the same many-to-one approach.
3.8.1 Absolute citizen congruence
Absolute citizen congruence looks at the average absolute distance between party
supporters and a party. It takes into account the position of all party supporters,
not just the median position. The use of the median citizen positions is one of
the main critiques brought against the traditional ways of measuring congruence
Golder & Stramski (2010). The main argument is that by focusing on the me-
dian position, any information about the distribution of citizens’ preferences is
ignored. Looking at the absolute citizen congruence fights against this critique.
As mentioned above, the data incorporates users’ position on 28, respectively 22
common statements, as well as the position of parties within each country, on the
same political statements. Only the political parties with real chances of winning
the elections were included in the VAA tools. The answer options to both the
2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUVox issue statements are on a 5-point Likert scale:
completely agree/tend to agree/neutral/tend to disagree/completely disagree/no
opinion. Each answer option has a numerical value attached to it, as follows:
‘completely agree’ - 100, ‘tend to agree’ - 75, ‘neutral’ - 50, ‘tend to disagree’ -
25, ‘completely disagree’ - 0. Following (Trechsel & Mair 2011), the agreement
score is calculated with the following formula
Agreement scorei = 100− |Ci − Pi|
where Agreement scorei stands for agreement score on issue i, Ci stands for citizen
position on issue i, and Pi stands for party position on issue i. Congruence takes
values between 0 and 100, where 100 means perfect congruence.21
In computing the congruence score at individual level, only user’s most preferred
21Due to data limitations, not all EU countries were included in the analysis. For absolute
citizen congruence (assessed at individual level), the minimum number of respondents from a
country is 400. Additionally, for relative congruence (assessed at party level), the minimum
number of party supporters is 30
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party22 is considered. Accordingly, each user has a total of 28 agreement scores
with the party she intends to vote for in the 2009 EU Profiler data, respectively
22 in the 2014 EUVox data.
As emphasized in the introductory chapter, one of the contributions this thesis
brings is the focus on issue dimensions. More than looking at individual issues,
I will compile issues into issue dimensions, such as Economy, Social and EU.
The issue dimensions follow the structure created by VAA developers. The score
per issue dimension is computed by averaging across the issues belonging to
that specific dimension. Accordingly, each individual will have three measures
of congruence, one for each issue area, in an addition to an overall congruence
score, that can be thought of as the equivalent of ideological congruence, since
it does reflect the agreement over a diverse range of issues.
Because absolute citizen congruence is assessed at an individual level, it can be
aggregated at the party and country level. A general congruence score for each
country is obtained by averaging across the scores for each issue dimension. In
the next section, I will present an alternative measure, relative congruence, which
according to Golder & Stramski (2007) is superior, because it takes into account
the distribution of citizens’ preferences.
3.8.2 Relative congruence
Because it follows the same approach, many-to-one congruence and relative mea-
sure congruence is similar to absolute citizen congruence. What differentiates
between the two is that the relative measure takes into account the distribution
of citizens’ preferences, in this case of the entire base of party supporters. This
measure is assessed at a party level. Following Golder & Stramski (2010), under
this approach congruence is measured as follows:
Agreement scorei = 1−
∑ |Ci − CiMedian|∑ |Ci − Pi|
where Agreement scorei stands for agreement score on issue i for a party, Ci
stands for citizen’s position on issue i, CIMedian stands for the median citizen
position on issue i and Pi stands for the party position on issue i. Congruence
takes on values between 0 and 1, where 1 represents perfect congruence.
22Listed as vote intention
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3Because relative congruence scores are under decimal format, while absolute cit-
izen congruence takes values between 0 and 100, the relative measure requires
some transformations, that will make the two measures comparable and the re-
sults easier to interpret. Accordingly, the relative measure becomes
Agreement scorei = 100− |(1−
∑ |Ci − CiMedian|∑ |Ci − Pi| ) ∗ 100|
As with the previous method of assessing congruence, I will compute scores for
each of the three issue dimensions, Economy, Social and EU, by aggregating the
values of the issues that form the dimension.
Because the relative measure of congruence takes into account the distribution
of the entire base of party supporters, the expectation is that relative congruence
scores for niche parties will be higher than absolute citizen congruence scores.
The distribution of preferences will vary less for niche, compared to mainstream
parties. The two ways of assessing congruence, the absolute citizen and the rela-
tive congruence can be compared at the party and country level. The decision to
use both measures of congruence was partly based on Golder & Stramski’s (2007)
results, who showed that different conceptualizations of citizen-representative
congruence lead to different empirical results.
3.9 Issue dimensions
As previously emphasized, the main advantage of VAA data is that it measures
citizens and parties measured on the same scale, on the same policy issues. The
28, respectively 22 issues can be compiled into issue categories, following the
dimensions set by the developers of the two VAAs. The dimensions are the
Economy, Social and the EU. Below I present the list of issues that load on each
issue dimension, for both data sets.
2009 EU Profiler: EU issue dimension
Issue 1 European integration is a good thing
Issue 2 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power
Issue 3 The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy
Issue 4 The European Parliament should be given more power
Issue 5 Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referen-
dum in the *country*
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Issue 6 On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU
should speak with one voice
Issue 7 *country* is much better off in the EU than outside it
Issue 8 The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey
2009 EU Profiler: Economy issue dimension
Issue 9 Greater efforts should be made to privatize health care services in the
UK
Issue 10 Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher
taxes
Issue 11 State subsidies for cre`ches and child care should be increased substan-
tially
Issue 12 Governments should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order
to fight unemployment
Issue 13 Governments should bail out failing banks with public money
Issue 14 The EU should acquire its own tax-raising powers
Issue 15 The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe’s farmers
Issue 16 The top rate of income tax should be reduced further
Issue 17 The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy
2009 EU Profiler: Social issue dimension
Issue 18 Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our
culture and values
Issue 19 Criminals should be punished more severely
Issue 20 Restrictions of civil liberties should be accepted in the fight against
terrorism
Issue 21 Policies to fight global warming should be encouraged even if it ham-
pers economic growth or employment
Issue 22 The legalization of same sex marriages is a good thing
Issue 23 Euthanasia should be legalized
Issue 24 The decriminalization of the personal use of soft drugs is to be wel-
comed
Issue 25 Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be en-
couraged as a means of fostering economic growth
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3Issue 26 Religious values and principles should be shown greater respect in
politics
Issue 27 The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green
taxes (e.g. road taxing
Issue 28 Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be
supported even if this means higher energy costs
The policy issues from the 2009 EU Profiler were divided across three categories,
Economy, Social and EU. Figure 4 illustrates the way issues (more precisely
agreement on issues assessed at individual level) are compiled into issue cate-
gories, but also the way in which congruence scores at the party and country
level are obtained.
Figure 4: Structure of congruence scores at individual, party and country level,
2009 EU Profiler
2014 EUvox had 7 issue dimensions, which have been compiled into categories,
Economy, Social and EU, to allow for comparisons between the two time points.
Below is the list of issues included in the 2014 EUvox, grouped into issue dimen-
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sions.
2014 EUvox: EU issue dimension
Issue 1 A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even
if all the other members states agree to it
Issue 2 There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the
capacity of *country* to act independently
Issue 3 The right of EU citizens to work in *country* should be restricted
Issue 4 EU treaties should be decided by *country* rather than by citizens in
a referendum
Issue 5 *country* should never adopt the Euro/ should leave the Euro
Issue 6 Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for *country*
Issue 7 The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions
2014 EUvox: Economy issue dimension
Issue 8 Free market competition makes the health care system function better
Issue 9 The number of public sector employees should be reduced
Issue 10 Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the poorest
Issue 11 The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy
Issue 12 Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the economic
crisis
Issue 13 External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a good solution
to crisis situations
Issue 14 It should be easy for companies to fire people
2014 EUvox: Social issue dimension
Issue 15 The recreational use of cannabis should be legal
Issue 16 Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion
Issue 17 Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples
to marry
Issue 18 Less serious crimes should be punished with community service, not
imprisonment
Issue 19 To maintain public order, governments should be able to restrict
demonstrations
Issue 20 Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of *country*
Issue 21 Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to combat crime
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3Figure 5 illustrates how congruence scores at individual, party and country level
were obtained, with the help of 2014 EUvox data.
Figure 5: Structure of congruence scores at individual, party and country level,
2014 EUvox
3.10 Instrumentation and measures
This section introduces the operationalization of the predictors of congruence.
Operationalization involves, but is not limited to: the disproportionality of the
electoral system, the degree of fragmentation, polarization, district magnitude,
old/new democracy, mainstream/niche party differentiation, governmental sta-
tus, election cycle, followed by political interest, self-placement on the Left-Right
scale and socio-demographic characteristics. In what follows, I will present the
predictors used for testing congruence, starting with features of the electoral
system, party type and individual level predictors.
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3.10.1 Country level predictors: election rules and party system char-
acteristics
At a country level, the predictors of congruence can be divided between election
rules and characteristics of the party system. The election rules I will test in
relationship with congruence are the disproportionality of the electoral system
and district magnitude. The party system characteristics tested polarization, the
effective number of parties and the old/new democracy dichotomy. The reasoning
behind the use of these predictors was discussed in chapter two. In this section
I will focus solely on presenting the instruments and their operationalization.
The disproportionality of the electoral system
The proportionality, or more precisely the disproportionality of the electoral sys-
tem is assessed using the Gallagher Index (Gallagher 1991). The index is useful
for comparing proportionality across electoral systems. Also called the least
square index, the Gallagher Index takes the difference between the percentage of
votes received and the percentage of seats a party gets in the legislature and is
calculated using the following formula:
LSq =
√√√√1
2
n∑
i=1
(Vi − Si)2
The scores range from 0 to 100, where a lower value indicates low disproportion-
ality, and an higher value indicates high disproportionality (Gallagher & Mitchell
2005).
District magnitude
District magnitude is drawn from the World Bank Political Institutions database,
where the measure is available by year.
Party system fractionalization (EFNP)
Another element which can be used to describe and compare party systems is
fractionalization, or the effective number of parties (EFNP). The idea behind
the measure of fractionalization is that the universe of party systems sizes is
not continuous and there is a need for a continuous measure that would help to
identify different classes of party systems (Caulier & Dumont 2005).
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3An alternative to the the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the most used tool in
comparative research on party systems, is the measure developed by Laakso &
Taagepera (1979). It is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and simply
put, it counts the number of parties weighted by their size, to account for the
reduced relevance of the small parties. The main advantage this method holds
over the previous indexes is that it can be interpreted as ‘the number of equal-
sized parties to which the unequal-sized parties is equivalent’ (Golosov 2009).
The Laakso and Taagepera index weights the parties according to their own size,
giving larger weights to larger parties, therefore making it possible to discount the
small parties. The Herhindahl-Hirschman and Laakso and Taagepera indexes are
used interchangeably, and as Dalton (2008) points out, for the elections included
in the CSES database textit(N = 62), the two scores are highly correlated, at r
= .92.
Another way to look at the fractionalization is following Rae’s F index, computed
as:
F = 1−
∑
(si)
2
where si is the proportion of parliamentary seats of party i, and P is the sum-
mation of all parties’ squared proportions of seats, subtracted from 1, to provide
the fractionalization of parties. A value close to 1 indicates high fractionaliza-
tion. In a system where one party gets all the seats (a proportion of 1) the
index will point to 0 (Caulier & Dumont 2005). This measure is useful in cross-
country comparisons of electoral systems. The effective number of parties equals
the number of parties only when the parties have equal strength; otherwise, the
effective number of parties is always lower than the actual number of political
parties in a party system (Laakso & Taagepera 1979). To account for the num-
ber of parties, I will rely on Laakso & Taagepera’s (1979) measure, employed by
Gallagher & Mitchell (2005).
Polarization
The measure of polarization is borrowed from Dalton (2008). The index measures
the distribution of the parties along the Left-Right scale, and is computed as:
P =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
v1(
pi − p¯
5
)2 (2)
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where i represents individual parties. The index is comparable to a measure of
a standard deviation of a distribution. It has value of 0 when all the parties
are situated at the exact same position on the Left-Right scale and 10 when
the parties are split between the two ends of the continuum (Dalton 2008) 23.
Although there is variability over time, most systems are fairly stable in regards
to their polarization scores.
Old/new democracy
The last predictor under the country level category is the old/new democracy
dichotomy. Countries with a long democratic experience are coded as 1, while
those from the third wave of democratization are coded as 0. The World’s Bank
Political Institutions database contains a record of the years since a country
became democratic, which was the information I used to create the old/new
democracy variable.
3.10.2 Party level predictors
The second level of analysis focuses on party level predictors, namely the ideolog-
ical leaning of a party, the niche/mainstream party dichotomy and governmental
status, taking into account the election cycle.
Niche/mainstream parties
The first and most important differentiation is between niche and mainstream
parties. Following Meguid (2005), niche parties emphasize a limited number of
issues, that are usually neglected by the mainstream parties. The operationaliza-
tion of niche parties is restricted to Green, radical-right/nationalist, Communist
and ethno-territorial party families. Another important characteristic that helps
to discern between niche and mainstream parties is the salience of economic is-
sues, or the absolute lack of it for niche parties (Meyer & Wagner 2013). I will
use Meguid’s (2005), who used expert surveys to classify the parties into niche
and mainstream parties, and Wagner (2012) classifications.
Governmental status
23For the countries not included in Dalton’s (2008) study, the scores were borrowed from
studies employing similar measures (Italy, Estonia, Greece, Slovakia from ECPR paper
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/c588a466-ecdd-48f4-a127-dfc5db37f909.pdf)
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Janda (1980), where governmental status refers to the nature of extent of a
party’s participation in national politics. A party has high governmental sta-
tus when it enjoys government favour rather than interference, when it claims
identification with the chief executive of the parliament, when it holds cabinet
positions, holds a majority of the votes in the national legislature and benefits
from strong support in elections (Janda 1980, p. 29).
The election cycle (Reif 1984) variable is computed using the number of days
between the last national election and the European election, as well as the
distance between the national elections, using the following formula:
Election cycle =
NE1 − EE
NE1 −NE2
If the election cycle is 1, the national election and the European elections are
on the same day, a value of 0.5 indicates the middle of the electoral cycle and a
value of 0 indicates a very new electoral cycle.
The last predictor at party level is ideological leaning, where the parties are
divided across Left, centre and Right.
3.10.3 Individual level predictors
The third level of analysis focuses on individual characteristics as predictors of
issue congruence, such as age, gender, educational attainment, interest in politics
and self-positioning on the Left-Right scale.24 Age is divided into five categories
(18-29, 30-49, 50-64, and above 65 years old). Education is measured into pri-
mary, lower secondary, upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary, first stage
of tertiary education and second stage of tertiary education. Interest in politics
is measured on a four-point scale (a little, somewhat, very, not at all interested).
I recoded self-placement of the Left-Right scale into a variable that illustrates
whether the voter places herself towards the end of the ideological spectrum,
denoting extremism. Self-placement on the Left-Right scale was assessed on a
11 point scale (0 Left, 10 Right). After recoding, the new variable takes 6 values
(where 0 denotes a non-extreme position, and 5 an extreme position).
24This measure is available only in the 2009 EU Profiler data set
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This chapter presented the research design of the thesis. The theoretical un-
derpinnings of congruence were introduced and discussed in the previous two
chapters; in this chapter, I presented different approaches to measure congru-
ence, making a case for the use of VAA data and the absolute citizen and relative
measures. I discussed the role of European Parliamentary elections, the levels
of analysis, data sources, and the modeling strategy. Next, I explained how
the absolute citizen and relative measures of congruence are computed, how the
scores for issue domains are obtained, as well as party and country level scores,
followed by preliminary results. The chapter ends with the operationalization of
the variables to be used in the empirical chapters.
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between institutional
designs, party and individual level characteristics and political representation,
understood as congruence. Although the effect of electoral systems on the num-
ber of parties, vote-seat-disproportionality, ideological congruence and social rep-
resentation is a well researched topic, there is no consensus in the literature on
what helps to explain congruence. There are three major points in representation
studies related to the use of the Left-Right that I will address in the empirical
chapters of this thesis.
First of all, the match between voters and representatives is inferred from al-
ternative interpretations of congruence. By matching I refer to proximity, or
congruence, which is most widely used. In most cases, congruence is assessed on
the Left-Right dimension, which brings up a series of substantive setbacks. The
most common conceptualization of congruence, using the Left-Right dimension,
requires an intensive ideological exercise on the users’ part, where they have to
place themselves on this continuum. Taking this aspect a bit further, comparing
citizens and political actors raises a series of methodological problems.
Second, the results of users’ self-placement on an ideological scale can differ from
those using positioning on substantive policy issues (Belchior 2013). Further-
more, it has been shown that high correlations between citizens and MPs do not
translate automatically into greater proximity, used as congruence (Bingham
Powell Jr 2009).
Third, the Left-Right positioning says little about the meaning of the positions.
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European parties in a comparative manner, most of this work is descriptive
(Belchior 2013). The meaning of Left and Right is different across countries,
amplifying the problem when the results are used in cross-country comparisons
(Benoit & Laver 2006).
The present study tries to address and overcome some of these setbacks. Because
cross-country comparisons cannot be made when the Left-Right issue dimension
is not perceived similarly across countries. Employing a set of issue policies that
are common across EU countries significantly reduces the problem. The result
is a metric-free concept of congruence, as inspired by the work of Golder &
Stramski (2010). By focusing on issue congruence, the use of the abstract Left-
Right scale and its shortcomings are avoided. Furthermore, I address the debate
initiated by Golder & Stramski (2010), who argue in favor of a relative measure
of congruence, that takes into account the distribution of citizens’ preferences,
instead of focusing only the median citizen. As detailed in the previous chapter,
I employ both an absolute citizen and a relative measure of congruence.
As pinpointed in the theoretical chapter, the empirical part of this thesis focuses
on three levels of analysis. First, congruence is tested against country level pre-
dictors. Second, the focus moves to party level predictors. Third, individual
level predictors are tested in relation to congruence. I employ two measures of
congruence, an absolute citizen and a relative measure. Absolute citizen congru-
ence is tested against predictors at all three levels of analysis (country, party and
individual). Relative congruence is tested only against predictors at a country
and party level. Relative congruence scores are calculated at a party level, then
aggregated at country level. Absolute citizen congruence scores are computed at
individual level and then aggregated at a party and country level.
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4 Congruence under different institutional de-
signs
In terms of electoral rules, most
studies predict that party-voter
congruence will be higher in
proportional systems than in
majoritarian ones.[...] There are
reasons to believe, however, that
the story is more complicated than
this. - Golder & Ferland (2017)
4.1 Introduction
Most studies on political representation argue that PR systems, with a large
number of political parties and high district magnitude perform better in terms
of the degrees of congruence between citizens and their representatives. The vast
majority of studies focus on one or a small number of cases. Therefore, few stud-
ies offer a comparative perspective on this issue (Belchior 2013). This analysis
contributes to the stream of research on political representation understood as
congruence, offering two snapshots at the quality of democratic representation
in EU countries, from 2009 and 2014. By institutional designs I am referring to
a political system’s characteristics, such as the number of parties, polarization,
size of electoral districts, proportionality of the electoral system and democratic
experience.
A longstanding consensus in representation studies supports the view that PR
systems produce more congruence between the citizens and their representatives
compared to majoritarian systems (Huber & Powell 1994, Powell 2000, 2006).
This stream of literature uses vote-seat disproportionality as a measure of politi-
cal representation, and in most cases, the absolute distance between the median
citizen and the government (Golder & Stramski 2010). Golder & Stramski (2010)
propose the use of a direct counterpart measure of ideological congruence, namely
relative congruence.
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that it portrays the presence of a legislature that ‘accurately reflects the ideo-
logical preferences of the citizenry as a whole’. Furthermore, they argue that
the results depend greatly on the conceptualization and measure of congruence
used. While congruence assessed as vote-seat proportionality captures how accu-
rately the votes translate into seats in the legislature, Golder & Stramski’s (2010)
measure captures how accurately the underlying ideological preferences of voters
are translated into seats. As discussed in the previous chapter, the measures of
congruence proposed in this thesis capture how accurately the underlying issue
preferences of voters are matched to those of the party the user intends to vote
for.
By employing the new measure of relative congruence, Golder & Stramski (2010)
argue that in contrast with the consensus in the literature, PR systems do not
hold a substantive advantage in representing their citizens, over majoritarian
systems. However, PR systems are characterized by more congruent legislatures
(Golder & Stramski 2010, p.91 ). Arguing that the varying results are due to
various measures of congruence employed, they suggest that it is extremely im-
portant for scholars to justify the conceptualization and measurement of the
congruence, or to demonstrate more robust results compared to alternative mea-
sures (Golder & Stramski 2010, p.103). Following this line of thought, employing
a new measure of congruence, besides detailed explanations and justifications of
the method used, requires testing and comparison to traditional methods, con-
sidered the norm. For this reason, I use both an absolute citizen and a relative
measure of congruence.25
4.1.1 Hypotheses
In chapter two of the thesis I engaged with a theoretical approach to the study of
issue congruence. After reviewing the relevant work on the topic, I developed five
working hypotheses, centered on party system fractionalization, disproportion-
ality, district magnitude, polarization and the old/new democracy dichotomy.
25Even though the measure of congruence developed by Golder & Stramski’s (2010) looks at
the distance between citizens and governments, while the measures of congruence developed in
this thesis focus on the match between citizens and parties, the rationale stays the same
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H1: Countries with a more fragmented electoral system present higher levels of
congruence 26 between citizens and their representatives.
H2: Countries with a more proportional electoral system present higher levels of
congruence.
H3: Countries with larger district magnitudes present higher levels of congruence.
H4: Countries with higher polarization present higher levels of congruence.
H5: Old democracies of Western Europe present higher levels of congruence com-
pared to the post-communist democracies of Eastern Europe.
4.1.2 Data
Data from the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox are used for testing the predic-
tors of congruence in the pan-European space. The same hypotheses are tested
on both datasets. Due to data constraints, the final 2009 EU Profiler dataset
includes 11 countries27, while the 2014 EUvox data set contains 24 countries. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the main caveat of using VAA data lays in the
lack of representativeness. The results cannot be extrapolated to the entire EU
population, being restricted to VAA users, who tend to be young, better educated
and more interested in politics. As a consequence of non-representativeness, com-
parisons between 2009 EU Profiler data and 2014 EUvox data have to be treated
with caution. Acknowledging these caveats28, VAA data still offer an insightful
overview of the political preferences of VAA users and the match with political
parties. Even though it is unrepresentative of the whole population, the VAA
tool reaches people whose opinions are not captured by national or cross-national
surveys.
As stated in the beginning of the chapter, the vast majority of studies on political
representation use the Left-Right dimension to assess congruence, which gener-
ates certain setbacks. Additional problems arise when comparing countries, given
26By congruence I am referring to both absolute citizen and relative measures of congruence
27Belgium is split between Flanders and Wallonia
28While discussing the limitations of VAA data, I mentioned post-stratification techniques
which could alleviate the problem of non-representativeness; however, due to data limitations
(the fact that some demographic cells do not have enough respondents), without limiting the
number of countries to an extremely small one, post-stratification is not feasible
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its meaning changes across countries (Benoit & Laver 2006). The present study
tackles this problem, by employing two measures of congruence based on a series
of 28 substantive policy issues (22 for 2014 EUvox), identical across European
countries. Even if it does not solve the problem entirely, the measure of con-
gruence obtained by employing VAA generated data reduces the ambiguity of
the Left-Right dimension. While the Left-Right dimension comprises elements
of economic and social policies, the statements of the VAA tool cover a wider
area of issues, encompassing GAL-TAN attitudes in addition to socio-economic
ones. Issues are divided across Economy, Social and EU.29
4.2 2009 EU Profiler data
As mentioned throughout the thesis, the vast literature on political representa-
tion has shown, most often, that PR systems, with a large number of political
parties, and high district magnitude perform better in terms of representing their
citizens. I will put these arguments to the test, employing an absolute citizen
and a relative measure of congruence.
I start the analysis by portraying congruence in the countries under study. As
thoroughly explained in chapter three, the measures of congruence employed
in this thesis are issue based, ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 means perfect
agreement with the party the user intends to vote for in the elections to the
European Parliament of 2009 and 2014.
As emphasized in the introductory chapter, besides employing issue congruence,
the other contribution this thesis makes is the use of issue areas. 30 The issue
policies are compiled into three categories, Economy, Social and EU. The Overall
measure of congruence31, is an average across these three issue areas. The reason
I am using this measure is to show that by discarding issue areas and focusing
on just one aggregated measure, we throw away information. Even by looking at
29A comprehensive list of the issues assigned to each category can be found in the Issue
dimensions section of chapter three
30Also referred to as issue categories, or issue dimensions. Dalton (1985, 2017b) refers to
them as issue domains
31The overall measure can be thought of as the equivalent of ideological congruence, assessed
with the help of the Left-Right dimension, which supposedly encompasses a wide range of issues
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Table 4: 2009 EU Profiler - Country level congruence scores
Absolute citizen congruence Relative congruence
Country Overall Economy Social EU Overall Economy Social EU N
Belgium Fr 71.84 67.96 71.14 77.86 85.00 83.25 83.50 88.25 1192
Belgium Nl 75.85 73.90 79.99 78.15 85.56 84.22 88.22 84.22 361
England 72.80 74.59 74.17 68.70 84.56 83.50 88.33 81.83 451
France 75.13 74.26 71.53 78.54 80.87 79.08 83.31 80.23 931
Germany 66.64 65.89 55.88 71.05 83.03 81.40 85.60 82.10 1174
Italy 74.77 74.28 64.36 79.16 82.25 82.38 83.25 81.13 756
Netherlands 75.83 75.69 80.12 73.93 83.48 84.73 85.73 80.00 2604
Poland 71.96 70.05 62.59 78.78 79.90 77.57 75.29 86.86 534
Portugal 70.09 70.05 71.45 69.98 77.70 75.78 76.00 81.33 924
Spain 77.66 75.58 82.46 79.30 87.07 83.56 89.00 88.67 651
Sweden 71.22 75.37 68.04 68.58 85.44 87.22 87.89 81.22 1828
Mean 72.9 72.8 71.4 74.1 83.0 81.9 84.3 82.8
Standard deviation 8.86 10.94 19.63 13.9 7.67 8.88 12.28 9.47
Absolute citizen congruence is assessed at individual level; Relative congruence is assessed at party level
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
congruence scores, one can see that they vary by issue area. As Dalton (1985)
argues, we need to use a multidimensional approach of congruence.
The two snapshots of issue congruence, assessed in 2009 and 2014 show slight
variation across EU countries. 32 It is this variation that I will focus on. The goal
is to examine cross-national variation in congruence levels. The vast literature on
political representation suggests that there are a number of systemic33, political
and social factors that can impact congruence. Additionally, their associated
hypotheses were presented at the beginning of this chapter.
32See Table 4 on page 112 for congruence assessed in 2009 and Table 8 on page 125 for
congruence assessed in 2014
33Table 5 on page 113 presents the country level indicators used as predictors. District
magnitude comes from the World Bank Political Institution database (Cruz et al. 2016), EFNP
and disproportionality comes from the Election Indices developed by Gallagher & Mitchell
(2005), and the polarization measures are borrowed from Dalton (2008). The same sources are
used to assess the predictors in 2014; see Table 9 on page 126.
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4Table 5: Country level predictors - 2009
Country EFNP LSq Polarization District magnitude Old democracy
Belgium Fr 7.82 4.09 4.09 13.63 1
Belgium Nl 7.82 4.09 4.09 13.63 1
England 3.84 5.09 2.37 9.20 0
France 2.49 13.58 4.33 1.00 1
Germany 4.83 3.40 3.63 1.90 1
Italy 3.07 5.73 3.89 22.50 1
Netherlands 6.97 0.81 3.73 8.30 1
Poland 3.13 5.96 3.22 11.20 0
Portugal 2.93 5.63 3.19 10.50 0
Spain 4.54 1.25 4.58 11.60 1
Sweden 2.57 15.10 4.62 1.00 1
Note: EFNP = Effective number of parties, LSq = Disproportionality
4.3 2009 EU Profiler data - Absolute citizen congruence
4.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler data Absolute citizen
congruence
Figure 6 presents the associations between country level predictors and congru-
ence, assessed as an absolute citizen measure. Used as preliminary hypothesis
testing, the correlation plots suggest that there is a positive association between
congruence and the effective number of parties, polarization and old democracy.
Although most congruence studies use a majoritarian/proportional representa-
tion dichotomy, the low number of majoritarian systems in the data prevents me
from doing so. Alternatively, following Golder & Stramski’s (2010) suggestion,
I measure electoral systems along a disproportionality continuum. The associa-
tions between the disproportionality of the electoral system suggests a moderate
negative relationship. Similarly, an increase in district magnitude is associated
with a decrease in congruence scores.
One of the potential causes of large standard errors is the small number of cases.
To be able to compare across the two measures (absolute citizen and relative
congruence), absolute citizen congruence scores, assessed at individual level, were
compiled into congruence scores at a party level. However, the association plots
suggest that between the values of 70 and 75, where most values of congruence
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Figure 6: Correlation plots - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence - Overall
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4are clustered, the error is smaller.
I made the case to use multilevel modeling in the previous chapter, but I will
outline the reasoning behind it: a complete pooling linear model would have con-
gruence predicted as a function of country level predictors, ignoring the variation
in congruence scores across parties. At the opposite pole, a no-pooling model,
in which a separate model is fitted for each country, would overstate the varia-
tion between countries (Gelman & Hill 2007). The problem of variability across
countries is given by the different number of observations per country, which
would make the estimates unreliable. A solution to this dilemma is represented
by a multilevel framework. In order to test the hypotheses, multilevel analysis
will be carried out. The structure of the data requires hierarchical modeling,
with individuals nested under countries. The predictors of congruence are tested
using a linear mixed effects model, according to the following formula:
yijk = αijk + β1EFNPk + β2Disproportionalityk + β3DistrictMagnitudek
+β4Polarizationk + β5OldDemocracyk + i
(3)
and
αk = µα + ηk
Linear mixed effects regression analysis 34 was conducted to examine the relation-
ship between absolute citizen congruence and theoretical predictors. To account
for nesting in the data, with parties being nested under countries, the regres-
sion models include a random component for country intercepts (see Equation
3). There are four regression models, Overall.c.35, Economy.c, Social.c and EU.c
The response variable of the first model, Overall, is an average of congruence
scores across the issue dimensions, while the other three models have as response
variables congruence scores on Economy, Social and EU issue areas. Originally
assessed at an individual level, absolute citizen congruence scores are compiled
into party scores that vary from 0 to 100. The hierarchical models account for
34The models are fitted with restricted maximum likelihood (REML), using the lmer pack-
age in R. The linear mixed-effects models are built from the baseline model, then extended to
include polarization, LSq, district magnitude, effective number of parties and old/new democ-
racy
35The ‘.c’ indicates the level of measurement of the predictors used in the model, in this case
country level
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the fact that the observations within the same country are not independent of
each other.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of absolute citizen and relative congruence scores
per issue area. The Social issue area has the most dispersed values, while Econ-
omy has the most dense ones. The pattern is similar for both measures of
congruence.
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Figure 7: Density plots - EU Profiler
The decision to run models with absolute citizen congruence on each issue cat-
egory as response variable is based on the variation in congruence scores across
issue areas. 36 37Following Dalton (1985, 2017b) congruence varies from one issue
domain to another. Consequently, it is expected that congruence predictors will
have varying effects on different issue dimensions. For example, that the new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will present less congruence on the
36The variation can be observed in Figure 7, in the Appendices, page 116
37I tested for the variation in congruence scores across issue areas using the Asymptotic test
for the equality of coefficients of variation from k populations (Feltz & Miller 1996) and the
Modified signed-likelihood ratio test (SLRT) for equality of CVs (Krishnamoorthy & Lee 2014),
within the cvequality R package. These tests are used for testing whether there is a difference
in variation and are based on the coefficient of variation statistic. It is also known as a relative
standard deviation coefficient, and it is defined as standard deviation divided by the mean
(Feltz & Miller 1996). As can be seen in Tables 20 and 22 on page 233 of the Appendix,
the low p-values suggest that the variation across the different issue dimensions is not due to
chance.
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4Social issue area, compared to the advanced democracies of the West.
4.3.2 Results - EU Profiler data Absolute citizen congruence
Table 6: Absolute citizen congruence EU Profile
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall Economy Social EU
EFNP −0.01 −0.78 0.90 1.48
(0.98) (0.70) (2.54) (1.80)
Polarization 0.22 0.10 −0.22 1.24
(0.86) (0.60) (2.24) (1.60)
LSq 0.06 −0.78 −0.24 1.66
(1.18) (0.80) (3.14) (2.22)
Old democracy 2.58 6.90∗∗∗ 6.04 −5.48
(2.96) (2.20) (7.54) (5.46)
District magnitude −0.02 −0.38 −1.40 1.00
(0.90) (0.64) (2.30) (1.66)
Constant 70.80∗∗∗ 66.74∗∗∗ 67.10∗∗∗ 78.88∗∗∗
(2.84) (2.08) (7.28) (5.26)
Observations 93 93 88 90
Random variance 4.24 0 32.22 15.48
Residual variance 69.2 26.0 70.87 48.05
ICC 0.20 0 0.30 0.24
Log Likelihood −260.441 −276.894 −306.180 −296.493
Akaike Inf. Crit. 536.881 569.787 628.360 608.985
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 557.142 590.048 648.179 628.984
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6 presents the results of linear mixed effects models with absolute citizen
congruence as a dependent variable and polarization, effective number of parties,
disproportionality, district magnitude and old/new democracy as predictors. 38
38The independent variables were centered at their grand mean, because they are third level
predictors. What this means is subtracting from each group’s mean the mean of all means. In
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The estimates for hypotheses H1, H3, H4 and H5, testing for the effect of the
number of parties39, district magnitude, polarization and old democracy, take
values in the right direction, but due to the large standard errors we can have
little confidence in the direction of the relationships. Exception makes H5, where
old democracy present higher levels of congruence compared to new denocracies.
The results reach the traditional treshold of statistical significance only in the
Economy.c model. Figure 41 on page 233 presents the marginal effects plots of
the models presented above, and show that the effects are not consistent across
the models. The lack of significant findings is consistent with the results of
previous work (Belchior 2013).
The low intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of the EU.c model indicates that
as we move from one country to another, individuals do not differ much, in terms
of being congruent with their most preferred party. If we look at the Economy
and Social issue area, we can notice a bit more variation across countries. Table
27 on page 235 of the Appendices presents the ICCs of baseline models for each
of the mixed effects models in Table 6. Even though the data does not support
the hypotheses, looking at the difference between the ICC of the baseline models
and the models with system level predictors, one can see that once country level
predictors are accounted for, ICC increases. In other words, controlling for coun-
try level predictors such as polarization, district magnitude, disproportionality,
number of political parties and the status as an old/new democracy leads to
more variation in congruence scores between the countries being accounted for
40. Given the particularities of VAA data, the wide degree of uncertainty is due
to sampling error, more precisely to the bias that accompanies these data.
Figure 8 on page 119 presents the random country intercepts of the models with
absolute citizen congruence as the response variable. The countries that present
higher levels of congruence after controlling for system level characteristics are
relatively constant across the models41 (England, Spain and the Netherlands).
other words, xcentered = xj − x¯
39Or fractionalization of the party system
40ICC = 0.10 in the Economy baseline model and 0.14 in the Economy.c model with system
level predictors, ICC = 0.18 and 0.25 in the Social.c models. However, in the EU.c model the
variability between countries decreases once we control for country level predictors
41For the Economy.c model, the random country intercepts are at 0. This doesn’t mean that
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4There is not enough variation in the old democracy variable to be able to say
something meaningful about the performance of new democracies. The larger
variation in congruence scores on the Social issue area from Figure 7 is evident
when one investigates the difference between the countries’ intercepts in the
lower left panel of Figure 8. Countries’ intercepts vary from 62.4 to 74 from the
intercept in the Social issue area, while the variation on the EU issue area is
smaller (74 to 84).
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Figure 8: Random country intercepts - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence
there is no variation between the groups, but that for this model, adding variance a variant
component for the country variable does not improve the fit of the model
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4.3.3 2009 EU Profiler data - Relative congruence
4.3.4 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler data Relative congru-
ence
In this section, the focus moves to the relative measure of congruence. As prelim-
inary hypothesis testing42, the correlation plots in Figure 9 on page 122 present
the associations between country level predictors and congruence, assessed as a
relative measure. The effective number of parties, polarization and old democ-
racy indicate a positive association, while the disproportionality of the system
suggests a negative relationship. District magnitude does not present any clear
pattern. As in the previous subsection, the large standard errors are attributed
to the small number of observations.
4.3.5 Results - 2009 EU Profiler data Relative congruence
The results of the linear mixed effects models with relative congruence as re-
sponse variables are presented in Table 7 on page 121. As in the models with
absolute citizen congruence as dependent variables, there are four regression mod-
els, Overall.c, Economy.c, Social.c and EU.c. Relative congruence is assessed at
the party level, taking values from 0 to 100.43
In testing the effect of the number of parties, district magnitude, polarization and
old democracy, the coefficients have the hypothesized direction for hypotheses
H1, H3, H4 and H5 44, but the results fail to reach the conventional threshold of
statistical significance.
The ICCs are extremely low, indicating that there is low variability across coun-
tries. The small differences are visible in Figure 10 on page 123, where I explore
the variation in the countries’ intercepts. Table 28 on page 235 of Appendices,
presents the baseline models, with results suggesting that the ICCs change only
for the EU.c model. For the Economy.c and Social.c models the ICCs do not
change, indicating that the low variability across countries remains even after
42Table 21 on page 232 of Appendices shows the Pearson R correlation coefficients of con-
gruence and the country level predictors assessed in 2009
43The tests for variation in relative congruence assessed in 2009 across issue areas show a
statistically significant difference (see Table 22 on page 233 of Appendices)
44except in the EU.c model
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4Table 7: Relative congruence EU Profiler
Dependent variable:
Congruence
Overall Economy Social EU
EFNP 0.90 1.07 1.39 0.10
(1.17) (1.32) (1.73) (1.25)
Polarization 1.21 1.13 1.76 0.68
(0.99) (1.11) (1.44) (1.04)
LSq 0.16 0.07 0.51 −0.33
(1.34) (1.51) (1.95) (1.39)
Old democracy 0.60 2.24 5.41 −5.29
(3.19) (3.60) (4.89) (3.66)
District magnitude −0.33 0.28 −0.99 −0.21
(1.05) (1.18) (1.53) (1.10)
Constant 82.54∗∗∗ 79.97∗∗∗ 79.39∗∗∗ 87.62∗∗∗
(3.06) (3.45) (4.68) (3.49)
Observations 95 95 95 95
Random variance 2.55 3.15 2.67 3.32
Residual variance 56.24 71.93 144.45 91.17
ICC 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
Log Likelihood −318.371 −329.294 −359.860 −336.852
Akaike Inf. Crit. 652.742 674.588 735.720 689.705
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 673.173 695.019 756.151 710.136
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Number of countries = 11
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
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Figure 9: Correlation plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence - Overall
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4controlling for country level predictors.
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4.4 2014 EUvox data
As with the analysis of the 2009 EU Profiler, I begin by exploring the variation in
congruence scores across issue areas, for both absolute citizen and relative mea-
sures of congruence. Table 8 on page 125 presents absolute citizen and relative
congruence scores, assessed with the help of 2014 EUvox data. Each measure of
congruence is assessed on Economy, Social and EU issue categories, but also on
an Overall dimension. The variation of congruence scores on issue dimensions
is illustrated with the help of density plots. Figure 11 on page 124 presents the
density distribution of absolute citizen and relative congruence values per issue
area.
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Figure 11: Density plots - EUvox
The Social issue area presents the most dispersed values, whereas the EU has
most dense ones. The pattern is similar for both measures of congruence. The
Social issue area has the largest standard deviations for congruence scores as-
sessed in 2014, as well in 2009.45
4.4.1 2014 EUvox data- Absolute citizen congruence
Table 9 presents country level predictors, assessed in 2014. The bias towards
old democracies from the 2009 dataset is reduced, with new democracies, such
as Romania, Slovakia or Hungary entering the pool of countries available for
analysis .
45See Figure 7 on page 116
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4Table 8: 2014 EUvox - Country level congruence scores
Absolute citizen congruence Relative congruence
Country Overall Economy Social EU Overall Economy Social EU N
Austria 70.12 65.88 61.90 78.31 71.18 69.36 66.55 77.64 2375
Bulgaria 68.23 65.90 62.33 73.66 75.69 67.15 72.13 87.80 2128
Czech Republic 76.59 73.69 77.25 77.63 74.33 70.79 80.52 71.96 5902
Denmark 63.36 61.37 54.48 69.99 70.90 67.86 57.44 87.09 40688
England 71.21 71.35 65.18 74.34 74.33 75.39 70.51 77.08 16280
Estonia 73.41 64.64 73.52 78.12 80.35 70.50 82.01 88.55 4692
Finland 68.59 71.46 59.41 74.18 76.75 84.50 59.73 86.02 2515
France 61.88 53.43 61.71 67.11 68.88 68.79 61.91 75.95 1693
Germany 64.40 61.76 57.35 71.05 67.51 63.44 58.66 80.44 3217
Hungary 70.47 67.46 67.56 74.33 75.64 76.38 69.77 80.79 1350
Ireland 65.85 63.13 57.64 74.09 67.78 68.84 60.22 74.29 2310
Italy 67.07 69.56 60.44 70.96 79.05 81.87 60.22 88.17 459
Lithuania 65.03 62.32 55.79 73.67 71.79 70.39 58.35 86.64 1900
Netherlands 71.10 68.22 59.72 77.28 66.83 69.44 57.29 73.75 600
Northern Ireland 66.70 71.94 62.21 66.89 72.50 74.23 62.60 80.66 430
Poland 66.68 57.43 64.40 73.63 70.52 65.70 64.69 81.18 19053
Portugal 64.05 57.85 54.64 74.01 64.66 62.63 49.94 79.55 8382
Romania 73.14 72.71 69.92 75.55 79.89 76.14 75.84 87.70 2173
Scotland 69.68 62.54 73.93 70.34 74.48 65.13 81.71 76.60 2062
Slovakia 65.23 65.97 54.16 73.56 79.22 78.81 74.81 84.04 740
Slovenia 69.96 65.99 66.70 74.79 75.08 71.34 75.66 78.24 414
Spain 60.07 61.29 40.51 72.82 63.24 65.68 45.08 78.96 29708
Wales 69.66 61.03 72.62 72.13 74.40 64.14 83.00 76.07 1531
Mean 65.60 62.9 57.0 72.8 72.4 70.7 65.8 80.6
Standard deviation 8.38 14.7 16.15 10.34 8.76 13.55 15.12 11.31
Absolute citizen congruence is assessed at individual level; Relative congruence is assessed at party level
Source: 2014 EUvox
4.4.2 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox data Absolute citizen con-
gruence
The correlation plots in Figure 12, page 127, present the associations between
country level predictors and congruence, assessed as absolute citizen congru-
ence. The plots suggest that there is a positive association between the effective
number of parties and congruence, as hypothesized (H1). The relationships be-
tween polarization(H3), disproportionality(H2), district magnitude(H4) and old
democracies which indicate negative associations, especially in the case of old
democracy, that has the steepest decrease, contrary to the theoretical expecta-
125
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Table 9: Country level predictors - 2014
Country EFNP LSq Polarization District magnitude Old democracy
Austria 3.96 3.31 3.96 20.30 1
Bulgaria 5.06 5.06 4.37 4.74 0
Czech Republic 6.12 6.12 5.43 14.29 0
Denmark 5.61 0.73 3.57 10.50 1
England 2.57 15.10 2.37 1.00 0
Estonia 4.72 2.34 4.46 9.20 0
Finland 5.83 2.95 2.85 13.33 1
France 2.83 17.66 4.43 1.00 1
Germany 3.51 7.83 3.34 1.90 1
Hungary 2.01 17.80 5.85 4.00 0
Ireland 3.52 8.69 2.20 4.00 1
Italy 3.47 17.34 3.89 22.50 1
Lithuania 5.28 9.08 3.41 35.30 0
Netherlands 5.70 0.99 4.04 8.30 1
Northern Ireland 4.16 4.22 2.37 1.00 1
Poland 3.00 5.9 5 2.92 11.20 0
Portugal 2.93 5.68 3.19 10.50 0
Romania 2.12 6.20 2.13 1.00 0
Scotland 2.61 7.45 2.37 1.00 1
Slovakia 4.01 7.46 5.14 150.00 0
Slovenia 3.97 6.57 2.15 10.00 0
Spain 2.60 6.93 4.58 6.69 1
Wales 2.90 10.47 2.37 1.00 1
tions outlined in H5.46
4.4.3 Results - 2014 EUvox data - Absolute citizen congruence
Table 10 on page 128 presents the results of linear mixed effects regression mod-
els using an absolute citizen measure assessed in 2014. Across models, the effect
of the effective number of political parties (H1) is in the hypothesized direction
46These associations are supported by the correlation tests in Table 23, page 234 of the Ap-
pendix. Absolute citizen congruence scores are positively correlated with the effective number
of parties and disproportionality of the system, but present a negative, although small, corre-
lation with district magnitude, polarization and old democracy. Even though new countries
were added to the dataset, the correlation coefficients between the country level predictors do
not change much
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Figure 12: Correlation plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence - Overall
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in the Social.c and EU.c models, although they do not reach statistical signifi-
cance. The old democracies of Western Europe present less congruence, with the
largest effect found in the Social.c model, where old democracies score almost
10 congruence points less then the CEE countries. The hypothesis finds support
also across the Overalll.c and EU.c models.
Table 10: Absolute citizen congruence - EUvox
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall Economy Social EU
EFNP 0.78 1.78 1.84 0.78
(0.96) (1.30) (2.12) (0.96)
Polarization −0.84 −1.48 −1.94 −0.82
(0.78) (1.08) (1.72) (0.78)
Disproportionality 0.36 0.30 2.36 0.36
(0.88) (1.22) (1.92) (0.88)
Old democracy −4.78∗∗∗ −3.24 −9.86∗∗∗ −4.78∗∗∗
(1.54) (2.08) (3.34) (1.54)
District magnitude −0.74 0.40 −2.48 −0.74
(0.74) (1.02) (1.64) (0.74)
Constant 70.24∗∗∗ 66.86∗∗∗ 67.84∗∗∗ 70.24∗∗∗
(1.162) (1.571) (2.524) (1.162)
Observations 155 155 155 155
Random variance 7.18 9.50 40.22 7.18
Residual variance 18.38 52.86 54.26 18.38
ICC 0.28 0.14 0.44 0.28
Log Likelihood −355.859 −413.406 −422.547 −355.859
Akaike Inf. Crit. 727.717 842.812 861.094 727.717
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 750.149 865.244 883.526 750.149
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The intra class coefficients for each of the 4 models are reported in Table 10 and in
Table 29 on page 235) of Apendices for baseline models. The low ICC of the EU.c
model indicates that 0.7% of the total variance in absolute citizen congruence
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Figure 13: Random country intercepts - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence
scores are accounted for by the clustering in the data, namely the countries.
Although this means that individuals’ congruence scores are not very different
as we move from one country to other, the ICC for the Economy.c and Social.c
model indicate that 14% and respectively 27% of variation is accounted for by
clustering under countries.47 Accordingly, a larger part of the total variation in
congruence scores is between country variation in the Economy.c and Social.c
models.
As stressed above, the ICCs in Table 10 suggest that 27% of the variation in
congruence scores in the Social model is between country variation. I explore
47The variation in congruence scores across the issue areas has been tested for and the results
of the tests are presented in Table 24. As the low p-values suggest, the variation across the
different issue dimensions, observed in Figure 11 and Table 8 is not due to chance
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this variation in Figure 13, plotting the the random effects of the intercept. The
values of the countries’ intercepts vary from 51.24 (Spain) to 80.54 (Scotland).
The variation is smaller when we look at the Economy.c and EU.c model. There
is no clear pattern visible across countries. Comparing the ICC of the baseline
models (Table 29, page 235 in Apendices) with the ICC of the models in Table
10, we notice change in the Social.c and EU.c models. By controlling for country
level variables, the variability between countries decreases slightly.
4.4.4 2014 EUvox data - Relative congruence
4.4.5 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox data Relative congruence
The association plots from Figure 14 are used as preliminary hypothesis tests.
Illustrating the effect of the number of parties, polarization and district magni-
tude, H1, H3, H4 are supported by association plots, although there is a large
amount of error. H2 and H5, portraying the effect of disproportionality and old
democracy are not supported by the data. 48
4.4.6 Results - 2014 EUvox data Relative congruence
The results of the mixed effects models, with relative congruence as response
variables are presented in Table 11 on page 131.49. The effect of a country’s status
as an old democracy (H5) has a negative effect on relative congruence, with the
largest effect found in the Social.c model, where citizens in new democracies are
48As it can be seen in Table 26 on page 235 of the Appendices, the relative congruence
scores are positively correlated with the effective number of parties and disproportionality
of the system, district magnitude and polarization. Old democracies tend to present lower
levels of relative congruence. This relationship is present for both correlation analyses, with
r = -0.27***. The negative correlation between disproportionality of the system and district
magnitude is present in 2014, as in 2009 (r = -0.20*** and r = -0.1), indicating that as district
magnitude increases, the disproportionality decreases. Old democracies and district magnitude
are negatively correlated, in both years and all four correlation analyses, but the results may
due to the fact that the countries with a district magnitude of 1 are old democracies.
49The difference in variation in congruence scores across issue categories visible in Figure 11
on page 124 is tested using the ‘Asymptotic test for the equality of coefficients of variation from
k populations’ and the ‘Modified signed-likelihood ratio test for equality of CVs’. The results
are presented in Table 25 The low p-values suggest that the variation across the different issue
dimensions is not due to chance.
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4Table 11: Relative congruence EUvox
Dependent variable:
Relative congruence
Overall Economy Social EU
EFNP 1.53 2.75∗ 1.37 0.64
(1.16) (1.49) (2.57) (1.52)
Polarization −1.48 −1.19 −2.43 −0.98
(1.03) (1.34) (2.23) (1.35)
LSq 1.88∗ 2.71∗ 2.70 0.44
(1.13) (1.47) (2.53) (1.48)
Old democracy −4.47∗∗ 0.47 −10.33∗∗ −3.43
(1.93) (2.51) (4.25) (2.53)
District magnitude 1.34 2.63∗∗ 0.48 0.89
(1.04) (1.32) (2.39) (1.36)
Constant 75.36∗∗∗ 70.44∗∗∗ 72.71∗∗∗ 82.82∗∗∗
(1.45) (1.91) (3.17) (1.90)
Observations 168 166 166 168
Random variance 8.39 5.51 62.68 12.97
Residual variance 61.34 166.86 141.78 116.08
ICC 0.12 0.03 0.31 0.10
Log Likelihood −583.178 −652.296 −649.360 −634.037
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,182.356 1,320.592 1,314.721 1,284.074
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,207.347 1,345.488 1,339.617 1,309.066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Number of countries = 23
Source: 2014 EUvox
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Figure 14: Correlation plots - EUvox Relative congruence - Overall
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410.33 points more congruent with their most preferred party. The hypothesis
finds support in the Overall.c model as well.
The hypotheses regarding the effect of the effective number of parties and district
magnitude find support in the Economy.c model. Contrary to the theoretical
expecttations, disproportionality has a positive effect on congrunece scores, but
the result reaches statistical significance only in the Economy.c model.
The largest variation between countries is found on the Social issue area, with
the model presenting an ICC of 0.31. The random variance for countries is 62.78,
higher than in the rest of the models. I explore this variation in Figure 15. The
country intercept in the Social model is set at 72.71, with a standard error of
3.17. Looking at the random effects of country intercept (Figure 15), we notice
that some countries in the data set have intercepts as low as 59.54 (-13.17 value
of random effect) for Lithuania or 62.02 (-10.69) for Spain and as high as 82.9
(9.58) for Scotland.
The standard error for the country intercept in the Social.c model is higher,
compared to the Economy.c and EU.c models across the regression models, with
absolute citizen and relative congruence assessed in 2009 and 2014.
Compared with the baseline models (Table 30, page 236 of Appendices), once we
control for country level predictors, the variability across countries is reduced,
for the Economy.c and Social.c models.50
4.5 Discussion
In this section I investigated the effects of system level predictors on congruence,
assessed with the help of 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox data. The effect of
effective number of parties, polarization, district magnitude, disproportionality
of the system and old democracy status were tested against absolute citizen and
relative congruence. Both absolute citizen and relative congruence scores are
assessed at a party level. Due to the nesting of the data, with parties nested
under countries, a multilevel approach was preferred. For both election years,
2009 and 2014, the two measures of congruence are assessed on the Economy,
50From ICC = 0.07 to 0.03 for the Economy.c model and ICC = 0.36 to 0.31 for the Social.c
model
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Figure 15: Random country intercepts - EUvox Relative congruence
Social and EU issue areas, plus an Overall measure.51 The linear mixed effects
models did not prove sufficient in explaining the variation in congruence across
countries, but it offered insights into the variation in congruence across issue
dimensions.
Contrary to the theoretical expectations, old democracies tend to present lower
levels of congruence. In the instances where the estimates reached statistical sig-
nificance, the hypotheses are not supported by the data. The expected contrast
between old and new democracies, based on the reasoning that Western democ-
racies are more stable and institutionalized, with a long democratic history is
not found. However, this result is in line with previous research (Dalton 2017b).
51The Overall measure is assessed as an average across the congruence scores on the Econ-
omy, Social and EU issue areas
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4What the results show is that old democracies present lower levels of congruence
on the Social issue area, as data from 2014 shows. However, these results can be
attributed to the bias inherent in VAA data. As mentioned throughout the thesis,
VAA data is biased towards young, better educated individuals, with higher lev-
els of interest in politics. The new democracies of Eastern Europe are countries
with less VAA experience compared to the older democracies of Western Europe.
Consequently, the biases are exacerbated in these countries. I will explore these
expectations later on, in the centered on individual level characteristics.
4.6 Conclusion
As presented in the introductory and theoretical chapters, Dalton (1985) studied
dyadic correspondence between citizens and party elites by calculating ‘issue
centrism’ scores52, and a measure of political ‘responsivness’,53 on issue areas,
such as economic policy, foreign aid, security policy and new politics. In a
similar manner, I investigated congruence as the agreement between a citizen
and the party she intends to vote for in the upcoming EP elections, on three issue
areas, Economy, Social and EU. The system level characteristics tested by Dalton
(1985), PR system, number of parties and legislative fractionalization proved to
have different correlation estimates, depending on the issue domains. This was
one of the reasons I focused on issue domains, to explore the variations across
issue dimensions. This conclusion section is built around three major points,
addressing the lack of consistent results, the variation across issue domains and
the differences across the two measures of congruence.
Although preliminary hypotheses testing suggested that the number of parties,
the polarization and proportionality of the system may impact congruence, the
results of the mixed effects models proved inconclusive. Besides the varying
52Issue centrism is defined by Dalton (1985) as a measure of representation that ‘focuses on
aggregate policy agreement between parties and voters. Centrism implies that parties locate
themselves near the centre of the opinion distribution of their supporters. The dispersion
of opinion within the constituency is not considered, because parties presumably have little
control over the variation in policy views among their voters. [...] centrism measures whether
a party represents the policy preferences of its average voter.’ (Dalton 1985, p280)
53assessed as the result of a regression equation between the party elites’ mean position and
the party supporters’ mean position (Dalton 2017b)
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direction of the effects in the case of polarization and the status of a country
as a new or old democracy, the large standard errors stop me from drawing any
conclusions regarding the direction or strength of the relationship. However, the
lack of findings is line with the results of previous studies (Belchior 2013). In
spite of the inconclusive results, the analysis provided some interesting insights
with regards to congruence on issue areas. Mainly, it did show that there is
variation across issue areas, which makes for a promising research avenue, which
brings me to the second point.
The variation in congruence scores across issue areas is reflected in the mixed
effects models not only in the effect of the predictors, but also on the values the
regression constants take, which are highest on the EU area across both elections
and congruence measures. One of the benefits of assessing congruence on issue
areas is that we avoid the ‘trap’ set by ideological congruence, that assumes a
unidimensionality in the political space. In this work, this unidimensionality is
represented by the overall assessment of congruence. Focusing only on this mea-
sure, we obtain one portrayal of congruence. However, the ranking of countries
is distorted when congruence is assessed on the Social issue area, for example.
I will discuss at length the comparison between absolute citizen and relative
measures of congruence in the Conclusions chapter of the thesis. For the time
being, after assessing the effect of system level predictors on congruence, one
can notice that the two measures tell a relatively similar story. However, when
assessed with the relative measure, congruence values are higher with 10 points
on average.
Moving from the overallabsolute citizen to relative congruence, the pattern across
countries is consistent, but less so when we turn our attention towards issue areas.
With congruence assessed as an absolute citizen measure, there is more variation
across countries on the Social issue area, compared to the Economy or the EU.
Countries are most similar on the EU issue dimension. When congruence is
assessed as a relative measure, the Social issue area remains the category with the
largest variation across countries. For the purpose of this section, using a relative
approach to congruence showed a slightly more positive image of congruence in
the countries under study.
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4In the next section, the focus is on party level characteristics, such as niche or
mainstream status, ideological leaning, governmental status and the election cy-
cle. After failing to show that country level predictors impact congruence, as
Belchior (2013) suggests, turning our attention towards a lower level of explana-
tion, namely party level characteristics, may represent a more fruitful avenue.
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5 Party characteristics and issue congruence
‘Electoral systems however do
influence niche party
competitiveness. The role of niche
parties in turn has dramatic
implications for the way in which
representation works. Thus,
electoral systems matter because
they influence the level of niche
party competition.’ - Ezrow
(2010)
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, Congruence under different institutional designs, I tested
the effects of system level characteristics, including: polarization, district magni-
tude, the number of political parties, proportionality of the electoral system and
the status as an old or new democracy. These characteristics were tested on the
match between individuals and the party they intend to vote in the upcoming
elections to the European Parliament, assessed as absolute citizen and relative
congruence. By matching I am referring to the agreement between citizens and
their most preferred party.54 Because 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox datasets
used in the previous chapter contain information on the European member states,
to account for nesting in the data, a hierarchical modeling approach was taken.
The data did not support the hypotheses (see summary of hypotheses tests, in
Table ?? on page ??). One possible culprit may be the measures of congruence
used, namely issue congruence. Most representation studies assess the match
between citizens and their representatives.55. However, failing to show that the
aforementioned predictors have an effect on congruence are a common finding in
representation studies (Belchior 2013)
Political parties are the agents responsible for the well functioning of a democracy,
54Identified as the party they intend to vote for in the upcoming elections to the European
Parliament
55The representative can be a government, individual legislators or political parties
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5due to their central role in articulating citizens’ political preferences. The focus
of this section is on the characteristics of political parties that may impact the
match between citizens and their representatives. I will address two points that
stand out in representation studies, both best assessed within the analysis at
the party level. The first one is related to the niche party status, and calls on
more attention to be paid to the role that niche parties play in the process of
democratic representation. The second point addresses the reasons behind the
non-findings in the analysis at the country level.
Following Meguid (2005) niche parties differ from mainstream parties in three
significant ways. First of all, instead of prioritizing economic demands, niche
parties focus on issues neglected by the mainstream parties. Second, the issues
promoted by niche parties are not only novel, but also diverge from the existing
structure of political division. A third and last differentiation, niche parties focus
on a limited number of issues, and most times are being perceived as single issue
parties. Their importance in the process of democratic representation is the focus
of the steady stream of studies, pioneered by Meguid (2005, 2008).
Niche parties refer to those parties that occupy the extreme Left and Right, or a
non-centrist position. They belong to Green, Communist and Right-wing Nation-
alist party families, while mainstream parties belong to Conservative, Christian
Democratic, Social Democratic or Liberal party families Ezrow (2010).
Niche party supporters are often overlooked in traditional surveys. Rather than
overlooking, traditional surveys do not reach groups such as niche party sup-
porters. However, VAA data, as an opt-in sample, does include this particular
group. I am referring here to the bias inherent in VAA data, with most of re-
spondents being young, highly educated and highly interested in politics. Most
often perceived as negative, the bias in VAA data can also work to a researcher’s
benefit. Probably the main advantage of the VAA data is that it reaches groups
in society that are not easily accessible with traditional surveying methods. One
of these groups is represented by the supporters of niche parties. Knowing the is-
sue preferences of VAA users opens a great opportunity to investigate the match
between niche party supporters and their most preferred party, expressed as vote
intention.
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The second point focuses on the question ‘what is next?’, when confronted with
non-findings of country level analysis. Ezrow (2010) argues that electoral sys-
tems matter for political representation in a different way than it was preached
over long decades in representation studies. He stresses the importance of niche
parties as agents promoting congruence. Ezrow’s (2010) main argument is that
citizens who have access to both pathways in a democracy, one created by main-
stream parties and the other by niche parties, are better off than citizens who
have access only to a mainstream pathway. While supporting the point raised
above, that niche parties promote congruence, Ezrow’s (2010) explanation helps
to address my second point, the one related to the non-findings in the analysis at
a country level. Testing the effect of an electoral system’s settings on the match
between citizens and parties may not prove fruitful, exactly because the electoral
systems matter in a different way than it was thought. Some electoral systems
make it easier for niche parties to become institutionalized and ultimately, to
offer political alternatives.
Non-findings are a common result in congruence studies focusing on country-
level predictors Belchior (2013). After failing to show that proportionality and
fractionalization of the electoral system determine the ideological congruence
between MPs and citizens, and following Belchior (2013), I will turn my attention
towards the characteristics of political parties.
Accordingly, the aim of this section is to explore the relationship between par-
ties’ characteristics and their ability to represent the political preferences of their
supporters. By parties’ characteristics I am referring to the mainstream/niche
differentiation and governmental status. However, Reif (1984) suggests that ac-
counting for governmental status is not enough. One has to control for the
amount of time a party has been in government. Accordingly, I will account for
election cycle, calculated as the time between the national and EP elections, as
suggested by Reif (1984). I will also control for the ideological leaning of the
party (Left, Right, or centrist).56
56Although the most popular approach is the placement of parties on a ten or seven point
Left-Right scale, for ease of analysis, I coded the parties on a 3 point Left-Right scale, using
their party family affiliation
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55.1.1 Hypotheses
Based on Belchior’s (2013) results, suggesting that centrist parties are more
congruent with their supporters, I hypothesize that
H6: Parties at the centre of the ideological spectrum are less congruent with
their supporters.
However, centrist parties, in trying to attract the median citizen, loose their ide-
ological edge. Alternatively, one could argue whether niche parties are better in
representing their voters compared to mainstream parties. Ezrow (2010) argues
that citizens in PR systems are better represented, compared to plurality sys-
tems, because they are presented with more avenues for representation, which
he calls pathways. More precisely, his argument is based on the fact that niche
parties offer new channels of representation, that are not offered by mainstream
parties who respond only to changes in the mean voter position. The analysis
developed in this section focuses on the effect of niche party status, tested with
the following hypothesis:
H7: Niche parties present higher levels of congruence with their supporters,
compared to mainstream parties.
Another reason behind this hypothesis is that given the nature of the measure
of congruence, especially the relative one, the distribution of preferences within
a niche party is expected to be smaller, compared to a mainstream party.
Going on step further, and following (Ezrow 2010, p. 121), who argues that citi-
zens in disproportional systems are not able to reward political parties for policy
distinctiveness, I test whether parties in more proportional systems are more
congruent with their supporters. More precisely, this relationship is tested with
a cross-level interaction between the disproportionality of the electoral system
and niche/mainstream party status.
H7a: Niche parties will present higher congruence with their voters on the in
systems with higher proportionality
Based on the findings of Mattila & Raunio (2006), Dalton, Farrell, McAllister
et al. (2011), who argue that generally, larger parties are more congruent with
their voters on economic issues, rather than social or cultural ones, I hypothesize
that:
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H7b: Mainstream parties will present higher congruence with their voters on the
Economic issue dimensions
Based on the assumption that niche parties perform better on the Social issue
area, and because there are less niche parties in Eastern Europe, I expect that
H7c: Eastern European democracies will present lower levels of congruence on
Social issues
The hypothesis is based on the assumption that due to the lack of niche parties
in Central and Eastern Europe, social issues are not pushed on the political
agenda and that consequently political competition revolves around economic
issues, where mainstream parties are in closer agreement with their supporters.
Regarding governmental status, the expectation is that parties with higher gov-
ernmental status present lower degrees of congruence with their supporters. The
logic behind this reasoning is that government parties tend to be more centrist
and larger. By adopting a centrist position, parties are losing their ideological
distinctiveness, leading to confusion among their voters with regards to policy
stances. Accordingly,
H8: Parties with governmental status present lower levels of congruence with
their supporters.
Controlling for governmental status is not enough, as the timing of the elections
matters as well. Reif (1984) devised the concept of an election cycle, as the period
of time between the European elections and national ones. The expectation is
that a party with high governmental status will present lower levels of congruence,
the further it goes in an election cycle.
H8a: As the elections to the European Parliament are closer to the national
ones, parties with higher governmental status present lower levels of congruence
with their supporters.57
Investigating the effect of incumbency status on the positions of the parties on EU
issues, Arnold & Franklin (2012) argues that incumbent parties are more likely
to be in favour of European integration (Arnold & Franklin 2012). I hypothesize
that
57In other words, the expectation is that there will be a significant interaction effect between
the election cycle and governmental status variables
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5H8b: Parties with high governmental status will tend to present higher levels of
congruence on the EU issue area.
5.1.2 Data
As in the previous section, data from the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox
are used to assess congruence and to test the effect of its predictors. The same
hypotheses are tested on both data sets.58 Comparisons between the 2009 EU
Profiler data and 2014 EUvox data have to be treated with caution, since the data
is not representative of the countries’ voting population and the country sample
sizes vary dramatically between the two data sets.59 As flagged throughout the
thesis and emphasized in the beginning of this section, the main caveat of VAA
data is a lack of representativeness. VAA users tend to be young, better educated
and more interested in politics, nut are non-representative of the population at
large. Among these VAA users are supporters of niche parties, whose opinions
are not easily captured through traditional surveys.
Congruence between the VAA users and their most preferred party expressed
as vote intention is assessed as absolute citizen and relative congruence. The
absolute citizen measure is assessed at an individual level, and individual scores
are aggregated to obtain party scores. Relative congruence is assessed at a party
level. The structure of the analysis is similar to the previous chapter, which
focused on country level predictors of congruence. I start by looking at congru-
ence assessed as absolute citizen and relative congruence, measured with data
collected through the 2009 EU Profiler, then I use the same modeling strategy
on the 2014 EUvox data.
5.2 2009 EU Profiler data
The 2009 elections to the European Parliament ran in 27 countries, where a
number of 736 political parties participated. Due to data limitations, the 2009
EU Profiler dataset is reduced to 11 countries, with 94 parties (see Table 31).60
58Due to data constraints, the final 2009 EU Profiler data set includes 11 countries (Belgium
is split between Flanders and Wallonia), while the 2014 EUvox contains 24 countries
59As expected, the data sets from countries with less VAA experience are smaller
60Some of the political parties in the VAA dataset did not compete in the EP 2009, such as
MRC - France. Because they are associations, not registered as political parties, they are not
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Table 31 in Appendix shows the party level predictors assessed in 2009, as well
as the values of congruence scores for each of the parties included in the data
set.
5.2.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler
Because niche party status is one of the variables that make the focus of this
study, I will start by exploring the relationship between niche parties and con-
gruence. Following Meguid (2005), a party is categorized as niche party if it em-
phasizes a limited number of issues that are usually neglected by the mainstream
parties and it is usually known as a single issue party. The operationalization
of niche parties is restricted to Green, radical-right/nationalist, Communist and
ethno-territorial party families.
Niche parties are not a new phenomenon; Green parties emerged in the 1970s, and
radical Right parties emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Meguid 2005). However,
compared to the mainstream parties, their number is relatively low. To get an
overview of the difference in numbers between niche and mainstream parties,
while accounting for ideological leaning, I divided the parties into Left, centre
and Right wing parties. Among the 94 parties for which congruence scores
were assessed, 18 are niche parties. Figure 46 illustrates the distribution of
parties across the niche versus mainstream and ideological leaning in the 2009
EU Profiler data set. Even though there are less niche parties than mainstream
ones, one can look at the distribution of congruence scores across these categories.
mentioned in the ‘The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament. Country Reports’ (Gagatek
2010) used as reference material
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Figure 16: EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence Niche vs Mainstream
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Figure 18: Violin plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence
Figures 17 and 18 present the density distributions of party congruence scores,
illustrated as violin plots, for the absolute citizen and relative congruence mea-
sures. The right side pane of the figures show the distribution of congruence
scores for niche parties, and the left side for mainstream ones. At the top are the
illustrated the parties on the Right side of the ideological spectrum, while at the
bottom are the ones on the Left.61 When congruence is assessed as an absolute
citizen measure, niche parties on the Right present in general less congruence
61Because only one of the niche parties was coded as a centre party, I removed this category
from the plots
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5compared to niche parties on the Left side of the ideological spectrum.62 How-
ever, the congruence scores of parties on the Left, both niche and mainstream,
vary to a higher degree. Moving on to relative congruence, the distributions
of congruence scores of parties on the Left and on the Right are more similar.
Niche parties present higher congruence compared to mainstream parties.63 At
first sight, it seems that the way in which congruence is assessed depicts different
stories of representation.
Table 32 on page 239 of the Appendix presents the mean party congruence scores
for Economy, Social and EU issue areas, assessed with both measures of congru-
ence. A careful examination shows that parties present higher level of congruence
when assessed as a relative measure.64 There is higher congruence on the Social
issue area when congruence is assessed as an absolute citizen measure, but when
the relative measure is used, the EU issue area comes in first. In the next sub-
section, I explore the variation in party congruence scores across issue areas with
mixed effects models, fitting one model for each issue area.
5.2.2 2009 EU Profiler data - Absolute citizen congruence
Due to the nesting in the data, with parties being nested within countries, a
hierarchical modeling approach is the most suitable one. As the results of the
previous empirical chapter indicate, the country level predictors do not account
for congruence, neither absolute or relative. After extending the model to include
party level characteristics in addition to system level ones, it becomes:
yijk = αkji + β1EFNPk + β2Disproportionalityk + β3DistrictMagnitudek
+β4Polarizationk + β5OldDemocracyk + i + β6Nichej
+β7GovernmentalStatusj + β8ElectionCyclek + β8LeftRightj + i
(4)
62Right wing niche parties’ absolute citizen congruence score mean = 71.86, Left niche par-
ties’ absolute citizen congruence score mean = 74.96
63Niche parties relative congruence score mean = 85.50, mainstream parties relative congru-
ence scores mean = 82.42
64On the Economy issue area, mean = 73.16 for absolute citizen and mean = 81.09 for
relative congruence, on Social issue area mean = 71.74 for absolute citizen and mean = 83.32
for relative congruence and for EU mean = 74.36 for absolute citizen and mean = 82.88 for
relative congruence
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and
αj = µα + ηj
.
Table 12 on page 149 presents the results of hierarchical regression models fo-
cusing on party level predictors that have absolute citizen congruence as a re-
sponse variable. To account for nesting in the data, the models include only
a random term for country, but also a random term for party.65 The models
Overall.c, Economy.c, Social.c and EU.c include just the party level predictors,
while Overall.p, Economy.p, Social.p and EU.p are the extended versions of the
models from the previous section, including niche and governmental status, the
election cycle and ideological leaning of the party.66
5.2.3 Results - 2009 EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence
Moving from models with party level predictors to the extended models, once
we control for country level predictors, the effect of a party being in government
and further away in the election cycle is associated with a decrease in congru-
ence scores, but the results do not reach the conventional tresholds of statistical
significace. The ICCs show that once we account for country level predictors
in addition to party level ones, the explained variance at country level increases
only in the EU.p model, but stays the same in the other models.
Hypothesis H6 stated that parties at the centre of the ideological spectrum are
less congruent with their supporters. The results are in the hypothesized direc-
tion across models, except for the EU area, but do not reach the threshold of
statistical significance. Parties on the Right of the ideological spectrum present
less congruence compared to parties on the Left, effect found across all models
except the EU.cp one.
65I am not including a random intercept for parties, because the variation I am interested
in is at the country level
66Although in a multilevel model, the third level (system-level) and second level (party
level) predictors should be centered at their grand mean, I am using a group mean instead.
The reason for this is that system-level predictors have one value per country, therefore a group
mean suffices. Two of the party-level predictors are dichotomous, one is a factor variable and
one continuous, centered on the group mean
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5Table 12: Mixed effects regression models - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congru-
ence
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall.p Overall.cp Economy.p Economy.cp Social.p Social.cp EU.p EU.cp
Country level
EFNP 0.52 −0.76 2.36 2.26
(0.82) (1.14) (2.34) (1.80)
Polarization −1.18 0.24 −3.62 −1.90
(1.18) (1.60) (3.20) (2.48)
Disproportionality −1.26 −0.72 −3.94 −1.42
(1.24) (1.68) (3.50) (2.68)
Old democracy 5.38∗ 6.78∗ 12.22 0.40
(2.98) (4.04) (8.06) (6.26)
District magnitude −0.84 −0.08 −3.76 −1.24
(0.96) (1.30) (2.70) (2.08)
Party level
Niche 0.48 0.28 0.434 0.28 3.08 2.92 −0.34 −0.32
(1.16) (1.16) (1.40) (1.42) (2.48) (2.46) (2.04) (2.06)
Governmental status −1.00 −0.72 −2.94∗ −2.78∗ −3.50 −2.56 2.26 2.70
(1.32) (1.40) (1.60) (1.68) (2.82) (2.90) (2.32) (2.44)
Centre −1.16 −1.34 −1.80 −1.96 −1.78 −1.80 1.12 1.26
(1.18) (1.20) (1.44) (1.44) (2.62) (2.62) (2.10) (2.12)
Right −2.60∗∗ −2.76∗∗ −3.14∗∗ −3.22∗∗ −3.62 −4.16∗ −0.68 −0.92
(1.08) (1.08) (1.28) (1.32) (2.34) (2.34) (1.90) (1.92)
Election cycle −0.52 −2.06 0.34 0.14 −0.22 −5.20 −2.30∗∗ −4.58∗
(0.62) (1.28) (0.88) (1.76) (1.70) (3.46) (1.16) (2.72)
Gov. status * Election cycle 0.48 −1.14 0.16 −0.12 1.04 −4.18 0.16 −2.14
(1.56) (1.94) (1.96) (2.60) (3.34) (4.52) (2.70) (3.70)
Disproprtionality * Niche 1.20 0.60 3.68∗ 2.40
(1.04) (1.26) (2.20) (1.86)
Constant 74.66∗∗∗ 69.82∗∗∗ 74.96∗∗∗ 68.92∗∗∗ 74.46∗∗∗ 63.56∗∗∗ 73.60∗∗∗ 73.26∗∗∗
(0.90) (2.88) (1.18) (3.90) (2.20) (7.66) (1.64) (5.60)
Observations 93 93 93 93 88 88 90 90
Random variance 1.74 2.10 4.92 4.48 20.10 20.86 6.82 11.66
Residual variance 15.96 15.92 23.08 23.28 69.08 68.00 49.22 48.90
ICC 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.18
Log Likelihood −254.602 −246.162 −272.062 −261.743 −302.087 −287.119 −293.342 −281.406
Akaike Inf. Crit. 527.204 522.324 562.124 553.487 622.175 604.239 604.684 592.812
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 549.997 560.313 584.917 591.476 644.471 641.399 627.183 630.309
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
149
Party characteristics and issue congruence
Hypothesis H7 advanced the proposition that niche parties present higher levels
of congruence with their supporters compared to mainstream parties. The co-
efficients work in the same direction across models, expect in the EU.p model .
The results do not reach the conventional threshold of a statistical significance of
p < 0.05. However, when a significance test results in a high probability, it does
not mean that the data provides no evidence that the null hypothesis is false
(Wasserstein & Lazar 2016). In other words, a high probability is not evidence
that the null hypothesis is true. Another important remark is that statistical
significance is sensitive to the sample size. The sample sizes are rather small; 93
and 94 parties in 2009 EU Profiler data and 155 and 168 in 2014 EUvox data.
Looking at the disproportionality of the electoral system and its effect on con-
gruence, the results suggest that more disproportional systems present less con-
gruence. Going one step further, the hypothesis H7a tested whether the effect
of niche parties on congruence is affected by the proportionality of the electoral
system. The regression results do not back up Ezrow’s (2010) argument that
niche parties are rewarded for policy distinctiveness in proportional systems and
that citizens have more means of representation, leading to more congruence.
The coefficients work in the same direction and suggest that for niche parties,
more disproportionality leads to less congruence, but the results reach statisti-
cal significance onlyin the Social.cp model. Hypothesis ( H7b) put forward the
expectation that mainstream parties will present higher congruence with their
voters on economic issues, which is not supported by the data. Similarly, ( H7c),
testing whether parties in Eastern European democracies are less congruent with
their supporters on social issues is not supported either.
Because looking at the effect of governmental status is not enough, hypothesis
H8a tests whether the election cycle has an effect on issue congruence by in-
troducing an interaction term between these two variables. Looking only at the
extended models, for parties in government, congruence decreases as the coun-
try is further away in the election cycle. Although regression coefficients do not
reach statistical significance, the coefficients work in the same direction. Parties
on the Right side of the ideological spectrum present lower levels of congruence
across the models.
Although the results do not reach the conventional threshold of statistical signif-
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5icance, this does not strip the results of substantive significance. As discussed by
Wasserstein & Lazar (2016), P-values do not measure the probability that the
data were produced by random chance alone.
The random country intercepts are plotted in Figure 19, after controlling for the
effect of system and party level predictors. While Economy.p and Social.p models
present a relatively similar pattern, the EU.p model tells a rather different story.
Looking further into these differences, I identified the countries with highest and
lowest intercepts, as well as the issues belonging to the EU issue area.
Table 13 presents the issues with lowest values related to the EU issue area,
looking at the top three and bottom three cases, as indicated by the results of
the mixed effects model (in Table 12, page 149). The aim of this exercise was
to see whether there is a pattern across countries, more precisely if there is an
issue or a set of issues on which parties and their supporters disagree. Issue 28
and 21 register among the lowest vales.67
Table 13: Congruence scores on issues
Issue Se value Eng value Nl value Es value De value Pt value
S21 52.78 61.97 67.93 84.11 64.60 39.95
S22 55.86 49.54 67.28 66.68 55.07 63.06
S23 57.61 52.93 73.88 84.11 67.93 58.83
S24 58.19 55.07 77.04 90.83 67.76 34.60
S25 55.01 50.18 61.80 66.81 58.53 68.86
S26 54.87 56.20 61.13 78.53 56.29 60.64
S27 54.97 60.71 65.90 79.99 64.40 69.13
S28 52.30 53.38 56.59 56.37 54.53 68.66
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
Note: Se, Eng and Nl register the lower values, Es, De, Pt higher values in Figure 19
67Issue 21: ‘On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should
speak with one voice’. Issue 28: ‘Any new European treaty should be subject to approval in a
referendum in country X’
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Figure 19: Country intercepts - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence
5.2.4 2009 EU Profiler data - Relative congruence
Moving from one way of assessing congruence to the other, Figure 43 presents
the density distribution and means of relative congruence scores assessed in 2009,
through violin plots. As discussed in the previous sections, where the 2009 EU
Profiler data was introduced, the distribution of relative congruence scores on the
Right and Left side of the ideological spectrum is rather similar. Looking at the
issue dimension, overall, parties present a more positive image of representation
when congruence is assessed as a relative measure, rather than an absolute one.
Table 14 on page 154 presents the mixed effects models with relative congruence
assessed on the Overall.c, Economy.c, Social.c and EU.c issue areas as dependent
variables.
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55.2.5 Results - 2009 EU Profiler Relative congruence
Hypothesis H6 advanced the proposition that parties at the centre of the ide-
ological spectrum are less congruent with their supporters. As in the previous
models, centre parties tend to be less congruent with their supporters by ap-
proximate 3 points on the congruence scale. However, the effect is much more
modest on EU issues. Furthermore, parties on the right side of the ideological
spectrum present lower levels of congruence across models, except on the EU.c
one. This may be due to the fact that the anti EU policies are a characteristic
of the Right, captured by the VAA policy statements. Even though the results
point in the same direction, the large standard errors indicate that we can have
little confidence in the direction of the relationships.
Hypothesis H7a, testing the interaction effect between the niche party status
and the degree of disporportionality does not find support in the data, similar
to hypothesis H8a, which introduces an interaction term between governmental
status and the election cycle. Looking at the models with party predictors only,
the interaction term has a positive effect (although it fails to reach statistical
significance), suggesting that parties in government present more congruence,
the further on they are in the election cycle. However, moving to the extended
models, the regression results show that for parties in government, congruence
decreases as the country is further away in the election cycle. The effect is
found across the Overall.pc, Economy.pc and Social.pc models, but not for the
EU.pc one. The ICCs do not tell a consistent story; moving from the party to
the extended models, the country level variance explained increases only in the
Overall.c and EU.c models.
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Table 14: Mixed effects regression models - EU Profiler Relative congruence
Dependent variable:
Relative congruence
Overall.c Overall.cp Economy.c Economy.cp Social.c Social.cp EU.c EU.cp
Country level
EFNP 0.845 0.943 1.365 0.300
(1.259) (1.535) (1.803) (1.829)
Polarization −0.114 0.200 −0.011 −0.484
(1.781) (2.171) (2.554) (2.590)
Disproportionality −1.795 −2.526 −2.337 −0.489
(1.827) (2.241) (2.583) (2.683)
Old democracy 3.897 4.839 9.882 −3.094
(4.638) (5.622) (6.718) (6.684)
District magnitude −0.698 −0.228 −1.576 −0.256
(1.456) (1.779) (2.077) (2.126)
Party level
Niche 3.408 3.019 3.707 3.321 5.225 4.316 0.896 1.634
(2.161) (2.219) (2.489) (2.524) (3.477) (3.535) (2.734) (2.861)
Governmental status −3.495 −4.097∗ −3.816 −4.345 −5.439 −5.895 −1.579 −2.106
(2.267) (2.386) (2.631) (2.720) (3.642) (3.787) (2.849) (3.088)
Centre −1.872 −2.741 −3.228 −4.530 −2.545 −3.840 −0.314 0.096
(2.410) (2.579) (2.826) (2.951) (3.860) (4.059) (2.991) (3.359)
Right −0.578 −0.623 −0.944 −1.203 −1.261 −1.200 0.312 0.739
(1.856) (1.901) (2.128) (2.160) (2.990) (3.036) (2.360) (2.447)
Election cycle −0.539 −1.597 0.066 −0.897 −0.312 −2.162 −1.259 −1.709
(1.010) (2.027) (1.310) (2.474) (1.583) (2.901) (1.158) (2.954)
Gov. status * Election cycle 1.597 −0.126 0.135 −1.275 1.580 −1.565 2.966 2.542
(2.516) (3.133) (2.959) (3.674) (4.032) (4.787) (3.137) (4.265)
Disproportionality * Niche 0.888 2.583 2.092 −2.030
(1.910) (2.168) (3.053) (2.455)
Constant 83.626∗∗∗ 80.381∗∗∗ 83.005∗∗∗ 78.995∗∗∗ 85.248∗∗∗ 76.545∗∗∗ 82.860∗∗∗ 85.593∗∗∗
(1.487) (4.531) (1.812) (5.470) (2.365) (6.614) (1.803) (6.484)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Random variance 1.98 2.78 6.54 4.24 3.68 0.00 0.00 7.42
Residual variance 56.90 57.08 73.90 74.22 148.30 0.00 93.28 94.82
ICC 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06
Log Likelihood −311.213 −300.532 −323.788 −310.858 −352.574 −338.483 −331.632 −320.968
Akaike Inf. Crit. 640.427 631.063 665.575 651.717 723.148 706.966 681.264 671.937
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 663.316 669.213 688.465 689.866 746.038 745.116 704.154 710.086
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 20: Country intercepts - EU Profiler Relative congruence
Figure 20 on page 155 presents the country intercepts and their values, extracted
from the mixed effects models from Table 14 on page 154, where countries were
introduced as a random term. For the Social.c model no random effects were
identified. Looking at the Economy.c and EU.c models, we see that the countries
do not present similar patterns. Countries that do well in representing their
citizens’ political preferences on the Economy.c issue area, such as Sweden and
the Netherlands, do worse when we look at the EU.c models. These findings
suggest that looking at the Overall.c model to judge how a country performs in
terms of representation does not suffice. This finding applies to the analysis on
both measures of congruence.
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5.3 2014 EUvox data
Moving to EUvox data, Tables 34 on page 244 presents the values of congruence
scores for parties, assessed with the help of data generated through the VAA
tool for the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. The data set contains
20 countries (although there are 23 entities represented graphically, as Scotland,
Northern Ireland and Wales are treated separately from England), and 168 par-
ties.68 The bias towards Western European democracies observed in the 2009
EU Profiler data set is reduced, because countries such as Hungary and Romania
are included in the data.
5.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox
Tables 37 and 38 in the Appendices, page 247 presents cross tabulation on the
niche and Right-Left variables. Compared with the 2009 EU Profiler (Table 32
on page 239 of the Appendices) the number of mainstream parties on the Left
and on the Right doubles, but the increase in the number of niche parties is
rather modest. The reason is because the new countries introduced in the data
set, mostly Eastern and Central European democracies, do not include niche
parties in their party system configuration. A more extensive description of the
countries and parties included in the data set is found in Table 33 and 34 in the
Appendices, page 241.
68Due to data limitations, for the absolute citizen congruence measure, the scores were
calculated only for 155 parties out of 168
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Figure 21: EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1a
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55.3.2 2014 EUvox data - Absolute citizen congruence
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Figure 24: Violin plots - EUvox Relative congruence
Figure 44 on page 247 presents the density distribution of absolute citizen con-
gruence assessed with the help of data generated through the 2014 EUvox tool.
Overall, niche parties register slightly higher values of congruence compared to
mainstream parties, but the difference consists of only one point. Adding another
layer of differentiation, Left versus Right positioning on the ideological spectrum,
we see that when it comes to niche parties, those on the Right perform less well
than those on the Left. However, this does not hold when we shift the focus to-
wards mainstream parties; on average, mainstream parties on the Right present
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slightly higher levels of congruence with their supporters. These assessments of
absolute citizen congruence were created on a total of 155 parties, among which
16 were niche and 139 were mainstream. A cross tabulation of the number of
parties on ideological positioning and type of party, niche or mainstream, can be
found in Table 37 in Appendices, page 247.
A similar cross tabulation table, only for relative congruence this time, can be
found in Table 38 on page 247 of the Appendices. The number of parties for
which a congruence score was calculated increased to 168, and more niche parties
entered the data set. The density distributions, presented in Figure 45 show very
different distributions if we compare niche parties to the mainstream ones, but
rather similar average values. Looking at the Left/Right divide, parties on the
right, both niche and mainstream, present higher levels of congruence with their
supporters. The top right panel of Figure 45 indicates the presences of two
outliers (British UKIP, who registers a rather high value (81.56) and the Dutch
PVV, that registers a low congruence score (61.57)).
5.3.3 Results - 2014 EUvox Absolute citizen congruence
Table 15 on page 162 presents the mixed effects models with absolute citizen con-
gruence assessed on the Overall.c, Economy.c, Social.c and EU.c issue areas as a
dependent variable. Hypothesis H6 advanced the proposition that parties at the
centre of the ideological spectrum are less congruent with their supporters.The
resylts suggest that on the contrary, centre parties are closer to their supporters
on all issue areas, with the highest effect on Economy related issues, where cen-
tre parties are 4 points more congruent. Furthermore, parties on the Right side
of the ideological spectrum present higher levels of congruence, a trend visible
across all models. The effects reach statistical significance in all models, except
the Social.pc one.
Hypothesis H7a introduces the interaction term between the disproportionality
of the electoral system and niche party status, but it does not find support in
the data. Mainstream parties are not more congruent with their supporters on
economic issues H7b. Parties in Central and Eastern European democracies are
more congruent with their supporters not just on the Social issue area, contra-
dicting hypothesis H7c, but across all issue domains.
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5Hypothesis H8a introduces an interaction term between governmental status and
the election cycle. The regression results show that for parties in government,
congruence decreases as the country is further away in the election cycle. The
effect points in the right direction across all models, but it fails to reach statis-
tical significance. The ICCs (also the random variance) tell a rather interesting
story; moving from the party to the extended models, the country level variance
explained decreases, even though more explanatory variables were added.
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Figure 25: Density plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence
5.3.4 2014 EUvox data - Relative congruence
5.3.5 Results - 2014 EUvox Relative congruence
Hypothesis H6 advanced the proposition that parties at the centre of the ideolog-
ical spectrum are less congruent with their supporters, but the results show that
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Table 15: Mixed effects regression models - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall.c Overall.cp Economy.c Economy.cp Social.c Social.cp EU.c EU.cp
Country level
EFNP 0.76 1.42 1.88 0.76
(0.98) (1.20) (2.16) (0.98)
Polarization −1.04 −1.56 −2.18 −1.04
(0.928) (1.142) (2.041) (0.928)
Disproportionality 0.26 0.56 2.06 0.26
(0.92) (1.16) (2.00) (0.92)
Old democracy −4.76∗∗∗ −3.22∗ −9.70∗∗∗ −4.76∗∗∗
(1.60) (1.96) (3.50) (1.60)
District magnitude −0.88 0.24 −2.54 −0.88
(0.76) (1.00) (1.70) (0.76)
Party level
Niche 0.26 0.52 1.44 1.64 1.14 1.60 0.26 0.52
(1.36) (1.38) (2.26) (2.24) (2.40) (2.40) (1.36) (1.38)
Governmental status 0.82 0.64 4.22∗∗ 3.42∗∗ 1.32 1.34 0.82 0.64
(1.02) (1.04) (1.64) (1.68) (1.78) (1.80) (1.02) (1.04)
Centre 2.44∗ 2.66∗ 4.96∗∗ 4.46∗ 2.78 3.24 2.44∗ 2.66∗
(1.40) (1.42) (2.30) (2.36) (2.48) (2.48) (1.40) (1.42)
Right 2.22∗∗ 2.02∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗ 2.34 2.26 2.22∗∗ 2.02∗∗
(0.899) (0.910) (1.478) (1.503) (1.585) (1.593) (0.899) (0.910)
Election cycle 0.24 −0.28 0.30 −0.44 0.36 −0.28 0.24 −0.28
(0.80) (0.86) (1.00) (1.10) (1.76) (1.90) (0.80) (0.86)
Gov. status * Election cycle −0.22 −0.88 −0.02 −1.14 −0.04 −0.78 −0.22 −0.88
(1.04) (1.10) (1.40) (1.58) (2.10) (2.26) (1.04) (1.10)
Disproportionality * Niche 0.32 −2.20 1.94 0.32
(1.04) (1.70) (1.80) (1.04)
Constant 65.70∗∗∗ 68.70∗∗∗ 60.90∗∗∗ 63.40∗∗∗ 60.14∗∗∗ 65.80∗∗∗ 65.70∗∗∗ 68.70∗∗∗
(1.00) (1.40) (1.34) (1.88) (2.08) (2.92) (1.00) (1.40)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
Random variance 10.12 7.34 6.14 6.22 57.66 42.46 10.12 7.34
Residual variance 18.10 18.30 51.86 51.42 55.36 55.48 18.11 18.30
ICC 0.36 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.30
Log Likelihood −355.465 −345.607 −407.073 −397.061 −424.745 −409.628 −355.465 −345.607
Akaike Inf. Crit. 728.929 721.215 832.145 824.121 867.490 849.255 728.929 721.215
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 754.165 763.275 857.381 866.182 892.727 891.316 754.165 763.275
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5Table 16: Mixed effects regression models - EUvox Relative congruence
Dependent variable:
Relative congruence
Overall.c Overall.cp Economy.c Economy.cp Social.c Social.cp EU.c EU.cp
Country level
EFNP 0.78 1.94 0.28 0.28
(1.24) (1.42) (2.96) (1.56)
Polarization −1.00 −0.58 −2.50 0.06
(1.26) (1.44) (2.96) (1.60)
Disproportionality 1.44 3.06∗∗ 1.52 −0.06
(1.26) (1.46) (2.98) (1.60)
Old democracy −3.50∗ 1.70 −9.98∗∗ −1.86
(2.08) (2.46) (4.98) (2.66)
District magnitude 0.98 2.36∗ 0.50 0.20
(1.14) (1.26) (2.78) (1.42)
Party level
Niche −0.38 −0.04 −1.78 −1.54 3.32 3.64 −3.30 −2.74
(1.88) (1.82) (3.22) (3.22) (3.04) (3.06) (2.64) (2.68)
Governmental status 0.64 0.44 2.58 3.20 1.08 0.76 −1.26 −1.44
(1.46) (1.50) (2.52) (2.60) (2.42) (2.44) (2.06) (2.16)
Centre 4.32∗∗ 3.90∗ 6.04∗ 4.42 0.54 0.36 6.06∗∗ 6.08∗∗
(2.00) (2.04) (3.44) (3.54) (3.26) (3.30) (2.84) (2.90)
Right 7.14∗∗∗ 6.80∗∗∗ 7.38∗∗∗ 6.98∗∗∗ 7.24∗∗∗ 6.92∗∗∗ 6.52∗∗∗ 6.18∗∗∗
(1.26) (1.28) (2.20) (2.24) (2.04) (2.06) (1.78) (1.82)
Election cycle −0.06 −0.12 −1.20 −0.32 −0.04 −1.00 0.88 0.78
(0.98) (1.18) (1.32) (1.46) (2.18) (2.74) (1.12) (1.52)
Gov. status * Election cycle 1.56 1.38 1.66 2.02 1.20 0.26 2.68 2.68
(1.38) (1.50) (2.10) (2.16) (2.68) (3.10) (1.76) (2.02)
Disproportionality * Niche −0.70 −3.64 −0.10 1.46
(1.60) (2.76) (2.58) (2.28)
Constant 68.46∗∗∗ 70.80∗∗∗ 65.86∗∗∗ 65.00∗∗∗ 62.24∗∗∗ 68.38∗∗∗ 77.32∗∗∗ 78.64∗∗∗
(1.26) (1.84) (1.90) (2.52) (2.60) (4.00) (1.60) (2.44)
Observations 168 168 166 166 166 166 168 168
Random variance 12.14 11.10 6.54 1.28 88.16 88.70 7.66 14.76
Residual variance 52.70 53.16 165.82 167.36 134.92 134.10 109.80 109.74
ICC 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.40 0.39 0.08 0.12
Log Likelihood −570.690 −560.795 −647.555 −634.974 −646.400 −632.169 −623.969 −615.118
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,159.379 1,151.589 1,313.109 1,299.947 1,310.800 1,294.338 1,265.938 1,260.236
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,187.495 1,198.449 1,341.117 1,346.627 1,338.808 1,341.017 1,294.054 1,307.095
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the opposite is true. Hypothesis H7a introduces an interaction effect between the
disproportionality of the electoral system and niche party status. As disportion-
ality increases, niche parties present less congruence. The coefficients point in
the right direction across the Overall, Economy and Social models, but the large
standard errors suggest that we can have little confidence in the direction of the
results.
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Figure 26: Density plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence
Hypothesis H7b put forward the expectation that parties in Eastern European
democracies will present lower levels on congruence on social issues, but it does
not find support in the data.
Going one step further, hypothesis H8a introduces an interaction term between
governmental status and the election cycle, setting the expectation that the fur-
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5ther on in the election cycle governmental parties are, the less congruence they
present. The effects are not found in any of the models.
As in the models with absolute citizen congruence the explained variance at
country level decreases once more variables are introduced to the models. The
only model in which adding party level variables helps to explain more random
variance is the EU.c one.
Figure 26 on page 164 illustrates the countries’ intercepts, after controlling for
country and party level predictors, as presented in Table 16 on page 163. The
EU.c model has the lowest variation in each country’s intercepts, with values
between 64.8 and 65.3. The highest variation is found within the Social.c, with
countries such as Lithuania registering values as low as 54 and Scotland as high
as 84. The large variation across countries within the Social issue area can
be attributed to the nature of the issues included in this dimension, including
policies on same sex marriage or immigration.
5.4 Discussion
The previous empirical chapter focused on country level characteristics, such as
polarization, proportionality of the electoral system, district magnitude, number
of political parties and democratic experience and their effect on congruence,
assessed as absolute citizen and relative congruence. I extended the models to
include party level predictors, as scholars of political representation suggested
(Belchior 2013). The party level characteristics that made the focus of this sec-
tion are the niche/mainstream party differentiation, governmental status, elec-
tion cycle and the ideological leaning of the parties.
Niche parties are defined as parties that emphasize a limited number of issues
which are usually ignored by mainstream parties (Meguid 2005). The niche
parties included in the analysis are mostly from Green (Ecolo - Belgium, Die
Grunen - Germany, Centerpartiet - Sweeden) and radical right (Vlaams Belang
- Belgium, Lega Nord - Italy) party families. From the total number of 34
niche parties 69 that competed in the 2009 EP elections, 18 are included in the
69The number of niche parties competing in the EP elections of 2009 and 2014 is based on
my own calculations.
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data set. For 2014, from 35 niche parties, the data set includes 20. Although
the effect of niche party status point in the hypothesized direction, due to the
large standard error we have little confience in the direction of the relationship.
Exploring the effects of niche party status, I introduced an interaction effect
between niche party status and the disproportionality of the electoral system.
This hypothesis is rooted on Ezrow’s (2010) results, who argues that proportional
systems do better in terms of representing their citizens’ preferences, because the
party system configuration in these systems allows for niche party competition.
As a result, citizens in these systems have more political alternatives, and better
chances to find a party that will represent their political preferences to a higher
extent. In a similar fashion, but focusing on the EU policy dimension only,
Mattila & Raunio (2006) show that niche parties represent the views of their
supporters to a larger extent, compared to centrist, government parties. In the
analysis based on 2009 EU Profiler data, more disproportionality corresponds to
less congruence, as expected. 2014 EUvox data shows a reversed pattern, with
more disproportional electoral systems presenting higher levels of congruence.
However, when looking at the interaction term between the niche party status
and disproportionality, the hypothesized effect is found only in 5 out of the 16
models, and predominantly in the analysis of relative congruence assessed with
2014 EUvox data.
The next set of hypotheses focus on governmental status and election cycle. Par-
ties in government tend to be rather large and centrist, in order to appeal to the
median citizen. By adopting a catch-all, centrist position, they lose their ideolog-
ical edge. As a consequence, the agreement with their supporters on particular
issues diminishes. The hypotheses set out the expectation that governmental
status corresponds to lower congruence scores. The effect is found across all
models in the analysis on 2009 EU Profiler data, but only in one of the models
on 2014 EUvox data. This finding reinforces the results of Mattila & Raunio
(2006), who also showed that government parties are less representative of their
voters.
Accounting for the effect of governmental status does not suffice; as Reif (1984)
suggested, the timing of the elections play an important role in the whole congru-
ence story. Accordingly, an interaction effect was introduced, for governmental
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5status and election cycle. The expectation was that further on in the election
cycle a governmental party is, less congruence will present. Although the results
point in the hypothesized diretion (except the model based on relative congruence
assessed with the 2014 EUvox data), they fail to reach statistical significance.
No theoretical expectations were formulated in regards to the ideological leaning
of the parties. Traditionally, more congruence is found on the Left side of the ide-
ological spectrum (Holmberg 2000), which the analysis of 2009 EU Profiler data
also reflects. Parties on the Left are in closer agreement with their supporters.
However, when looking at 2014 EUvox data, the effects are reversed; placement
on the Right side of the ideological spectrum corresponds to more congruence.
This shift may be due to the rise in support for populist right wing parties that
ran in the 2014 EP elections.
After discussing the main findings of this chapter, in the next subsection I will
situate them within the scholarly literature on congruence.
5.5 Conclusions
As Walgrave, Lefevere, Pepermans & Nuytemans (2009) correctly point out, in
most democracies, representation is organized by political parties. Parties are
the ones who present political platforms, and carry them out if elected. One of
the requirements for the proper functioning of a representative democracy is that
the voters cast their ballot for a party because of its political platform, and at the
same time, that ‘voters vote [for] the party that best represents their opinions and
beliefs’ (Walgrave, Lefevere, Pepermans & Nuytemans 2009, p2). Starting from
this assumption, this section focused on the characteristics of political parties
and their role in the match between the voters and their most preferred parties.
After running the analysis on extended models, that included party characteris-
tics as predictors of both absolute citizen and relative congruence and discussing
the results, there are three takeaway points that I will address as concluding
remarks of this section.
The first point is related to niche parties and is rooted in the bias inherent in VAA
data. This is the idea that the bias can be regarded as an opportunity, rather
than a disadvantage. Although it does create substantial bias, over-representing
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the young, better educated and those highly interested in politics, the main
advantage of the VAA tool is that it reaches people whose opinions are not
captured by national or cross-national surveys, such as niche party supporters.
For the purpose of this chapter, it allows one to see whether there are differences
in congruence scores across the type of party.
Overall, niche parties are better in promoting congruence. It may be because
due to their rather narrow focus on issues, they manage to make their position
on certain issues well known. As a consequence, voters can easily identify the
parties that stand closer to their own political preferences. In the models where
niche parties do not present more congruence, once we control for the dispro-
portionality of the electoral system 70, the niche party status is associated with
more congruence.
Another interesting finding is related to the ideological leaning of niche par-
ties. Overall, parties on the Right side of the ideological spectrum tend to
show less congruence compared to those on the Left. Once we introduce the
niche/mainstream party differentiation, we notice that niche parties follow the
same trend. However, in 2014 the situation changes, and only mainstream par-
ties (assessed with absolute citizen congruence) fit this pattern. In the other
three instances (niche parties - absolute citizen congruence and niche and main-
stream parties relative), parties on the Right side of the ideological spectrum
have associated higher congruence scores. This may be due to the fact that
more countries are included in the 2014 data set, such as Austria, Finland, or
Hungary, all with right wing parties with relatively high scores of congruence.71
With extremist parties on the rise, there is more and more interest towards niche
parties, and VAAs play an important role in capturing the preferences of niche
party supporters.
The second point was briefly addressed in the previous chapter, from the perspec-
tive of country level analysis and it touches upon the differences observed across
issue areas. As stressed throughout the thesis, VAA generated data, through
its 30 policy issues provides a great avenue for studying issue congruence. More
than that, the policy issues are classified into three issue dimensions, Economy,
70Through an interaction term
71Austria - FPO 74.84 Finland - Kristillidemocraatit 76.57, Hungary - Jobbik 74.75
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5Social and EU. In addition to assessing congruence on the three issue areas, also
referred to as issue dimensions or issue categories, I used an Overall assessment of
congruence, that includes all issue policies. The varying congruence scores across
issue areas made me believe that an Overall measure of congruence, although
the standard in congruence studies, would depict a distorted reality.
Regressing country and party level predictors of congruence on the three issue
areas and on the Overall measure of congruence returned different results. Look-
ing only at the models with Overall congruence, one would conclude that the
predictors have the hypothesized effects across the two European elections and
across the two measures of congruence employed, with the exception of relative
congruence in 2014 EUvox data. However, looking at the models on issue di-
mensions, we observe a rather different reality. The EU models offer different
results, while the Economy and Social are rather similar.
The difference in the EU issue area, especially in 2014 EUvox data, can be
attributed to the increase in support for right wing parties, that flourished in the
2014 EP elections. This is based on the positive effect on congruence of Right
ideological leaning. This reinforces the advice given by Dalton (1985, 2017b) that
political representation scholars should take a multidimensional approach when
studying congruence.
The third and last point touches upon the different approaches used to measure
congruence in this thesis, the absolute citizen and relative measures. Throughout
the thesis I have argued that a relative measure of congruence, one that takes
into account the distribution of citizens’ congruence scores is superior to an
absolute measure, that is focused on the median citizen. However, the analyses
conducted in this section, centered on party level predictors, as well as the on
extended models which includes country and party level characteristics, offer
rather similar results, but less so on the EU issue area.
What sets the EU issue area apart is the fact that parties are more similar
to their supporters on EU related topics. In both 2009 EU Profiler and 2014
EUvox data, the EU issue area has on average the highest congruence scores,
for both the absolute citizen and the relative measure. For both data sets, the
2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EUvox, the relative congruence approach offers a
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more positive image of congruence, with an average 5 point difference between
the two measures, across all issue areas. More than that, on the EU issue
area niche parties have on average higher scores than mainstream parties, even
though the differences are more modest in the 2009 EU Profiler data. The
niche party category accommodates the radical right parties and their anti-EU
character. The fact that parties are more congruent with their supporters on EU
topics comes as no surprise, given the surge in support the radical right parties
competing in the EP elections of 2014 have known. Furthermore, the ideological
leaning on the right is positively associated with both measures of congruence.
Any other differences between the two data points can be attributed to the
samples, as the 2014 EUvox data set includes the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe.72 In an analysis on the congruence of opinions in the EU
dimension, Mattila & Raunio (2006) show that citizens in the new EU member
states (who are also CEE countries) are better represented by their parties than
those in older EU democracies. They attribute this difference to the central role
the EU occupies in the agendas of new EU member states (Mattila & Raunio
2006). These differences reinforce the point made by (Golder & Stramski 2010)
and suggest that the way we assess congruence may lead to different results.
Including party level predictors did not help explain a larger proportion of vari-
ation across countries. It did however shed light on the performance of niche
parties in promoting more congruence, compared to mainstream parties. In or-
der to get a more complete picture and one often overlooked by the scholars of
political representation due to the lack of an analytical framework, in the next
section I will focus on individual characteristics as predictors of congruence.
72These countries were excluded from the 2009 EU Profiler data set due to the small number
of cases, that did not allow for congruence scores to be calculated.
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66 Individual level predictors of congruence
‘[...]ultimately, it is the voter who
evaluates the policy offers of
parties on the electoral market
and it is the voter who decides to
vote for a party that does, or does
not, match her preferences.
Disaggregating the issue
congruence puzzle to the
individual voter level may be the
best strategy to make progress in
this field.’ - Walgrave & Lefevere
(2013)
6.1 Introduction
As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) point out, at the centre of political representation,
one finds the voter. It is the voter who assesses the political promises of parties,
that casts a vote, then evaluates the performance of her most preferred party
and either rewards or punishes the party in the following elections. Seen as a
cycle, the action of choosing a party and casting a vote has the voter as a central
element. Ultimately, it is the voter who matches her preferences with those of
a party. As a consequence, we should know more not only about the voter’s
political preferences, but also about the individual features of the voter that
may play a role in explaining congruence.
The long tradition of political representation provides explanations for congru-
ence by focusing on either the system or party level. Until recently, research
on congruence systematically overlooked the individual level characteristics that
can play a role in explaining the congruence puzzle. This brings me to the first
point addressed in this section, namely the need to account for individual level
attributes in explaining congruence.
As emphasized in both the introductory and the theoretical chapter, the vast
majority of the studies on congruence focus on a single level of explanation,
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such as features of the political parties or of electoral systems. The individual
level predictors of congruence are systematically neglected, with one notable
exception, Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) and to a smaller extent Steenbergen et al.
(2007). Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) argue that individual policy incongruence is
an area that was previously ignored due to lack of data. The development of the
VAA field came to cover this gap, as VAA generated data provides the perfect
grounds for delving into individual level predictors of congruence. In addition
to information on the users’ political preferences, the VAA tool captures the
individuals’ voting intention, as well as socio-demographic attributes that can
be used in attempting to explain congruence.
The second point I am addressing is related to niche party supporters. Through-
out the empirical chapters, I have emphasized the main advantage of VAA gener-
ated data, namely the users it attracts. Oftentimes interpreted as a disadvantage,
the bias inherent in VAA data can be seen as an opportunity to study groups
who are under-represented in traditional survey tools. In this section, I will look
into the differences between niche and mainstream party supporters, as captured
by VAA data. In what follows, I will briefly restate the working hypotheses that
make the focus of this chapter.
The current section is centered on individual level characteristics in relation-
ship with congruence, assessed as an absolute citizen measure. As I emphasized
throughout the sections, VAA generated data present a major source of bias,
with the young, those from urban areas, highly educated, and those highly inter-
ested in politics individuals being over-represented. However, it is exactly this
bias that allows VAA researchers to address issues focusing on these specific in-
dividuals, whose preferences are often not captured by traditional mass surveys.
Often times, this is the profile of a niche party supporter: with high education
and highly interested in politics, cosmopolitan and with libertarian values.73 I
explored the characteristics of niche parties and their effect on congruence in the
previous section. The analyses centered on country and party level predictors
did not shed light on the entire congruence puzzle, with only isolated effects at
73This fits the profile of a Green party supporter, rather than the one of a radical Right
party, where the profile of a supporter is illustrated by individuals with less education, from
lower strata of the society McGann & Kitschelt (2005)
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6both levels of analysis. Now, it is time to turn my attention towards a lower level
of analysis, namely individual level predictors.
Placing the voter at the center of the representation process requires that we
know the role played by voters’ characteristics in explaining congruence. Most
studies suggest that the congruence between voters and parties is low. The
most common explanation for this lack of congruence is represented by a low
interest in politics, as well as inconsistent preferences74 and misinformation75 on
the voters’ part. However, this misalignment between the preferences of voters
and parties is mostly assessed using ideological and not issue congruence. My
attempts to explain the congruence puzzle at country and party level did not
prove successful, meaning that the country and party level predictors did not
explain much of the variation in congruence scores. I will now turn my attention
towards individual level characteristics, placing the voter at the centre of the
process of political representation. The analysis in this section will allow me to
identify who is better represented.
6.1.1 Hypotheses
As previously emphasized, most of the vast scholarly literature on political rep-
resentation provides explanations for congruence at a single level of analysis,
country or party level. Oftentimes, characteristics of both are included, because
drawing a line between the effect of institutional factors and electoral systems is
extremely difficult. Furthermore, the number of studies that include individual
level characteristics as predictors of congruence is rather limited (Walgrave &
Lefevere 2013). The small area of studies that examine the effect of individual
characteristics in relationship with congruence, focus on educational attainment
and political interest. Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) found that highly educated
and more politically interested individuals are less likely to be incongruent with
74Following Converse & Pierce’s (1986) theory on integrated belief systems, the lack of
consistency of voters’ political preferences makes it difficult for them to make a vote choice,
even more a ‘correct’ one (voting for the party that best matches the voter’s preferences) (Lau
& Redlawsk 1997).
75Because VAAs follow a spatial modeling approach, it is worthwhile mentioning that with
this approach, a rational voter takes only policy preferences into account when making a
vote choice. Also, this view assumes that a by doing so, a rational voter will vote ‘correctly’
(Walgrave et al. 2016).
173
Individual level predictors of congruence
their most preferred party. The expectation is that those more knowledgeable
about politics will be more congruent with their most preferred party. Because
education works as a mediator between knowledge and congruence, I hypothesize
that: H9: Individuals with higher educational attainment present higher levels of
congruence with their preferred political party. A slightly different line of stud-
ies, focusing on the representation of sub-groups show that there is inequality in
representation generated by income. More precisely, that policy tends to repre-
sent the wealthier electorate (Soroka & Wlezien 2008). Similarly, that policy is
most responsive to the preferences of the better educated. From this perspective,
those with better education are more congruent with their most preferred party
because the parties aims to represent this demographic subgroup.
The argument initiated above, mentioning knowledge, can be extended to polit-
ical interest. More precisely, those with an interest in politics are more knowl-
edgeable about politics and lastly are more likely to participate in politics Powell
(1986). H10: Individuals with higher levels of interest in politics present higher
levels of congruence with their preferred political party. Ezrow (2010) argues that
niche parties improve representation in a party system by offering more channels
of representation. What Ezrow (2010) means by ‘more channels of representa-
tion’ is simply more parties, and consequently, a larger political offer. Given the
nature of niche parties, issues such as immigration or ecology are pushed into
the political agenda, offering voters a wider range of political options. Giger &
Lefkofridi (2014) has shown that on salient issues, policy congruence is higher
between niche parties and their supporters. The analysis of the previous chapter
revealed that niche parties are also more congruent with their supporters. After
studying the effect of niche parties as a party characteristic, in this chapter I
focus on niche parties as an individual attribute. More precisely, I examine the
effect that being a niche party supporter has on congruence. Given the results
of previous studies and the results of the previous empirical chapter, the expec-
tation is that: H11: Niche party supporters are more congruent with their most
preferred party, compared to mainstream party supporters. Before going into de-
scribing and analyzing data, I must address the implications of the bias inherent
in VAA data for the analysis at the individual level. If those who are congruent
are over-represented, it means that the size of the effects must be taken with a
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6grain of salt. More precisely, population estimates would be smaller.
6.1.2 Data
As in the previous two chapters, data from the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 EU-
vox are used to assess congruence and to test the effect of its predictors. The
hypotheses presented above are tested on both data sets.76. Congruence be-
tween the VAA users and their most preferred party expressed as vote intention
is assessed as absolute citizen congruence and it is measured at an individual
level. The relative measure of congruence used in the previous two sections was
assessed at a party level and therefore it is not included in the analysis at the
individual level. The structure of the analysis is similar to the approach within
the previous two chapters. I start by examining absolute citizen congruence us-
ing data collected through 2009 EU Profiler, and then I use the same modeling
strategy on 2014 EUvox data.
6.2 2009 EU Profiler - Absolute citizen congruence
Throughout the thesis I stressed the advantages VAA data presents, in terms of
having individuals and parties express their positions on the same set of issues.
Another aspect that makes these kind of data unique is represented by the public
who use VAA tools. Although open to the wide public, the access to a VAA
tool is restricted by Internet access and Internet literacy, and then mediated
by political interest. Discussing the bias inherent in VAA data, I mentioned
that VAA users tend to be young, mostly male, highly educated and highly
interested in politics (Garzia & Marschall 2012). In what follows, I will explore
the distribution of individual characteristics of VAA users, to see whether it
follows the pattern illustrated in VAA research and discussed extensively in the
introductory chapter.
Figure 27 presents the distributions of individual level characteristics, that are
a focal point of this chapter. The distributions show the patterns described
in VAA studies (Garzia & Marschall 2012). As previously shown by Garzia &
Marschall (2012) and Alvarez, Levin, Trechsel & Vassil (2014) among many, the
76Due to data limitations, the 2009 EU Profiler data set includes 11 countries (Belgium is
split between Flanders and Wallonia), while the 2014 EUvox contains 24 countries
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VAA users tend to be young, with two third of the respondents in the first two
age categories (18 to 29 and 30 to 49). The predominant gender is male, with
only one third female respondents. Furthermore, the respondents report high
levels of educational attainment, approximately two thirds reported higher and
postgraduate education. Lastly, the vast majority of respondents reported high
levels of political interest.
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Figure 27: Individual level characteristics - EU Profiler
These results indicate that the distribution of individuals’ characteristics are in
line with previous findings of VAA research, where users tend to be mostly male,
rather young, better educated, and highly interested in politics.
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66.2.1 Preliminary findings - 2009 EU Profiler
In what follows, I will present some of the preliminary findings leading to the
regression models. I start by exploring the bivariate distribution of individual
level characteristics and congruence scores, assessed as absolute citizen congru-
ence, using violin plots.77 I will start with age, gender, educational attainment
and political interest. Figure 28 presents the distribution of congruence scores
across age categories. Younger users tend to present higher levels of congruence
(in the 18-29 age category, the median value of congruence is 75, while in the
65-84 years, the median is 70). The last age category (85+) also registers the
lowest congruence scores.
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Figure 28: Age - EU Profiler
Figure 29 illustrates the distribution of absolute citizen congruence scores for
gender catgories. The distribution of congruence scores agross genders is rather
similar, with medians close to 75 for both categories.
Studies on the profile of VAA users have shown that they tend to report higher
levels of educational attainment than the general population (Garzia & Marschall
77Violin plots are a combination of boxplots and kernel density plots and are used to represent
comparisons of the distribution of one variable across different categories. In addition to
presenting information on the median value and the interquartile range, it shows the full
distribution of the data, with rotated kernel density plots on each side.
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Figure 29: Gender - EU Profiler
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Figure 30: Education - EU Profiler
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62012). One can notice that as we move towards the higher education categories,
the median of congruence scores increases slightly, from 71 for those in secondary
education to 80 for those with postgraduate studies. In other words, an increase
in education is associated with more congruence.
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Figure 31: Political interest - EU Profiler
Figure 31 shows the distribution of absolute congruence scores across categories
of political interest. One can notice that moving from not at all interested to
very interested in politics, the median value of congruence scores increases.
Figure 32 shows that niche party supporters are in higher levels of agreement
with their most preferred party, compared to mainstream party supporters. The
violin plots suggest associations between absolute citizen congruence and age,
educational attainment and interest in politics. These associations can be treated
as preliminary hypotheses tests.
6.2.2 Results - EU Profiler
The central expectations of this section are that education, political interest and
being a niche party supporter explain the level of agreement between the voter
and her most preferred party. The agreement is assessed as absolute citizen con-
gruence. Due to nesting in the data, with parties being nested within countries,
a hierarchical modeling approach is the most suitable method. After extending
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Figure 32: Niche party supporters - EU Profiler
the model to include individual level predictors in addition to system and party
level ones, it becomes:
yijk = αijk + β1EFNPk + β2Disproportionalityk + β3DistrictMagnitudek
+β4Polarizationk + β5OldDemocracyk + i + β6Nichej + β7GovernmentalStatusj
+β8ElectionCyclek + β8Left/Rightj + β9Agei + β10Malei
+β11Educationi + β12Politicalinteresti + β9ExtremeRiLei + +i
(5)
and αi = µα + ηi. In the preliminary analysis, I fitted four mixed effects models,
focusing solely on the individual level characteristics. I do this to examine the
effect of individual level characteristics without accounting for party or country
level predictors. Figure 33 on page 33 presents the fixed effects plots for each of
the four models. The fixed effects plots78, contain information on the regression
coefficients and a 95% confidence interval around them. The effects of individual
level characteristics vary slightly across models. Males tend to be more congruent
with their most preferred party, but less so on the Social issue area. Overall, the
78The fixed effects plots are created from mixed effects models with absolute citizen congru-
ence as dependent variable and individual level characteristics as independent variables. The
tables with the mixed effects models are found in Appendices, page 253, Table 39
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6effects of individual level predictors are rather similar across the four models.
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Figure 33: Fixed effects - EU Profiler
The regression model below is an extended version of the model from the previ-
ous two chapters, now including individual level predictors, such as age, gender,
education, political interest, self-placement on the Left-Right scale and support
for a niche party. As in the previous chapter, an interaction term between the
disproportionality of the electoral system (LSq) and niche party status is intro-
duced in the model, as well as one between governmental status and the election
cycle. As in the previous chapters, the small number of majoritarian electoral
systems in the data set prevents me from treating the electoral systems as PR or
majoritarian systems. As a consequence, I use the measure of disproportionality
to account for this difference.
181
Individual level predictors of congruence
Table 17: Mixed effects regression analysis - EU Profiler
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall.ipc Economy.ipc Social.ipc EU.ipc
Individual level
Age −0.864∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −2.382∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.083) (0.103) (0.181) (0.137)
Male 0.420∗∗∗ 0.077 −1.565∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.199) (0.348) (0.264)
Education 0.466∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.074) (0.130) (0.098)
Political interest 1.151∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.132) (0.232) (0.175)
Extreme L-R 0.276∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.048) (0.060) (0.105) (0.079)
Niche 1.411 2.327∗ 2.655 −0.087
(0.952) (1.196) (2.075) (1.655)
Party level
Governmental status 1.812 0.664 0.323 4.270∗∗
(1.158) (1.455) (2.522) (2.016)
Centre −0.773 −1.142 −0.708 1.415
(1.141) (1.435) (2.568) (2.008)
Right −2.794∗∗∗ −3.375∗∗ −3.995∗ −0.943
(1.076) (1.352) (2.404) (1.886)
Election cycle −2.376∗ −0.546 −5.214 −4.377∗
(1.253) (1.627) (3.555) (2.385)
Governmental status * Election cycle −0.049 1.529 −4.414 −0.840
(1.693) (2.167) (4.334) (3.102)
Country level
EFNP 0.553 −0.848 2.519 2.200
(0.866) (1.122) (2.443) (1.645)
Polarization −1.510 −0.503 −3.640 −1.679
(1.121) (1.455) (3.136) (2.105)
Disproportionality −1.349 −0.973 −3.755 −1.155
(1.190) (1.545) (3.334) (2.239)
Old democracy 5.849∗ 7.333∗ 13.275 −0.170
(3.250) (4.208) (8.937) (6.069)
District magnitude −0.872 −0.183 −3.493 −1.052
(0.921) (1.194) (2.591) (1.748)
Disproportionality * Niche 0.543 −0.312 3.010 1.754
(0.844) (1.060) (1.835) (1.473)
Constant 64.548∗∗∗ 63.278∗∗∗ 63.000∗∗∗ 66.082∗∗∗
(3.166) (4.093) (8.630) (5.888)
Observations 11,406 11,405 11,328 11,345
Random variance party 13.20 20.84 60.94 20.84
Random variance country 2.83 4.96 27.50 4.98
Residual variance 56.38 87.02 266.45 87.02
ICC party 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
ICC country 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04
Log Likelihood −39,157.740 −41,600.300 −47,751.910 −44,725.790
Akaike Inf. Crit. 78,357.480 83,242.600 95,545.820 89,493.580
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 78,511.660 83,396.770 95,699.850 89,647.640
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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6Table 17 on page 182 presents the results of mixed effects models with absolute
citizen congruence as dependent variables. The models Overall.ipc, Economy.ipc,
Social.ipc and EU.ipc are extended versions of the models from the previous
chapter, that tested the effect of country and party level predictors of congruence.
The models were extended to include individual level predictors, such as age,
gender, education, political interest and self-placement of the Left-Right scale.
Moving to the interpretation of mixed effects models from Table 17, hypothe-
sis H9 put forward the expectation that having more education corresponds to
presenting higher levels of congruence, and H10 suggests that higher political
interest corresponds to more congruence. Both hypotheses are supported, hav-
ing positive and statistically significant coefficients. More precisely, moving from
one category of educational attainment to a higher one is associated with an
increase in congruence. The effects are very similar across the models (0.44 in
the Economy.ipc and 0.52 in the EU.ipc model). The effect of political interest
is highest in the EU.ipc model, where moving from somewhat to very interested
in politics leads to an increase of 1.26 points in congruence scores.
Hypothesis H11 put forward the expectation that niche party supporters are
more congruent with their most preferred party. The hypothesis finds support
across the models, except for the EU.ipc one.
Although no theoretical expectations were set in relationship with age, the results
of previous studies suggest that older people are less incongruent with the party
they intend to vote for in the upcoming elections (Walgrave & Lefevere 2013).
The results of the mixed effects models suggest that an increase in age does
not correspond to an increase in congruence, contrary to previous findings. In
other words, younger people are more congruent with their most preferred party;
moving from one age category to another, the congruence on Social issue area
decreases which was 2.4. A slightly smaller effect is found in the Economy.ipc
model. The effect of age on congruence is similar in direction and statistically
significant across all models, except the EU.ipc one.
Turning to another individual characteristic, gender, the results suggest that
males are more congruent with their most preferred party on the Economy and
EU issue dimensions. The magnitude of the effects vary, with larger effects found
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in the EU.ipc model, where 2.4. However, the results of the Social.ipc model
suggest that males are less congruent with their most preferred party when it
comes to social issues. It is not surprising that women are in higher agreement
with their most preferred party on Social issues, as this issue dimensions covers
topics such as abortion and crime.
Focusing on the effect of ideological self-placement on the Left-Right scale, more
precisely on placing oneself towards the extreme of the ideological scale, the
results suggest that those on the exteremes of the political spectrum are in more
agreement with their most preferred party. The direction and magnitude of the
effects is similar across the models, but the effect is very modest in the EU.ipc
model.
The effect of country level predictors stays fairly constant once the individual
level predictors are added to the models. The effect of party level predictors is
less stable, especially for governmental status and self-placement on the Left-
Right scale variables. The Economy.ipc model is the only one where the effect of
the aforementioned variables changed direction and magnitude, although most
country and party level predictors lose their statistical significance once individ-
ual level predictors are included in models.
Table 39 in the Appendices, page 253 presents the baseline models with absolute
citizen congruence assessed at the individual level. Comparing the ICC of the
baseline models with those of the extended models from Table 17, there is a
slight decrease in both party and country level ICC. What this means is that as
individual level characteristics are accounted for, there is less variability across
observations from different countries. However, there is more variation accounted
for by the clustering at party level.
6.3 2014 EUvox - Absolute citizen congruence
As with the 2009 EU Profiler data, I will start by describing the individual
level variables, such as age, gender, level of educational attainment and political
interest. Due to data limitations, the 2014 EUvox data does not include a variable
on the ideological self-placement, ‘Extreme’.
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Figure 34: Individual level characteristics - EUvox
Figure 34 presents the distributions of individual level characteristics, that make
the subject of this chapter. As in the analysis of the 2009 EU Profiler data, most
the respondents are young and predominantly male. They report high levels of
educational attainment and political interest.
6.3.1 Preliminary findings - 2014 EUvox
Before testing the effect of individual level predictors on absolute citizen con-
gruence, I start by examining these relationships using violin plots. Figure 35
presents the distribution of congruence scores across age categories. In con-
trast to 2009, the median congruence values increase with age, which is rather
unexpected. In other words, older people are more congruent with their most
preferred party. However, the increase across age categories is rather small, and
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it decreases when we look at the highest age category (85+). The distribution of
VAA users across educational attainment categories from Figure 37 shows that an
increase in educational attainment is associated with an increase in congruence
scores.
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Figure 35: Age - EUvox
Figure 36 shows the distribution of absolute citizen congruence scores across
gender categories. Similar to the analaysis of 2009 EU Profiler data, the difference
in congruence scores across genders is rather small, with both groups registering
most values around 65.
Figure 38 presents the distributions of political interest and absolute citizen con-
gruence scores. As political interest increases, so does the median value of con-
gruence scores.
Figure 39 presents the distributions of absolute citizen congruence scores across
niche and mainstream party supporters. Niche party supporters present slightly
higher levels of congruence than those who support mainstream parties. These
associations represent preliminary hypotheses tests. In the next subsection, I will
test the hypotheses outlined in the beginning of the section using mixed effects
models, while controlling for party and country level predictors.
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Figure 38: Political interest - EUvox
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66.3.2 Results - 2014 EUvox
As with the analysis of the 2009 EU Profiler data, I am first examinining the
effects of individual level predictors on congruence, before testing their effects
within the extended mixed effects models. Figure 40 presents the coefficients of
the predictors of congruence across the models and their 95% confidence inter-
vals. The effect of political interest is not consistent across the models, having a
negative effect in the Economy.ipc and Social.ipc models, but a positive effect, as
hypothesized, in the EU.ipc one. I will discuss the effects of the other individual
level preditors within the extended regression models below, as the direction and
magnitude of the effect does not vary much between the extended models and
those based solely on inidvidual level predictors.
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Figure 40: Fixed Effects - EUvox
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Table 18 on page 191 presents the results of mixed effects models with absolute
citizen congruence assessed with the help of 2014 EUvox data as dependent vari-
ables. The models Overall.ipc, Economy.ipc, Social.ipc and EU.ipc are extended
versions of the models from the previous chapter, and include individual level
predictors, such as age, gender, education and political interest.79
Hypothesis H9 put forward the expectation that individuals who report higher
levels of educational attainment are more congruent with their most preferred
party. The hypothesis is confirmed across all models, but with varying effect
magnitudes. The most modest results is found in the Social.ipc model, where
an increase from one education category to another leads to an increase in the
congruence score of 0.04. Education seems to matter slightly more when it comes
to EU issues, where we find an increase of 0.52 points.
Hypothesis H10, focusing on the effect of political interest is confirmed only in
the Overall.ipc and EU.ipc model, where moving from being somewhat to very
interested in politics leads to an increase in the congruence score of 1.38. In the
Economy.ipc and Social.ipc models, the effect is reversed, suggesting that more
interest in politics corresponds to less congruence on economic and social issues,
although the magnitude of the effects is rather small.80
Hypothesis H11 put forward the expectation that niche party supporters are
more congruent with their most preferred party, compared to mainstream party
supporters. The coefficients work in the expected direction for the Economy.ipc
and Social.ipc model, but fail to reach the conventional threshold of statistical
significance. However, the results of the EU.ipc model suggest that being a niche
party supporter corresponds to being in less agreement with the most preferred
party on EU topics.
No theoretical expectations were set in relationship with age, but as mentioned
above, previous studies suggest that older people are more congruent with the
party they intend to vote for (Walgrave et al. 2016). The results of the mixed
effects models suggest that an increase in age does corresponds to an increase
in congruence. The effect is found across all models, except the EU.ipc one,
79The baseline models and the models focusing only on the individual level predictors can
be found in Appendices, page 257, Table 40.
80-0.62 in the Economy.ipc model and -0.88 in the Economy.ipcmodel.
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6Table 18: Mixed Effects Models with individual level predictors - EUvox
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall.ipc Economy.ipc Social.ipc EU.ipc
Individual level
Age 0.194∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028)
Male 0.076∗∗ −0.158∗∗ 0.067 0.379∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.068) (0.062) (0.056)
Education 0.274∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023)
Political interest 0.132∗∗∗ −0.632∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.043) (0.039) (0.035)
Niche 0.291 1.674 1.234 −0.830
(1.347) (2.217) (2.419) (1.529)
Party level
Governmental status 0.366 2.953 1.077 −0.780
(1.117) (1.814) (2.017) (1.236)
Centre 2.913∗∗ 5.111∗∗ 3.033 2.423
(1.411) (2.342) (2.524) (1.631)
Right 2.072∗∗ 3.542∗∗ 2.182 1.188
(0.890) (1.469) (1.597) (1.016)
Election cycle −0.287 −0.442 −0.279 −0.149
(0.644) (0.810) (1.392) (0.478)
Governmental status * Election cycle −0.668 −0.923 −0.625 −0.581
(0.819) (1.153) (1.664) (0.736)
Country level
EFNP 0.829 1.524 1.947 −0.174
(1.059) (1.305) (2.306) (0.754)
Polarization −0.857 −1.316 −1.917 −0.008
(0.794) (0.986) (1.726) (0.574)
Disproportionality 0.235 0.511 2.121 −1.056
(0.957) (1.217) (2.052) (0.721)
Old democracy −4.789∗∗∗ −3.171 −9.700∗∗∗ −2.475∗∗
(1.580) (1.956) (3.434) (1.138)
District magnitude −0.358 0.045 −0.973 −0.097
(0.295) (0.369) (0.639) (0.217)
Disproportionality * Niche 0.396 −2.213 2.082 0.270
(1.056) (1.745) (1.893) (1.209)
Constant 66.864∗∗∗ 63.490∗∗∗ 65.642∗∗∗ 68.699∗∗∗
(1.434) (1.924) (3.000) (1.194)
Observations 150,382 150,333 150,338 150,379
Random variance party 17.18 47.86 54.80 23.28
Random variance country 7.34 6.80 40.36 0.84
Residual variance 37.54 129.90 107.12 86.98
ICC party 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.22
ICC country 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.02
Log Likelihood −486,326.100 −579,427.300 −564,981.000 −549,431.700
Akaike Inf. Crit. 972,692.300 1,158,895.000 1,130,002.000 1,098,903.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 972,890.700 1,159,093.000 1,130,200.000 1,099,102.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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where moving from one age category to another corresponds to a -.02 decrease in
congruence. In other words, younger people are more congruent with their most
preferred party on EU topics.
Turning to gender, another individual characteristic, the results in Table 18
suggest that males are more congruent with their most preferred party on the
Overall.ipc, Social.ipc and EU.ipc, but not on the Economy.ipc one. The size of
the effects is rather similar, except for the Social.ipc model, where the coefficient
0.08 does not reach statistical significance.
Moving from the models with country and party level variables to the extended
models, the effect of party and country level predictors changed only slightly,.
The only less stable model is the EU.ipc one, where the EFNP, disproportion-
ality of the electoral system, niche and governmental status variables changed
direction of their effect, but do not reach the conventional threshold of statistical
significance.
As individual level predictors are introduced in the models, residual variance at
the country level increases, although the increase is rather small. Comparing the
models from Table 18 with the baseline models from Table 40 on page 257 of
the Appendices, the party level ICCs remain constant, but there is a decrease
in the ICCs at a country level. In other words, as I account for individual
level predictors, observations from the same countries are no more similar than
observations from different countries. However, there is more variation accounted
for by the clustering at a party level.
6.4 Discussion
After portraying a rather worrying image of congruence between voters and par-
ties in Belgium, Walgrave, Lefevere, Pepermans & Nuytemans (2009) argue that
one of the reasons for high incongruence is the fact that the representational
process is flawed. More precisely, they suggest that voters vote for parties for
the wrong reasons. If that is indeed the case, and voters did not take policies into
consideration when picking a party, then how are parties supposed to keep their
electoral promises? Leaving from the assumption that the mismatch between
parties and voters leads to incorrect voting is caused by voters voting for par-
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6ties for the wrong reasons, Walgrave, Lefevere, Pepermans & Nuytemans (2009)
advance the proposition that ‘parties do not keep their promises to their voters
not because they are unloyal or because they betray their promises once they are
in power but simply because they promised other things than their voters think
they have’. Unfortunately, this leads to increased distrust in political parties and
to political alienation. The causes of alienation from politics is far from the scope
of this research. However, it places the focus on the individual, as a responsible
decision maker in the electoral arena, more precisely in the voting process.
The previous two empirical chapters of the thesis focused on country and party
level characteristics of congruence, respectively. Following the pattern set by the
most studies on political representation, I first tried to explain the congruence
puzzle at a country level. The first attempt, focusing on country level charac-
teristics did not prove very fruitful. The variation in congruence levels across
countries explained by the models developed in the first empirical chapter was
rather modest. In the second chapter, party level variables were added to the
models, but again, the explained country level variation was rather small, and in
some cases it even decreased. Following Walgrave & Lefevere (2013), in this chap-
ter I focused on individual level characteristics. Walgrave & Lefevere’s (2013)
argue that congruence is better explained at an individual level, where the match
between voters and parties takes place. The analysis run in this section allows
me to support this view.
The individual level characteristics that make the focus of this chapter are age,
gender, education, political interest and self-placement on the Left-Right scale.81
Table ?? on page ?? presents the results of hypotheses tests for the analyses run
in this chapter.
Educational attainment has the hypothesized effects across models.82 We en-
counter a similar situation when looking at the effect of political interest. In
most of the models83 more interest in politics corresponds to more congruence.
The positive association between political interest and congruence is in line with
81Due to data limitation, the ideological self-placement on the Left-Right scale variable is
included only in the models based on the 2009 EU Profiler data
82Except in the Economy.ipc 2014, but the negative coefficient does not reach the conven-
tional threshold of statistical significance
83Exception make the Economy.ipc and Social.ipc 2014
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the results of previous studies, which showed that more interested voters are
more likely to be knowledgeable about politics and in consequence, to vote for a
party that shares similar political views (Steenbergen et al. 2007, Lau et al. 2014).
These results confirm previous findings in the representation studies, where indi-
viduals who are highly educated and more interested in politics tend to be more
congruent with their most preferred party (Walgrave & Lefevere 2013).
Age, gender and self-placement on the extremes of the Left-Right scale84 are
included as control variables. The effect of age on congruence is not consistent
across the two time points. In the analysis based on the 2009 EU Profiler data,
younger individuals tend to be more congruent with their most preferred parties,
but the opposite effect is found in the 2014 EUvox analysis. Women are more
congruent with their most preferred party on the Social issue area, but the effect
is found only in the 2009 EU Profiler analysis. This effect may be due to the
nature of the topics under the Social issue area, such as issues related to abortion
and education.
For the analysis based on the 2009 EU Profiler data, the effect of country level
predictors stays fairly constant once the individual level predictors are added
to the models. The effect of party level predictors is less stable, especially for
governmental status and Left-Right leaning variables. The Economy.cp model is
the less stable one. Turning to 2014 EUvox data, the extended models are more
stable. The only model in which niche and governmental status variables change
direction is the EU one. After discussing the main findings of this chapter, in
the next and final section of this chapter I will discuss the results in the light of
their implications for congruence studies.
6.5 Conclusions
As Curini et al. (2015) begin their study, policy proximity is not a novel research
topic. However, its importance for the well functioning of democracies fuels
developments in the field. The classical study of Miller & Stokes (1963) examined
to which degree the opinions of citizens and individual legislators overlap, on
issues related to welfare. A decade later, Barnes (1977) shifted the focus from
legislators to political parties in government, an approach further developed in
84this measure was available only in the analysis is based on the 2009 EU Profiler
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6many studies focusing on the degree of overlap between the citizens’ political
preferences and the ones of the elites, such as Dalton (1985) and Macdonald et al.
(1995) to name just a few. Most studies assess the overlap on the ideological Left-
Right, although as Curini et al. (2015) emphasize, in an ideal scenario one would
have citizens and parties express their political preferences on the same set of
issues. Lacking such data, scholars of political representation have resorted to the
use of the Left-Right scale. As highlighted throughout the thesis, VAA generated
data offers the perfect opportunity to study the policy preference overlap between
citizens and political parties, because both can express their issue preferences on
a rather large number of policies. In a similar manner to Dalton (1985), who
assessed issue congruence on policy areas, I split the policy issues included in the
VAA tool in three policy dimensions, or issue categories, namely the Economy,
Social and EU.
The analysis at country and party level did not explain much of the variation
in issue congruence across countries. Following Walgrave & Lefevere’s (2013)
recommendation, I turned my attention towards individual level characteristics.
After all, it is the individual who casts her vote for one of the political parties
who compete in elections. The remainder of this section is built around three
major points, focusing on the role individual characteristics play in explaining
the match between voters and parties, the advantages offered by taking into
account issue dimensionality of policies and finally, the effect of being a niche
party supporter.
The first point refers to the importance of individual level predictors in explaining
the issue congruence puzzle. While most studies systematically ignore individual
level characteristics when explaining congruence, Walgrave & Lefevere (2013)
argued that the focus should be on the individual, as she is the one that takes the
voting decision. The individual level predictors, age, gender, self-placement on
the Left-Right scale, educational attainment and political interest explain some
of the variation at the country level. However, more variation is explained at the
party level in the baseline, but also in the extended models. The results of the
analyses run in this chapter emphasized the role individual level characteristics
play in the representation process. As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) point out,
tackling the congruence puzzle at a voter level allows scholars to address questions
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that have not been dealt with before.
The second point focuses on issue areas. The analyses in the previous two chap-
ters have shown that there is variation in congruence scores across issue areas,
but most importantly, that the effect of country and party level predictors is not
consistent across the Economy, Social and EU issue dimensions. Turning to the
role of individual level characteristics, the effects they carry across models are
more consistent. However, the EU issue area in the 2009 EU Profiler analysis and
Economy issue area in the 2014 EUvox analysis deviate from the patterns set by
the Overall models. These results support the argument for a multidimensional
approach of assessing congruence.
The third and final point addresses the effects of being a niche party supporter.
In an extensive study of niche parties, Belchior (2013) argued that niche parties
present less congruence, because due to their radical positions (in most cases),
they will be placed towards the extremes of the ideological scale, while their
supporters are situated at less extreme positions. However, Belchior’s (2013)
findings are the result of an approach based on ideological congruence. Because
the focus of this study is on issue congruence, the match between voters and
their most preferred party is assessed on policies. What the results of the anal-
ysis developed in this chapter shows is that niche party supporters are in closer
agreement with their most preferred parties, compared to mainstream party sup-
porters. This finding applies to the Economy and Social issue dimensions85, but
not to the EU one. In other words, niche party supporters are in less agreement
with their most preferred party on EU related topics. This helps to support the
point made above, that the dimensionality of the issue matters greatly.
85Also to the Overall assessment of congruence, that averages across congruence scores on
issue areas
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The aim of this thesis has been to inspect the relationship between institutional
designs, such as the features of the electoral system, party and individual level
characteristics and congruence in European Union countries. Congruence is re-
ferred to as the match between prospective voters in the elections to the European
Parliament of 2009 and 2014 and their most preferred party, expressed as vote
intention, on a set of 28, respectively 22 policy issues. The data were collected
with the help of two pan-European Voting Advice Applications, the 2009 EU
Profiler and 2014 EUvox, in the month previous to the elections. This chap-
ter concludes the thesis and it is structured around the motivations behind this
work, the contributions it makes to the field of political representation, including
limitations and ideas for further research.
7.1 Revisiting the motivations behind this thesis
The motivation behind this thesis is multi-faceted. The main motivation is rooted
in the disagreement found in the representation studies over the effects of insti-
tutional predictors. A long line of studies have shown that in plurality systems
the representation of the majority is enhanced, but certain groups are neglected
(Dalton 1985, 2017b). In proportional representation systems, these groups gain
representation. As a result, PR systems present an representational advantage
over majoritarian systems (Huber & Powell 1994, Klingemann et al. 2006, Pow-
ell 2000, Ezrow 2010). But research in the last decade brought evidence against
the representational advantage of PR systems upon majoritarian ones (Blais &
Bodet 2006). Given the limited number of majoritarian systems in the EU, I used
alternative measures, such as the disproportionality of the system. However, the
results of the analysis proved inconclusive on this aspect.
Another strong motivation behind this thesis is the lack of constant findings in
studies of representation. Belchior (2013) argued that system level characteris-
tics, such as the proportionality and fractionalization of an electoral system do
not determine the level of congruence between voters and their representatives,
as suggested in a line of studies on representation. She brings evidence that
supports the importance of investigating the effect of the characteristics of polit-
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ical parties, focusing on their electoral strategies. Furthermore, issue congruence
studies that take a comparative approach are scarce, due to a lack of data.
Going down the ladder of the levels of analysis, political representation liter-
ature systematically overlooks the effect individual characteristics could have
on congruence. With two notable exceptions, Walgrave & Lefevere (2013), and
Steenbergen et al. (2007), the scholarly literature on representation only focused
on the effect of system and party level predictors in relationship with congruence.
As Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) show, individual level characteristics influence the
degree of the match between the voter and her most preferred party. Further-
more, their study emphasizes the possibility to also consider interactions between
individual level and party level characteristics.
Last but not least, the main aspect that lays at the foundation of this research
is the debate over the best approach to measuring congruence. This last point
covers two aspects, the first one focusing on ideological versus issue congruence,
and the second related to the different ways of measuring congruence, as an
absolute or a relative measure (Golder & Stramski 2007).
Most research in representation studies employs ideological, rather than issue
congruence. Golder & Stramski (2007) issue an important critique of common
practice in representation studies, suggesting that research fails to address the
way in which ideological congruence is most appropriately conceptualized given
the research goals. They argue that oftentimes, the conceptualization is driven
by data availability and convention.
Ideological matching on the Left-Right scale is the most used measure of assessing
congruence. Powell (2000) argues that the decision to use the Left-Right scale
is often based on the assumption that in most modern democracies, the Left
and Right represent a unidimensional discourse that is familiar to voters. The
use of the Left-Right continuum requires that the political issues are reduced
to a single dimension. However, there are new issues that do not fit alongside
the traditional Left-Right divide. Additionally, the ambiguity of the meanings
of Left and Right across different electoral contexts poses problems when used
in a comparative study. The issue of measurement focuses on the problem with
the median citizen approach, as a less reliable portrayal of reality, in which the
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7distribution of preferences is ignored.
7.2 Summarizing thesis contributions
7.2.1 Comparative approach
Drawing on the motivations behind this thesis, I will revisit the contributions to
the literature made by this research, together with their implications. The first
contribution of this thesis stems from its comparative nature. While most studies
on congruence focus on one or two cases (Belchior 2013), this work takes a com-
parative approach, focusing on EU member states. In the long line of congruence
studies, comparative work such as Dalton, Farrell & McAllister (2011), Dalton
(2017a), Huber & Powell (1994), Rohrschneider & Whitefield (2012), Wessels
(1999), Thomassen & Schmitt (1999) looked at ideological congruence and to a
lesser extent at issue congruence (Dalton 1985, 2017b). Data on party position-
ing are now plentiful. However, there are not many sources of data where the
voter and party positioning are interconnected. The data generated through the
two VAA tools developed for the EP elections of 2009 and 2014 offer a good
opportunity to study congruence in a comparative perspective, as it captures the
political preferences of parties and citizens on the same set of issues and on the
same scales.
The elections to the European Parliament provide a suitable context for studying
the match between prospective voters and their most preferred parties. Although
named second order elections, due to their limited importance for national pol-
itics, EP elections are a time when people from multiple nations think simulta-
neously about their political preferences and the parties that can best represent
their interests. As Dalton (2017b) emphasizes, the party choices in EP elections
are based mainly on national conditions for a specific national party, and less
on the large European party families and their stances on EU issues. As a con-
sequence, the second order nature of the elections under which the data were
collected do not diminish the findings of this research.
The analysis in this thesis created two snapshots of issue congruence in EU mem-
ber states, assessed in 2009 and 2014. The analysis based on the data generated
through the 2009 EU Profiler focuses mostly Western European democracies,
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including only Poland as a Central and Eastern European country; however, the
2014 EUvox analysis includes more Central and Eastern European countries,
such as Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria. The small number of Central and East-
ern European countries in the 2009 data set is due to data limitations. Even in
2014 EUvox data, the sample sizes from Central and Eastern European countries
are systematically smaller than those of Western European countries. Some of
the comparative work on issue congruence limited the number of countries to
EU15 nations (Dalton 2017a) or similarly, focus on advanced democracies (Blais
& Bodet 2006, Golder & Stramski 2010, Golder & Lloyd 2014, Ferland 2016).
Instead of reducing the universe of cases to a smaller number, similar across the
two data points, I chose to maximize the number of countries, as research on this
countries is scarcer. Although the difference in sample sizes between Western
and Central and Eastern European countries leads to demographic biases to be
exacerbated, the differences are accounted for within the hierarchical regression
framework.86
The results indicate that overall, prospective voters in the EP elections of 2009
and 2014 have identified the parties that match their political preferences rather
well. For the 2009 EP elections, the average congruence score across countries is
72.9 for absolute citizen congruence and 83.0 for relative congruence. However,
there is variation across countries, but the ordering of countries according to
their overall congruence scores is not consistent across the two measures of con-
gruence. While Spain presents the highest levels of representation and Germany
the lowest, when congruence is assessed as an absolute citizen measure, its top
positions are replaced by Sweden and Portugal, when congruence is assessed as
a relative measure. In 2014, the average scores decreased by 10 points. Looking
at absolute citizen congruence, the top and bottom positions are occupied by
the Czech Republic and Spain, and by Estonia and Germany when turning to
relative congruence. There is no clear pattern in congruence scores that would
86Table 41 in Appendices, page 258, presents the results of extended hierarchical models
testing the predictors of absolute citizen congruence on a subset of countries that were included
in both analyses, for 2009 and 2014. Compared to the extended models from chapter six, the
results are rather similar. As a consequence, one can argue that the countries included in the
2014 EUvox dataset (mostly CEE countries) do not influence the results due to the demographic
bias they may carry
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7help differentiate between the new and the old democracies of Western Europe.
The low number of Central and Eastern European countries in the 2009 data
set makes the results indicating that old democracies present more congruence
less reliable. In the analysis of 2014 EP elections, the finding is reversed, results
suggesting that old democracies present less congruence.
7.2.2 Issue congruence versus ideological congruence
The vast literature on congruence follows the divide between ideological and issue
congruence. Thomassen (2012) raised for the first time the problem of the blind
corner of representation, arguing that the new cultural and social issues are not
properly represented by the Left-Right dimension. In a similar fashion, Dalton
(2017b) argues that over the last decades, the structure of political competition
became more complex. As a consequence, the Left-Right divide cannot reflect
accurately the wide range of party stances on a larger set of issues. Furthermore,
the ambiguity of the Left-Right scales raises the problem of comparability, with
Left and Right representing different issues in different electoral contexts. The
issue congruence approach, although more rare due to data scarcity, avoids this
ambiguity problem.
One can think of the Overall measure of congruence as an equivalent of a uni-
dimensional measure, such as the Left-Right scale. Although the assessment
of congruence as an Overall measure does make the variation across countries
visible, it blurs the effect of the predictors. In fact, the effect predictors have
on congruence vary across issue dimensions, but these differences are engulfed
in the Overall approach. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the analysis
conducted at the party and individual level, where on certain issue dimensions
the predictors have different effects compared to the ones of the Overall model.
For example, the effect of individual level predictors on the Economy issue area
do not follow the pattern set by the Overall model.
These differences reinforce the point made by Golder & Stramski (2007), on
the researchers’ failure to justify the conceptualization used. They blame this
shortcoming on the extensive use of conventions and data availability. One of
the motivations behind this thesis; the disagreement in the congruence literature
over the best measuring approach, influenced my choice of issue over ideological
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congruence. The proponents of ideological congruence assume that a wide range
of issues can be accommodated by the ideological continuum. However, the soci-
etal changes over the last decades brought new issues onto the political agenda,
issues that do not easily fit on the Left-Right divide. Not being able to assume
unidimensionality brings me to the third contribution of this thesis, focused on
issue dimensionality.
7.2.3 Issue dimensions
The issue congruence approach assesses the match between voters and parties
on a set of issues. More precisely, it is the distance between the positions of the
representatives (parties) and the represented (prospective voters). Rather than
measuring congruence issue by issue (Lax & Phillips 2012), the policy issues
were compiled into issue dimensions. As Dalton (1985, 2017b) repeatedly shows,
the voter-party congruence varies not only across parties, but also across issue
areas.87 One gains a better understanding of congruence by looking at issue areas,
compared to when an overall assessment of congruence is used. As Dalton (1985)
shown, the distance between citizens and parties varies across issue domains.
The overall assessment of congruence offers a less nuanced view than the Econ-
omy, Social and EU models. Focusing on issue areas, descriptive analysis shows
that prospective voters are closer to their parties on issues that belong to the
EU issue area, compared to the Economy or Social ones. While the link be-
tween parties and voters is mediated by partisan identification, the issues on
which parties differentiate themselves play an important role, as the variation in
congruence scores across issue areas has shown. Although it is useful and also
necessary to know on which issue dimensions parties are closer to their support-
ers, it is also important to know whether institutional factors, party or individual
characteristics influence these distances.
Moving from descriptive to regression analysis, the results suggest that the effect
of party and individual level predictors vary, according to issue areas. For ex-
ample, while older people seem to be more congruent with their most preferred
87Dalton (1985, 2017b) used both a ‘issue centrism’ which is a distance measure of congruence,
as well as a measure of political ‘responsivness’, assessed as the result of a regression equation
between the party
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7party on issues pertaining to the Economy or Social issue areas, the opposite is
true for the EU dimension. Here, an increase in age was associated with less
congruence.
Another interesting result is the effect of gender, that varies across issue areas.
Women are more congruent with their most preferred parties on the Social is-
sue area. The reason for this discrepancy may by attributed to the nature of
issues that make up this issue area, given that the policies address issues such
as same sex marriage, criminality or abortion. This is where an approach using
salience may be extremely fruitful, because it is possible that women put more
emphasis on social issues, compared to economic ones. I will return to the idea
of incorporating salience in the limitations and further research section.
To sum up, the effects of predictors vary across models, but less so on the analysis
centered on country level characteristics. In the analysis based on 2009 EU Pro-
filer data, the EU issue area deviates from the patterns set by the Overall model.
Similarly, in the analysis of 2014 EUvox data, the Economy model offered differ-
ent results. These results confirm Dalton’s (1985) choice and recommendation
for a multidimensional approach to congruence.
7.2.4 A relative measure of congruence in addition to a absolute cit-
izen one
Last but not least, the forth contribution brought by this research is represented
by the use of a relative measure of congruence, in addition to an absolute one,
which is the standard approach. The area of representation studies is burgeoning
due increased data availability. But with this increase comes a great deal of
ambiguity, based mostly on methodological considerations. Most studies use
congruence assessed as an absolute measure. More precisely, what this means
is that the position of the average (or median) party voter88 is compared to
the position of the party (Dalton 2017b, Huber & Powell 1994, Thomassen &
Schmitt 1999). Golder & Stramski (2010) argued that absolute congruence can
be assessed only when the Left-Right dimension is perceived similarly across all
contexts89. They put forward a relative measure, which avoids the use on an
88Or party supporter
89In other words across all countries
203
Conclusions
abstract scale, such as the Left-Right one and provides a metric free measure of
congruence.
In this thesis, I have employed both an absolute and a relative measure, which
represents the fourth contribution of this work. Both approaches were conceptu-
alized as a many-to-one type of relationship, following Golder & Stramski (2010).
To refresh, he absolute congruence looked at the average absolute distance be-
tween all the party supporters and the party, taking into account the positions
of all party supporters, not only the position of the median citizen. The relative
measure of congruence followed a similar calculation, but instead of an average
absolute distance, it took into account the distribution of citizens’ preferences.90
The strength of the relative measure lays in the fact that it measures the average
distance of a prospective voter from the most preferred position of the support-
ers of one particular political party, relative to the average distance between the
voter and the party. Golder & Stramski (2010) argue that this measure is supe-
rior to alternative conceptualizations because it incorporates information about
the distribution of citizens’ preferences, instead of looking just at the distance
between a representative and the median citizen.
According to the debate on measurement initiated by Golder & Stramski (2010),
the two approaches to measure congruence are bound to provide different re-
sults. As expected, the two approaches provided two slightly different images
of congruence across the EU member states. The two approaches to assessing
congruence revealed variation not only across countries, but also across issue cat-
egories. While countries are rather similar on the EU issue area, more variation
across countries was found on the Social dimension. Overall, the relative mea-
sure of congruence offered a more optimistic portrayal of representation across
countries, compared to the absolute congruence measure. What I mean by ‘op-
timistic portrayal’ is that the relative scores were on average 10 points higher,
especially for smaller parties. This may have to do with the fact that by taking
into account the distribution of preferences of party supporters, small parties are
advantaged.
90More precisely the distribution of preferences of all supporters of a party
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77.2.5 Niche party status and niche party supporters
Ezrow (2010) argued that electoral systems matter for political representation in
a different way than decades of research suggest. He stressed the importance of
niche parties as agents promoting congruence and wrapped his argument around
the idea that electoral systems matter because they allow or prohibit niche par-
ties. Proportional representation systems allow for niche parties to become in-
stitutionalized and ultimately, to offer political alternatives that may lead to
better representation. Confirming Ezrow’s (2010) argument, I have found that
as the disproportionality of an electoral system increases, niche parties are less
congruent with their supporters.
Furthermore, the analysis run in this thesis has shown that niche parties are
associated with more congruence, compared to mainstream parties. In 2009,
niche parties on the Left are more congruent with their voters, compared to
those on the Right. In 2014 however, niche parties on the Right present higher
levels of congruence than those on the Left. This inconsistency can be attributed
to the fact that the 2014 dataset includes radical right parties that present high
levels of congruence with their supporters.
Furthermore, the analysis at the individual level showed that those who support
a niche party present higher levels of congruence. One possible explanation for
this is that the distribution of preferences across party supporters is narrower
for a niche party, compared to a mainstream one. However, the analysis on the
2014 EP elections showed that niche party supporters are less congruent on the
EU issue area. One potential explanation is that citizens place less emphasis on
these issues, and are less likely to know the party’s stance on EU topics, therefore
lacking congruence.
7.2.6 Focus on individual level
Walgrave & Lefevere (2013) pointed out that the vast scholarly literature on
political representation provides explanations for congruence at the country or
party level of analysis, consistently disregarding individual level characteristics.
Taking their argument a step further, they place the voter at the centre of the
representation process, saying that ultimately, it is the voter who takes the vote
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decision and casts a vote for her preferred political party. Accordingly, individual
level characteristics should be also considered in explaining the agreement (or the
lack of it, in Walgrave & Lefevere’s (2013) study) between voters and parties.
Tackling the congruence puzzle did prove a fruitful strategy, as age, gender,
ideological self-placement on the Left-Right scale, education and political interest
helped explaining some of the variation at the country level.
7.3 Limitations and future research
While it is a goldmine of data on political behaviour and political preferences,
VAA generated data has its caveats. The main disadvantage of VAA data stems
from the fact that makes it unique, namely its online nature. When looked
at as tools generating data, VAAs are online voluntary samples. The list of
biases inherent in VAA data starts with Internet access and ends with political
interest. The profile of a VAA respondent portrays a young men, those who are
very interested in politics, with high education or from urban areas. Therefore,
analysis based on VAA generated data will be biased towards these demographic
sub-groups.
Using data from the first two pan-European VAAs was a challenge in the sense
that most VAA research is conducted on countries with high VAA usage, with
millions of users. Using VAA data from EU countries means that the differences
across countries are to some extent reflected in the data. More precisely, the
biases inherent in VAA data are exacerbated in Central and Eastern Europe,
where VAA tools are rather novel. As a consequence of their novelty, in Central
and Eastern European countries VAA usage is lower compared to Western Eu-
ropean democracies, which translates into low sample sizes. Accordingly, there
is less variation in age, education and political interest. For example, due to
data limitations, in the 2009 EU Profiler dataset I included only one Central and
Eastern European country (Poland). The increased popularity of VAAs mirrored
in the country sample sizes of 2014 EUvox, as 9 Central and Eastern European
country were included.
Due to the lack of representativeness of VAA generated data, the results must
be treated with caution. The findings do not talk about the entire population
of EU countries, and are limited to VAA users in these countries. One possi-
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through post-stratification techniques (Wang et al. 2014). However, applying
post-stratiifcation techniques to VAA data is an exercise that proved futile, due
to the low samples sizes in CEE countries that led to insufficient data in certain
demographic cells. Up to this point, scholars in the VAA community have not
found a satisfactory way to poststratify VAA data.
In advanced democracies however, VAA tools are an integrated part of the elec-
toral process, with millions of users consulting them in election times (Garzia &
Marschall 2012). As the popularity of the VAAs increases and more and more
people use them, the problem of representativity will become less stringent. Fur-
thermore, in his recent study on congruence in the 2009 elections to the European
Parliament Dalton (2017a) recognized the potential VAA data holds for studying
congruence, because it has citizens and parties express their policy preferences
over the same set of issues.
I believe the analysis developed in this thesis pinpoints to the advantages pre-
sented by VAA data, having the political preferences of voters and parties ex-
pressed on the same scale, on a rather large set of issues, and maybe even more
importantly, in the same time frame. As VAAs become an integrated part of
the electoral process, congruence studies could benefit greatly from this expan-
sion. At the same time, the ideas developed in this thesis have potential for post
doctoral work. For starters, I could work on improving the measure of congru-
ence by including issue saliency. Not only that individuals have different policy
preferences, but the order of the preferences differs as well. As a consequence,
one could give priority to an issue on which the agreement with her favourite
party is low. By including salience in the congruence measure, her overall con-
gruence score would be lower,and therefore inconsistent with a congruence score
without salience. As Giger & Lefkofridi (2014) has shown, when compared with
the results of other studies, their measure of salience-based congruence depicted
a different story of representation. The 2009 EU Profiler data contains salience
measures for each one of the 30 policy statements, but this measure was not
included in the tool for the 2014 EP elections. In order to make the measures
of congruence similar across the two elections, I chose to leave aside the salience
measure.
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This work was built under a frequentist approach. Accordingly, the results were
interpreted while accounting for p-Values, as correspondents of statistical sig-
nificance. In the light of the recent crisis in social sciences regarding p-Values
(Wasserstein & Lazar 2016), one of the directions this work could be steered
towards is a Bayesian approach. Furthermore, given the nature of VAA data as
a non-random sample, but also the hierarchical nature of the analysis, Bayesian
modeling represents a rather promising alternative.
Finally, I think that scholars of political representation, and more precisely of
congruence should acknowledge the immense potential held by VAA data. At the
same time, VAA developers should put more emphasis on collaboration. What I
mean is that while accounting the differences across countries, VAA developers
could create a set of policy issues that could become a staple of each VAA,
that would allow for cross country comparisons to be made. More importantly,
VAA data could become a strong competitor for other large surveys on political
behaviour.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Appendices Chapter 1
VAAs: Role and differences across electoral contexts Although the effect
of VAAs on users’ behavior is a promising research sub-field, there is another
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8question related to the use of VAAs that has not been addressed yet: what
makes VAAs to thrive in certain countries? Is it just the long experience with
these tools (as in the Netherlands or Switzerland)? Is it the number of political
parties? Or more subtle aspects, such as features of the electoral system (ballot
structure, polarization, party-system fragmentation)? Are VAAs endogenous in
relationship to the electoral systems? Although a pattern can be observed in
regard to the popularity of VAAs across certain electoral systems, there is no
clear relationship established. To shed light on this matter, a more careful and
detailed analysis is required.
First of all, one needs to look carefully at the countries with long-term VAA
experience, to see what these countries have in common. At a first glance, the
situation points towards PR systems and a large number of political parties,
which are characteristics of the electoral system. If these characteristics de-
termine the adoption and extended use of VAAs, they are endogenous to the
electoral system. If that is the case, it may have implications for the study of
political institutions and party systems. Also, the design of the tool may affect
greatly the tool, while media coverage influences its popularity. All these factors
will be considered below.
Features of the electoral system
Besides Internet access, following Dalton et al. (2000), Ladner, Felder & Fivaz
(2010) argue that another factor which can contribute to the popularity of VAAs
is a decline in the relationship between voters and parties, such as the increased
volatility and number of swing voters. They suggest that the electoral system,
combined with the low turnout rate in elections contributes to the success and
large use of VAAs in Switzerland. The fragmented social context adds to this
country-specific context.
Although the VAAs have expanded across all European countries and beyond,
they have been more successful in countries with PR systems and a large number
of parties (i.e. Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium and Finland) (Ladner, Felder
& Fivaz 2010, Ruusuvirta 2010). The presence of a large number of parties
implies a richer political offer, that makes it more difficult for voters to dis-
cern between the parties’ positions. Furthermore, different features of electoral
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systems such as open-lists (Ruusuvirta 2010) make the decision-making process
even more complicated for users. Therefore, they would seek help in the form of
VAAs.
Tackling the relationship between VAAs and electoral systems is a difficult task.
There is no doubt that VAAs are in continuous expansion and are turning into
a popular campaigning tool. While some countries, such as The Netherlands,
Germany and Switzerland, present a long VAA tradition, with million of users
using these sites in election times (Garzia & Marschall 2012), other countries have
rather moderate numbers of visitors. What else can help to explain the difference
across countries in the level of VAA usage? What do The Netherlands, Germany,
Switzerland and Belgium have in common? In what aspect do they differ from
the rest of EU countries?
Internet usage
Following the Dutch example of Stemvijer, Glasovoditel vas introduced in Bul-
garia in 2005, Politarena was introduced in Switzerland in 2003 and Wahl-O-Mat
in 2002 in Germany. Wahl-O-Mat became very popular in Germany, following
the trend of the Dutch StemVeijer, the Swiss Politarena was out-taken by the
Swiss smartvote, but still had a generous number of users, while the Bulgar-
ian Glasovoditel had only 30.000 users for the EU elections of 2009. What can
explain the variation in the number of VAA users across the European countries?
At a first glance, maybe the most intuitive reason is the use of the Internet, as
depicted by Internet literacy and Internet penetration rates. In an analysis of
the Swiss VAAs, Ladner, Felder & Fivaz (2010) argue that the increasing use
of VAAs can be explained through increased Internet access and technological
advancement. While almost two thirds of EU households have Internet access
at home, a closer look reveals significant differences across countries. While
Nordic and Western countries such as the Netherlands (93%), Sweden (91%)
and Denmark (88%) have very high penetration rates, Eastern and Southern
European countries present much lower levels, such as Italy (44%), Portugal
(47%) or Romania (54%). Up until this point, the countries with high VAA
usage also have high penetration rates. One can notice that the countries with
large VAA usage also present high Internet literacy and high Internet penetration
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8rates. One possible way in which these factors impact the quality of the VAA
data is through he exacerbation of the biases mentioned above. Given the large
VAA usage in countries such as the Netherlands, where more than half of the
electorate consults these tools, the users will be more heterogeneous, in terms of
education, age, interest in politics and party affiliation. It follows naturally that
the quality of the data from these countries is superior, compared to data from
Eastern European countries, where VAAs are still a novelty.
As stressed above, the biases in the data from countries with low VAA usage will
be exacerbated. As a consequence, the findings from these particular countries
must be read with a wary eye. In trying to deepen our understanding of the
biases inherent in VAA data, looking past the demographic ones, I will focus on
other potential sources of bias, such as the role of mass media and social capital.
The role of mass media: media coverage and media partners
Although they are campaigning tools that provide users with political informa-
tion, in a way competing with other media channels, VAAs also have a depen-
dency relationship with media channels. Because of its online character, VAAs
limit their coverage to online medium, meaning a limited pool of potential users.
However, advertisement in newspapers, radio or television can boost VAA’s pop-
ularity, sending more users online. Regardless of the level of sophistication of the
tool, media coverage plays a very important role in fostering the use and success
of the VAA. As (Ladner, Felder & Fivaz 2010, p. 99) illustrate, the smartvote
benefited from the support of the relevant Swiss media, radio, television and
print, that helped to expand the VAA coverage beyond the Internet community.
As the Swiss example shows, the media support is a very important factor in the
dissemination and success of a VAA. Playing this card, media companies started
to produces their own VAA tool, which are then intensively promoted in their
media channels. A very good example is the UK, where there were more than
10 VAA tools in the campaign for the 2015 General Elections. The UK is not a
singular case; Finland is another perfect example of media companies promoting
their own tools in election times (Ruusuvirta, 2010, p54).
Social capital
After reviewing some of the practical elements that could affect the success of a
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VAA, I will now turn to one that is more difficult to grasp. The way in which
people see these tools can affect their use. Whether people trust online tools can
influence their use. Whether people take political advice without the fear that
it is biased can also be a predictor of VAA use. The dissemination of the tool
is carried out not only through media, but also through peers. If the conditions
of trust, communication and networking play a role in the use of VAAs, social
capital can be an important predictor of their use in a country.
If using a VAA is considered an act of political participation, then developed
democracies, which experience newer forms of political participation, in the form
of buycotting and signing petitions, would present higher levels of VAA usage.
Nowadays, democracies experience decreasing levels of party membership and
increased volatility (Dalton et al. 2000). This does not necessarily mean that
people are exiting the democratic process, it means that they find new ways of
participating. The effects of social capital are numerous, but one of the most
important is the stimulation of political participation. Through networks, when
the network members trust each other, they are more likely to become more
active (Putnam 2001).
230
88.2 Appendices Chapter 4
As a first test of hypothesis testing, preliminary analysis shows that the effec-
tive number of parties, polarization, district magnitude and old democracy are
positively correlated with the measure of absolute citizen congruence assessed
with the help of 2009 EU Profiler.91 92 District magnitude has a positive and
statistically significant correlation coefficient, which indicates that as congruence
increases, so does the disproportionality, which goes against the theoretical ex-
pectations. Polarization is weakly linked with the effective number of parties (see
Table 19 and Table 21), as hypothesized by Dalton (2008). Similarly, Kim et al.
(2010) argue that these two features of the party system vary independently of
each other. According to Belchior (2013) the more proportional systems do not
contribute to higher congruence, on the contrary, they seem to promote more in-
congruence. In a similar fashion, the relation is positive, but disproportionality
does not correlate strongly with congruence.
Table 19: Correlation Matrix - Absolute citizen congruence EUP
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Congruence -
2. EFNP 0.04*** -
3. LSq 0.02* -0.63*** -
4. District magnitude 0.05*** 0.19*** -0.37*** -
5. Polarization 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.30*** 0.20*** -
6. Old democracy 0.02* 0.20*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 0.27*** -
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Source: 2009 EU Profiler; N = 11406; Absolute citizen congruence is assessed at individual level
To test for expected variation in the congruence scores per issue area, I use the
‘Asymptotic test for the equality of coefficients of variation from k populations’
(Feltz & Miller 1996) and the ‘Modified signed-likelihood ratio test (SLRT) for
equality of CVs’ (Krishnamoorthy & Lee 2014), within the cvequality R package.
Table 21 shows the Pearson R correlation coefficients of congruence and the coun-
try level predictors assessed in 2009. The correlation coefficients indicate the
91The Pearson r correlation coefficients are obtained with the use of Hmisc package in R
92Even though the correlation between a continuous and a dichotomous variable, congruence
and old democracy, should be approached with a point-biserial correlation, I am reporting the
Pearson R correlation coefficients. Point-biserial correlation is a special case of the Pearson’s
product-moment correlation. The difference in the results is on the second decimal point only
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Table 20: Summary of variation tests
Test name Test statistic p-value
Asymptotic 4110.01 0
M-SLRT 3974.46 0
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Tested on issue congruence per issue area - Absolute citizen congruence
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
same relationships as in the Table 19, with absolute congruence, with the excep-
tion of disproportionality of the system. Disproportionality has the hypothesized
effects, but fails to reach statistical significance. The lack of statistical signifi-
cance can be attributed to the different number of cases in the two correlation
analyses. Because absolute congruence is assessed at an individual level, while
relative congruence is at party level. As sample size increases, the correlation
coefficient varies less (Altman & Krzywinski 2015).
Table 21: Correlation Matrix - Relative congruence EUP
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Congruence -
2. EFNP 0.13 -
3. LSq -0.11 -0.61*** -
4. District magnitude 0.01 0.26* -0.48*** -
5. Polarization 0.16 0.11 -0.27** 0.12 -
6. Old democracy 0.12 0.16 -0.01 -0.12 0.30** -
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
Larger district magnitude means more proportionality, as the correlation with
the disproportionality index, LSq, indicates in both correlation analyses, with
r = -037*** and r = -0.48*** (see Table 19 and Table 21). The lively debate
about district magnitude points out that even if larger district magnitudes are
associated with increased proportionality, as more parties get representation into
the legislature, the linkage between an elected member and their voters becomes
weaker. This is due to the fact that the larger the district magnitude, the larger
the geographic area it covers, therefore less chances that the voters know the
representative well.
As in the previous analysis, the tests for the variation in congruence scores across
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Figure 41: Marginal Effects - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence
Table 22: Summary of variation tests
Test name Test statistic p-value
Asymptotic 9.60 0.008
M-SLRT 9.25 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Tested on issue congruence per issue area - Relative congruence
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
issue areas show a statistically significant difference (see Table 22 on page 233).
As it can be seen in Table 23, the absolute citizen congruence scores are positively
correlated with the effective number of parties and disproportionality of the sys-
tem, but present a negative, although small, correlation with district magnitude,
233
Appendices
polarization and old democracy. Even though new countries were added to the
dataset, the correlation coefficients between the country level predictors do not
change much.
Table 23: Correlation Matrix - Absolute citizen congruence EUvox
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Congruence -
2. EFNP 0.05*** -
3. LSq 0.18*** -0.72*** -
4. District magnitude -0.01*** 0.24*** -0.20*** -
5. Polarization -0.15*** 0.18*** -0.21*** 0.24*** -
6. Old democracy -0.27*** 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.27*** -0.06*** -
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
N = 150382 , Source: 2014 EUvox
The variation in congruence scores across the issue areas has been tested for and
the results of the tests are presented in Table 24. As the low p-values suggest,
the variation across the different issue dimensions, observed in Figure 11 and
Table 8 is not due to chance.
Table 24: Summary of variation tests
Test name Test statistic p-value
Asymptotic 58292.2 0
M-SLRT 62419.28 0
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Tested on issue congruence per issue area - Absolute citizen congruence
Source: 2014 EUvox
The difference in variation in congruence scores across issue categories visible in
Figure 11 on page 124 is tested using the ‘Asymptotic test for the equality of
coefficients of variation from k populations’ and the ‘Modified signed-likelihood
ratio test for equality of CVs’. The results are presented in Table 25. The low
p-values suggest that the variation across the different issue dimensions is not
due to chance.
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8Table 25: Summary of variation tests
Test name Test statistic p-value
Asymptotic 35.71 0
M-SLRT 36.26 0
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Tested on issue congruence per issue area - Relative congruence
Source: 2014 EUvox
Table 26: Correlation Matrix - Relative congruence EUvox
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Congruence -
2. EFNP 0.07 -
3. LSq 0.09 -0.56*** -
4. District magnitude 0.20** 0.11 -0.01 -
5. Polarization 0.02 0.26*** 0.13 0.41*** -
6. Old democracy -0.27*** -0.15* 0.05 -0.37*** -0.28*** -
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
N = 168
Source: 2014 EUvox
Table 27: Baseline models - Absolute citizen congruence EUP
ICC Overall Economy Social EU
0.10 0.08 0.20 0.14
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
Formula of the linear mixed model: congruence 1 + (1 — country)
Table 28: Baseline models - Relative congruence EUP
ICC Overall Economy Social EU
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
Formula of the linear mixed model: congruence 1 + (1 — country)
Table 29: Baseline models - Absolute citizen congruence EUvox
ICC Overall Economy Social EU
0.34 0.18 0.50 0.34
Source: 2014 EUvox
Formula of the linear mixed model: congruence 1 + (1 — country)
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Table 30: Baseline models - Relative congruence EUvox
ICC Overall Economy Social EU
0.18 0.07 0.36 0.10
Source: 2014 EUvox
Formula of the linear mixed model: congruence 1 + (1 — country)
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Table 31: Party level predictors - EU Profiler
Country Party Niche GovStat RiLe ElCycle
Belgium Fr CDH 0 1 0 0.66
MR 0 1 1 0.66
Ecolo (PEF) 1 0 0 0.66
PS 0 0 99 0.66
Belgium Nl CDV Vlaams 0 1 1 0.66
GROEN ! 1 0 0 0.66
LD 0 0 1 0.66
NVA 1 0 1 0.66
OVLD 0 1 1 0.66
PA Benl 0 0 0 0.66
SLP 0 0 1 0.66
VB 1 0 1 0.66
SPA 0 0 0 0.66
Germany BDG 1 0 0 0.92
DR 1 0 1 0.92
DV 1 0 99 0.92
NEWROP 0 0 99 0.92
SPD 0 0 0 0.92
England BNP 1 0 1 0.81
Green 0 0 99 0.81
Labour 0 0 99 0.81
LibDem 0 0 0 0.81
Tori 0 0 1 0.81
UKIP 1 0 1 0.81
Spain ERC 0 0 0 0.33
BNG 0 0 0 0.33
CPC 0 0 1 0.33
ICV 0 0 0 0.33
IU 0 0 0 0.33
PD 0 0 99 0.33
PP 0 0 1 0.33
PSOE 0 0 0 0.33
UPD 0 0 99 0.33
France AL 0 0 1 0.39
FN 1 0 1 0.39
LO 0 0 0 0.39
LV 1 0 0 0.39
MD 0 0 1 0.39
MNR 0 0 1 0.39
MPF 0 0 1 0.39
NEWROP 0 0 99 0.39
MRC 0 0 0 0.39
PCF 0 0 0 0.39
PRG 0 0 0 0.39
PS 0 0 99 0.39
UMP 0 1 1 0.39
Italy FT 0 0 1 0.23
LN 1 1 1 0.23
PD 0 0 0 0.23
PL 1 1 1 0.23
PRC 0 0 0 0.23
SL 0 0 0 0.23
UDC 0 0 1 0.23
VI 0 0 99 0.23
Netherlands CDA 0 1 1 0.72
D1966 1 0 99 0.72
GL 1 0 0 0.72
LDP 0 0 99 0.72
PA 0 0 99 0.72
PD 1 1 99 0.72
PV 0 0 99 0.72
SP 0 0 0 0.72
VNEWR 0 0 99 0.72
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VVD 0 0 1 0.72
Poland PO 0 0 0 0.41
PPC 0 0 0 0.41
LPR 0 0 1 0.41
PS 0 0 99 0.41
PSL 0 1 1 0.41
SLD 0 0 0 0.41
UPR 0 0 1 0.41
Portugal MEP 0 0 99 0.93
CDU 0 0 99 0.93
PS 0 0 99 0.93
PSD 0 0 99 0.93
Sweden CENT 1 1 1 0.67
FL 0 1 1 0.67
JUN 0 0 1 0.67
KD 1 1 1 0.67
MG 1 0 0 0.67
MS 0 1 1 0.67
SA 0 0 99 0.67
SD 0 0 1 0.67
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
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8Table 32: Congruence scores at party leve - EU Profiler
Overall Economy Social EU
Party Country Abs Rel Abs Rel Abs Rel Abs Rel
Belgium Fr CDH 67.51 78.67 63.91 77.00 60.85 82.00 74.94 77
MR 68.91 75.33 65.51 78.00 59.99 66.00 76.82 82
Ecolo (PEF) 74.21 100.00 69.78 100.00 78.63 100.00 79.20 100
PS 73.57 86.00 70.15 78.00 76.99 86.00 78.26 94
CDV Vlaams 73.23 79.67 71.40 79.00 71.79 83.00 77.46 77
GROEN ! 78.17 89.67 74.80 79.00 88.27 98.00 82.53 92
LD 72.69 75.33 72.32 79.00 72.12 68.00 73.56 79
NVA 76.38 89.67 75.22 92.00 78.44 93.00 77.95 84
OVLD 77.15 100.00 72.27 100.00 85.10 100.00 82.67 100
PA Benl 75.87 87.67 75.45 85.00 78.75 93.00 75.00 85
SLP 79.24 83.67 73.97 78.00 82.24 87.00 87.98 86
VB 69.68 78.67 72.20 79.00 65.32 79.00 67.11 78
SPA 77.24 85.67 75.83 87.00 85.66 93.00 76.01 77
Germany BDG 62.39 73.33 60.93 74.00 47.40 66.00 68.92 80
DR 74.31 84.33 77.39 88.00 68.59 84.00 71.79 81
DW 78.55 94.00 78.19 93.00 82.00 100.00 78.17 89
NEWROP 74.29 90.33 70.13 80.00 84.33 100.00 77.18 91
SPD 73.57 82.67 74.32 85.00 66.81 79.00 75.45 84
England BNP 83.18 96.67 78.68 90.00 91.18 100.00 90.59 100
Green 70.44 74.00 75.85 84.00 72.18 82.00 57.68 56
Labour 68.98 76.00 67.52 70.00 70.22 73.00 71.27 85
LibDem 76.38 85.33 77.44 85.00 77.14 90.00 74.10 81
Tori 67.49 79.00 70.68 82.00 65.34 85.00 62.13 70
UKIP 72.10 96.33 72.48 90.00 79.65 100.00 69.61 99
Spain ERC 78.09 88.00 76.65 90.00 83.73 86.00 78.16 88
BNG 79.44 88.00 81.25 95.00 86.01 96.00 72.42 73
CPC 74.64 88.67 72.21 87.00 79.78 94.00 78.27 85
ICV 83.15 91.67 82.53 92.00 83.04 83.00 85.00 100
IU 83.74 94.67 83.78 84.00 95.74 100.00 77.36 100
PD 73.82 83.67 70.45 78.00 68.18 80.00 83.12 93
PP 66.57 78.33 62.86 72.00 72.63 87.00 72.21 76
PSOE 78.74 83.67 77.22 84.00 78.73 75.00 81.79 92
UPD 71.08 87.00 63.81 70.00 80.15 100.00 79.51 91
France AL 69.01 82.00 67.57 87.00 67.92 73.00 73.08 86
FN 66.75 72.67 68.93 78.00 72.66 79.00 59.38 61
LO 68.57 73.67 73.10 68.00 68.75 78.00 59.52 75
LV 76.76 85.67 75.99 85.00 78.29 89.00 78.05 83
MD 70.34 75.67 70.15 74.00 52.00 58.00 81.12 95
MNR 71.61 85.00 71.43 81.00 76.56 94.00 68.75 80
MPF 72.50 87.33 68.65 83.00 73.08 85.00 78.53 94
NEWROP 78.33 76.00 78.23 54.00 58.14 100.00 80.96 74
MRC 72.20 79.33 73.58 82.00 79.46 85.00 66.46 71
PCF 75.34 82.00 81.73 95.00 71.01 76.00 65.49 75
PRG 71.69 80.00 69.74 79.00 76.89 88.00 72.92 73
PS 78.22 86.67 77.11 84.00 76.98 91.00 81.62 85
UMP 71.95 85.33 66.74 78.00 71.13 87.00 80.65 91
Italy FT 67.69 77.67 66.22 70.00 67.86 75.00 70.54 88
LN 68.12 73.67 70.20 82.00 69.91 77.00 63.84 62
PD 75.06 83.00 73.34 80.00 61.00 81.00 82.04 88
PL 73.86 84.67 75.00 88.00 66.94 84.00 76.02 82
PRC 76.65 85.33 77.90 84.00 82.14 97.00 71.72 75
SL 77.97 83.67 76.53 84.00 78.39 88.00 81.28 79
UDC 76.23 89.67 73.14 86.00 72.73 92.00 82.65 91
VI 73.66 80.33 74.08 85.00 53.74 72.00 79.45 84
Netherlands CDA 72.20 74.33 73.57 86.00 72.23 64.00 69.43 73
D1966 75.21 82.33 73.91 78.00 79.45 91.00 75.67 78
GL 80.51 88.67 81.45 97.00 82.90 88.00 77.42 81
LDP 77.58 83.33 76.27 85.00 78.19 82.00 79.58 83
PA 77.64 83.00 77.73 87.00 81.86 90.00 75.33 72
PD 73.25 83.33 73.99 84.50 76.78 87.50 69.97 78
PV 73.09 88.67 73.14 88.00 81.82 95.00 68.63 83
SP 73.91 87.67 73.94 84.00 82.81 100.00 69.37 79
VNEWR 74.09 78.67 74.14 83.00 71.88 70.00 74.30 83
VVD 71.34 85.00 67.69 75.00 79.03 88.00 74.80 92
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Poland PO 70.40 82.00 70.65 87.00 51.05 71.00 77.41 88
PPC 78.53 84.33 74.96 93.00 73.86 67.00 88.44 93
LPR 65.34 73.67 61.93 68.00 71.25 72.00 66.67 81
PS 69.04 89.67 62.44 77.00 81.46 100.00 74.36 92
PSL 67.08 62.67 60.00 58.00 50.00 54.00 80.21 76
SLD 71.73 80.33 63.33 76.00 79.29 80.00 78.35 85
UPR 71.63 86.67 74.96 84.00 57.75 83.00 73.55 93
Portugal MEP 73.81 81.00 73.04 80.00 72.41 77.00 77.14 86
CDU 69.44 76.67 75.50 76.00 67.50 76.00 56.25 78
PS 69.83 86.33 68.24 78.00 72.14 94.00 75.00 87
PSD 69.16 85.00 69.27 75.00 71.61 91.00 66.34 89
Sweden CENT 71.75 86.00 70.81 81.00 68.53 92.00 74.45 85
FL 72.74 87.00 72.61 89.00 68.69 89.00 75.03 83
JUN 68.01 79.33 73.59 91.00 52.86 72.00 66.90 75
KD 68.88 84.00 70.04 78.00 65.87 90.00 68.21 84
MG 67.15 87.00 73.62 81.00 73.26 89.00 51.32 91
MS 71.73 81.33 71.87 83.00 66.64 82.00 74.02 79
SA 73.40 86.33 77.25 90.00 69.74 91.00 67.46 78
SD 74.42 92.33 74.99 97.00 76.21 89.00 72.75 91
Mean Niche 73.16 82.42 73.16 81.09 71.74 83.32 74.36 82.88
Mean Mainstream 72.30 85.50 71.74 85.50 70.62 88.32 73.28 82.66
Source: 2009 EU Profiler
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Party Country Niche GovStat RiLe ElCycle
Austria BZO 0 0 2 0.13
DG At 1 0 0 0.13
EUSTOP 0 0 2 0.13
FPO 1 0 2 0.13
SPO 0 1 0 0.13
NEOS 0 0 1 0.13
REKOS 0 0 2 0.13
OVP 0 0 2 0.13
UA 0 0 1 0.13
Bulgaria ABC 0 0 0 0.74
Attack 0 0 2 0.74
BSP 0 1 0 0.74
BwC 0 0 2 0.74
DPS 0 0 0 0.74
GERB 0 0 2 0.74
NFSB 0 0 2 0.74
ReformistBloc 0 0 2 0.74
Czech Republic ANO 0 1 2 0.16
CSSD 0 1 0 0.16
KSCM 0 0 0 0.16
TOP 0 0 2 0.16
ODS 0 0 2 0.16
SVO 0 0 2 0.16
SZ 0 0 0 0.16
KDUCSL 0 0 2 0.16
Germany AfD 0 0 2 0.16
CDUCSU 0 1 2 0.16
FDP 0 0 2 0.16
SPD 0 1 0 0.16
DL 0 0 0 0.16
DG 1 0 0 0.16
Denmark DF 0 0 2 0.71
DK 0 0 2 0.71
FolkEU 0 0 2 0.71
Venstre 1 1 1 0.71
LA 0 0 2 0.71
RV 0 0 0 0.71
SD 0 1 0 0.71
SF 0 0 0 0.71
Estonia EER 0 0 0 0.75
EK 0 0 0 0.75
IRL 0 0 2 0.75 6
Reformierakond 0 1 2 0.75
Rohelised 0 0 0 0.75
SDE 1 1 0 0.75
Keskerakond 0 0 1 0.75
England Green En 1 0 0 0.81
UKIP En 1 0 2 0.81
Labour En 0 0 0 0.81
Tori En 0 1 2 0.81
LibDem 0 1 1 0.81
Spain UPyD 0 0 2 0.61
VOX 0 0 2 0.61
Podemos 0 0 0 0.61
PP 0 1 2 0.61
PSOE 0 0 0 0.61
EquoCompromis 0 0 0 0.61
BilduBNG 0 0 0 0.61
CiUPNV 0 0 2 0.61
IU 0 0 0 0.61
ERC 1 0 0 0.61
Finland Vasemmistoliitto 0 1 0 0.77
Vihrealiitto 1 1 0 0.77
Kokoomus 0 1 2 0.77
Kristillisdemokraatit 1 1 2 0.77
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Perussuomalaiset 0 0 2 0.77
RKP 0 1 1 0.77 3
SDP 0 1 0 0.77
Keskusta 1 0 1 0.77
France EELV 1 0 0 0.38
FG Fr 0 0 0 0.38
FrontNational 0 0 2 0.38
UMP 0 0 2 0.38
UDIMoDem 0 0 2 0.38
NPA 0 0 0 0.38
PS Fr 0 0 0 0.38
Rassemblementcitoyen 0 0 2 0.38
DeboutlaRepublique 0 0 2 0.38
ForceVie 0 0 2 0.38
Hungary Fidesz 0 1 2 0.03
MSZP 0 0 0 0.03
Jobbik 1 0 2 0.03
LMP 0 0 0 0.03
Ireland FiannaFail 0 0 2 0.64
FineGael 0 1 2 0.64
Green 1 0 0 0.64
Labour Ir 0 0 1 0.64
Socialist 0 0 0 0.64
SinnFein 1 0 0 0.64
Italy LegaNord 1 0 2 0.23
ForzaItalia 0 0 2 0.23
ListaTsipras 0 0 0 0.23
MCS 0 0 2 0.23
NCDUdiC 0 0 2 0.23
SceltaEuropea 0 0 1 0.23
PartitoDemocratico 0 0 0 0.23
FDI 0 0 2 0.23
Lithuania DP 0 1 1 0.39
LLRA 0 0 2 0.39
LRLS 0 0 2 0.39
LSDP 0 1 0 0.39
LVZS 0 0 2 0.39
TSLKD 0 0 2 0.39
TT 0 1 2 0.39
Northern Ireland Alliance 0 1 0 0.61
DUP 0 1 2 0.61
UUP 0 0 2 0.61
SDLP 0 0 0 0.61
SinnFein NI 0 0 0 0.61
Netherlands CDA 0 0 2 0.37
CUSGP 1 0 1 0.37
D1966 1 0 1 0.37
50Plus 0 0 1 0.37
GL 1 0 0 0.37
VVD 0 1 2 0.37
SP Nl 0.37
PvdA 0 1 0 0.37
PvdD 0 0 0 0.37
PVV 1 0 2 0.37
Poland SP 0 0 1 0.64
NP 0 0 2 0.64
PO 0 1 0 0.64
PR 0 0 2 0.64
RN 0 0 2 0.64
ETR 0 0 1 0.64
SLDUP 0 0 0 0.64
PSL 0 1 2 0.64
Portugal BE 0 0 0 0.68
Livre 0 0 0 0.68
MPT 0 0 2 0.68
PAN 0 0 0 0.68
PPAliansaPortugalPSDCDSPP 0 0 2 0.62
PS Pg 0 0 0 0.68
CDUPCPPEV 0 0 0 0.68
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8PCTPMRPP 0 0 0 0.68
Romania PDL 0 0 2 0.49
PMP 0 0 2 0.49
PNL 0 0 2 0.49
PPDD 0 0 0 0.49
UDMR 0 1 2 0.49
PSD 0 1 0 0.49
Scotland Labour Sc 0 0 0 0.55
Libdem Sc 0 0 0 0.55
UKIP Sc 0 0 1 0.55
Green Sc 0 0 0 0.55
SNP 1 1 0 0.55
Conservative 0 0 2 0.55
Slovakia KDH 0 0 2 0.55
ASNS 0 0 2 0.55
NOVA 0 0 2 0.55
OLaNO 0 0 1 0.55
SMERSD 0 0 0 0.55
SMK 0 0 2 0.55
SaS 0 0 2 0.55
SDKDS 0 0 2 0.55
SNS 0 0 1 0.55
MostHid 0 0 1 0.55
Slovenia DeSUS 1 1 1 0.94
SDS 0 0 2 0.94
SD 0 1 0 0.94
NSi 0 0 0 0.94
DL 0 0 2 0.94
Wales Labour Wl 0 1 1 0.61
Libdem Wl 0 0 0 0.61
Green Wl 0 0 1 0.61
Tori Wl 0 0 2 0.61
PC 1 0 0 0.61
UKIP 1 0 0 0.61 -
Source: 2014 EUvox
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Table 34: Congruence scores at party level - EUvox
Overall Economy Social EU
Party Country Abs Rel Abs Rel Abs Rel Abs Rel
Austria BZO 62.26 85.88 59.00 87.52 57.50 87.11 67.78 83.02
DG At 73.70 62.32 68.29 46.51 69.24 48.90 80.19 51.06
EUSTOP 70.96 67.32 67.08 60.60 41.83 55.40 79.22 85.96
FPO 62.47 74.84 62.23 77.96 50.80 79.26 71.76 67.31
SPO 66.41 70.90 65.54 69.89 59.16 61.16 72.56 81.66
NEOS 70.28 71.31 64.76 68.68 58.13 48.91 81.51 96.35
REKOS 55.38 55.13 50.48 59.59 43.66 44.35 64.10 61.46
OVP 71.80 78.08 69.90 75.09 79.20 66.81 62.30 92.32
UA - 74.84 - 78.35 - 66.54 - 79.62
Bulgaria ABC 74.34 86.04 72.30 78.42 77.35 87.76 73.78 91.95
Attack - 74.56 - 60.86 - 69.60 - 93.23
BSP 65.80 76.36 64.97 74.77 62.94 74.03 68.45 80.29
BwC 66.37 75.57 54.43 52.90 70.79 86.20 70.12 87.63
DPS 66.39 77.05 67.23 75.01 64.12 70.82 67.28 85.30
GERB 66.84 72.58 69.35 74.53 58.93 58.66 71.52 84.55
NFSB 65.45 73.21 55.37 64.11 62.58 68.71 73.85 86.80
ReformistBloc 71.01 70.16 65.29 56.57 63.80 61.24 78.20 92.68
Czech Republic ANO 75.62 90.51 76.77 97.77 75.23 85.11 75.31 88.64
CSSD 77.09 37.32 75.25 23.22 79.49 75.38 76.23 13.36
KSCM 67.96 73.75 55.68 56.60 74.06 84.12 70.00 80.54
TOP 77.49 84.40 73.35 74.75 77.17 86.72 80.00 91.73
ODS 77.25 85.22 74.22 87.10 79.14 93.63 77.45 74.94
SVO 70.82 77.11 74.64 84.28 65.00 73.08 75.56 73.97
SZ 57.45 70.90 54.16 55.86 54.16 80.01 63.10 76.81
KDUCSL - 75.21 - 86.74 - 66.13 - 72.75
Germany AfD 64.21 66.73 61.53 49.20 65.62 76.43 64.71 74.57
CDUCSU 65.69 71.52 65.32 72.03 62.71 66.01 68.21 76.51
FDP 65.43 74.21 68.95 77.88 56.10 64.56 70.24 80.17
SPD 62.97 57.68 52.42 42.62 53.05 45.34 76.32 85.07
DieLinke 61.55 70.07 60.03 67.52 47.84 45.29 71.59 81.75
DieGrunen 69.05 70.07 71.09 71.36 56.43 45.29 77.93 84.55
Denmark DF 63.13 67.91 56.59 59.54 55.32 57.92 72.61 86.28
DK 65.09 76.25 51.05 62.77 43.52 69.65 71.24 89.94
FolkEU 61.93 - 51.05 - 43.52 - 71.25 -
Venstre 64.90 - 72.62 - 59.80 - 64.36 -
LA 62.53 73.42 53.35 62.78 62.19 69.66 67.36 87.82
RV 66.58 73.33 81.26 91.02 50.45 45.19 72.61 83.78
SD 63.69 73.33 60.44 68.71 55.55 54.21 71.34 83.78
SF 59.37 62.31 46.46 44.86 56.27 59.11 67.40 82.97
Estonia EER 72.60 76.59
EK 70.07 73.07
IRL 72.67 75.14 61.39 61.93 71.26 72.72 80.01 90.76
Reformierakond 75.45 78.46 62.98 75.13 78.13 54.83 80.25 90.10
Rohelised 72.60 84.09 70.49 81.45 69.06 83.51 76.59 78.99
SDE 72.43 81.77 71.34 81.46 70.18 83.92 74.54 79.94
Keskerakond - 82.31 - 86.39 - 70.75 - 83.98
England Green En - 64.30 - 74.80 - 67.83 - 51.20
UKIP En 73.57 81.56 75.72 83.62 65.24 72.17 76.09 88.89
Labour En 69.12 74.57 70.38 74.80 64.67 67.83 71.90 81.08
Tori En 68.09 74.83 63.77 63.66 65.44 75.14 72.53 85.69
LibDem 76.38 - 63.65 - 75.13 - 78.56
Spain UPyD 68.17 73.26 67.19 72.30 59.73 64.73 74.41 82.74
VOX 51.68 64.60 60.73 70.31 38.60 57.11 55.73 66.40
Podemos 55.07 59.63 55.51 63.77 28.52 29.72 72.83 85.40
PP 63.06 72.37 63.76 70.38 55.94 67.91 68.89 78.82
PSOE 64.28 62.03 66.75 97.53 41.27 26.97 78.32 61.57
EquoCompromis 57.70 59.58 59.16 62.66 74.68 38.77 35.13 77.32
BilduBNG 55.70 60.98 64.24 66.65 56.78 24.58 63.42 91.69
CiUPNV 70.24 79.55 65.14 72.26 70.02 86.32 73.92 80.07
IU 52.40 54.58 56.20 64.90 74.40 14.57 23.86 84.28
ERC 56.02 45.81 52.24 46.08 73.42 40.06 39.24 81.29
Finland Vasemmistoliitto 61.71 66.13 69.96 76.69 51.57 40.44 65.08 81.25
Vihrealiitto 65.66 66.58 72.88 88.73 47.13 38.41 76.02 72.62
Kokoomus 72.90 84.91 70.84 80.12 67.06 82.53 78.55 92.07
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8Kristillisdemokraatit 67.36 76.57 76.47 88.97 59.39 57.12 69.65 83.61
Perussuomalaiset 69.47 84.36 72.18 90.76 63.18 74.23 72.86 88.08
RKP 72.58 80.11 72.10 91.26 61.78 56.94 81.17 92.13
SDP 64.83 68.55 65.19 73.07 56.38 50.02 71.20 82.55
Keskusta 72.90 86.81 74.61 80.12 68.44 78.16 75.04 95.87
France EELV 62.53 61.50 45.72 44.40 64.97 65.80 69.99 74.31
FG Fr 56.60 62.20 50.76 59.77 57.62 57.14 59.10 69.68
FrontNational 62.40 75.11 64.00 79.33 70.72 57.03 50.62 88.94
UMP 67.94 77.38 67.19 78.89 61.65 66.30 73.91 86.93
UDIMoDem 70.40 72.28 70.46 74.32 79.70 82.32 56.40 88.54
NPA 54.98 61.70 45.35 51.09 58.26 69.93 57.72 64.08
PS Fr 61.06 69.91 51.60 64.74 66.04 67.44 62.50 77.55
Rassemblementcitoyen - 74.63 - 89.70 - 65.74 - 68.45
DeboutlaRepublique 56.66 72.36 55.10 78.99 56.12 56.07 57.84 82.01
ForceVie 70.00 71.55 78.32 77.14 68.40 67.57 65.86 69.93
Hungary Fidesz 72.48 77.84 75.76 86.65 65.17 61.94 76.36 84.92
MSZP - 78.16 - 79.59 - 71.25 - 83.71
Jobbik 69.80 74.55 64.97 62.95 71.91 84.87 70.79 75.84
LMP 69.51 72.04 63.46 76.41 63.10 61.02 77.72 78.68
Ireland FiannaFail 68.72 78.88 79.59 68.73 76.47 88.32
FineGael 67.58 68.38 65.15 61.81 75.14 78.16
Green 67.07 58.46 75.41 ? 53.05 ? 74.47 58.46
Labour Ir 66.43 65.66 ? 61.59 ? 51.91 78.59 83.47
Socialist 58.59 64.25 57.21 66.71 50.36 56.70 65.76 69.33
SinnFein 59.37 62.31 46.46 44.86 56.27 59.11 67.40 82.97
Italy LegaNord 67.10 81.51 69.55 88.83 60.46 68.73 70.97 86.98
ForzaItalia 67.32 80.51 69.27 82.10 72.83 68.73 59.69 91.07
ListaTsipras 67.18 68.16 72.20 71.82 75.18 51.36 54.53 81.29
M5S 67.72 77.91 71.20 83.16 71.76 71.12 66.28 79.45
NCDUdiC - 85.32 - 90.87 - 76.33 - 95.45
SceltaEuropea 42.82 80.53 68.94 72.78 80.96 77.94 70.50 90.87
PartitoDemocratico 72.70 78.82 77.60 72.78 81.68 52.41 57.76 93.17
FDI 66.06 79.64 67.55 81.26 71.18 70.52 59.23 87.12
Lithuania DP 64.77 67.63 63.59 62.13 56.29 56.07 71.13 84.69
LLRA 70.47 84.58 67.59 80.36 65.48 78.13 74.47 95.24
LRLS 65.04 59.69 60.97 53.92 55.46 48.59 74.74 76.58
LSDP 63.35 66.86 65.07 71.41 54.49 49.41 69.31 79.76
LVZS 60.10 78.03 69.32 86.13 53.74 56.45 59.97 91.51
TSLKD - 62.12 - 53.28 - 53.01 - 80.07
TT 72.58 83.65 73.85 66.06 70.97 98.64
Northern Ireland Alliance 65.64 74.97 71.04 77.23 67.22 65.40 61.36 82.29
DUP 68.46 81.00 76.24 91.34 50.44 62.06 76.23 89.60
UUP 67.98 75.96 70.20 82.84 59.48 60.16 73.45 84.89
SDLP 67.45 - 60.94 - 65.37 - 76.04
SinnFein NI - 63.11 - 58.80 - 60.01 - 70.51
Netherlands CDA 70.72 75.77 74.64 77.35 61.05 63.99 75.00 85.98
CUSGP 66.81 75.06 68.08 66.33 65.13 72.86 67.43 86.01
D1966 73.40 77.50 71.17 82.38 61.76 56.79 83.67 93.34
50Plus 59.17 46.66 49.20 64.58 61.11 60.00
GL 70.13 68.38 68.75 73.74 60.42 48.31 78.45 83.09
VVD 61.32 62.13 63.30 66.59 51.77 52.91 67.90 66.89
SP Nl - 61.57 - 54.55 - 58.91 - 70.35
PvdA 67.48 70.16 69.23 80.62 60.19 61.75 72.20 68.11
PvdD 60.99 69.45 65.23 82.33 53.57 61.51 64.51 64.50
PVV 62.97 61.57 57.32 63.80 57.32 61.70 69.76 59.22
Poland SP 64.18 66.15 67.41 55.21 69.34 74.76
NP 63.12 70.71 48.35 54.97 63.55 74.17 71.04 82.98
PO 71.33 74.13 67.77 70.22 67.99 78.28 75.89 73.90
PR 68.52 75.95 74.69 84.09 58.26 65.91 71.90 77.84
RN 67.64 69.66 56.59 54.34 60.32 58.83 79.96 95.81
ETR - 71.29 - 83.22 - 42.42 - 88.24
SLDUP - 59.77 - 49.06 - 53.47 - 76.79
PSL 69.23 77.61 63.84 64.41 71.37 89.30 70.58
Portugal BE 61.62 63.19 50.08 55.49 58.82 56.06 70.32 78.02
Livre 60.09 53.70 52.76 60.05 46.66 32.42 73.12 68.64
MPT 61.32 60.97 59.98 55.52 53.86 50.29 69.77 77.11
PAN 62.38 56.80 58.08 54.62 36.01 29.45 75.24 86.34
PPAliansaPortugalPSDCDSPP - 79.91 - 89.60 - 69.86 - 80.26
PS Pg 69.34 77.66
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CDUPCPPEV - 60.76 - 57.14 - 44.30 - 80.84
PCTPMRPP - 67.33 - 59.45 - 60.84 - 81.68
Romania PDL 71.07 74.15 71.41 67.34 65.66 72.84 75.11 82.28
PMP 74.90 80.67 75.77 81.96 70.71 73.68 76.29 86.38
PNL 73.42 83.95 72.37 80.69 71.36 78.79 75.61 92.38
PPDD 60.89 69.10 48.19 49.39 62.99 70.85 66.16 87.05
UDMR 74.24 91.68 74.24 97.63 71.70 86.46 76.45 90.96
PSD - 79.80 - 79.81 - 72.41 - 87.18
Scotland Labour Sc 68.96 68.49 60.06 49.63 72.55 74.20 71.09 81.64
Libdem Sc 75.03 82.24 ? 79.60 ? 89.12 71.88 77.99
UKIP Sc 70.02 79.82 ? 66.36 ? 84.41 75.35 88.69
Green Sc ? 69.86 ? 68.55 ? 90.57 ? 50.44
SNP 68.74 73.47 63.03 69.25 74.83 78.74 67.16 72.43
Conservative ? 74.98 ? 49.62 ? 78.02 ? 87.90
Slovakia KDH 70.40 82.37 67.29 85.51 64.43 65.78 76.13 95.82
ASNS - 75.83 - 77.33 - 68.52 - 81.62
NOVA 70.89 77.91 66.89 70.74 68.54 77.44 74.50 85.56
OLaNO 53.29 80.28 ? 85.38 ? 60.29 72.31 95.15
SMERSD - 83.66 - 76.84 - 90.77 - 83.37
SMK 71.50 85.87 70.69 88.00 66.15 76.49 74.81 93.13
SaS - 78.20 - 73.89 - 83.36 - 77.34
SDKDS - 85.72 - 76.84 - 85.03 - 89.60
SNS 64.81 82.35 61.23 73.23 61.58 81.84 69.30 91.98
MostHid - 60.02 - 74.64 - 58.58 - 46.82
Slovenia DeSUS 73.32 80.28 75.56 76.00 73.81 81.90 71.48 82.93
SDS 70.18 77.44 69.52 70.47 62.38 76.93 76.64 84.92
SD 63.69 70.81 57.07 73.47 71.34 72.33
NSi - 66.80 - 64.52 - 75.57 - 78.03
DL - 75.53 - 64.52 - 80.13 - 74.76
Wales Labour Wl 68.61 65.95 57.24 46.49 72.37 69.91 71.97 81.46
Libdem Wl 73.74 80.74 ? 76.25 ? 89.33 71.28 76.62
Green Wl ? 71.43 ? 72.18 ? 90.34 ? 51.77
Tori Wl 69.79 60.50 62.73 74.55 70.52 73.13 85.58
PC 68.59 72.97 59.75 61.41 76.50 84.63 67.30 72.86
UKIP 70.20 - 62.27 - 69.93 - 74.71 -
Mean Niche 65.54 72.54 62.49 70.66 56.60 65.50 73.14 81.24
Mean Mainstream 66.62 71.60 69.08 71.06 62.91 68.48 67.92 75.2
Source: 2014 EUvox
Table 35: Cross tabulation Table - EU Profiler - Absolute citizen congruence
Left Centre Right
Mainstream 23 24 28
Niche 6 2 10
N = 93
Table 36: Cross tabulation Table - EU Profiler - Relative congruence
Left Centre Right
Mainstream 28 18 30
Niche 7 1 10
N = 94
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8Table 37: Crosstabulation Table - EUvox - Absolute citizen congruence
Left Centre Right
Mainstream 53 13 73
Niche 9 2 5
N = 155
Table 38: Crosstabulation Table - EUvox - Relative congruence
Left Centre Right
Mainstream 54 16 78
Niche 11 3 6
N = 168
Left
Right
50 60 70 80 90
Niche parties
Left
Right
70 80 90
Mainstream parties
Figure 42: Violin plots - EU Profiler Absolute citizen congruence
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Left
Right
60 70 80 90 100 110
Niche parties
Left
Right
60 70 80 90 100 110
Mainstream parties
Figure 43: Violin plots - EU Profiler Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream
Left
Right
60 65 70 75
Niche parties
Left
Right
45 55 65 75 85
Maintream parties
Figure 44: Violin plots - EUvox Absolute citizen congruence Niche vs mainstream
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Figure 45: Violin plots - EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream
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Figure 46: EU Profiler Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1a
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Figure 47: EUvox Relative congruence Niche vs mainstream 1b
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Figure 48: EUvox Relative congruence niche vs mainstream 1b
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88.4 Appendices Chapter 6
Table 39: Baseline and Individual level models - EU Profiler
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall.ipc Economy.ipc Social.ipc EU.ipc
Age −0.868∗∗∗ −0.979∗∗∗ −2.382∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.083) (0.103) (0.181) (0.137)
Male 0.423∗∗∗ 0.074 −1.571∗∗∗ 2.071∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.199) (0.348) (0.263)
Education 0.464∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.074) (0.130) (0.098)
Political interest 1.151∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.132) (0.231) (0.175)
Extreme L-R 0.275∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.048) (0.060) (0.105) (0.079)
Constant 73.189∗∗∗ 69.190∗∗∗ 72.958∗∗∗ 68.992∗∗∗ 72.655∗∗∗ 73.857∗∗∗ 73.895∗∗∗ 66.720∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.740) (0.657) (0.878) (1.609) (1.924) (1.190) (1.365)
Observations 11,406 11,406 11,405 11,405 11,328 11,328 11,345 11,345
Random variance party 14.00 13.20 21.86 20.53 66.52 64.40 41.58 40.78
Random variance country 1.98 2.15 1.72 2.50 18.44 21.68 9.52 8.86
Residual variance 58.21 56.45 89.28 87.16 272.38 266.44 154.88 152.50
ICC party 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
ICC country 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Log Likelihood −39,493.990 −39,184.100 −41,927.820 −41,627.630 −47,962.810 −47,778.650 −44,837.260 −44,751.850
Akaike Inf. Crit. 78,995.990 78,386.190 83,863.630 83,273.260 95,933.620 95,575.310 89,682.520 89,521.700
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 79,025.360 78,452.270 83,893.000 83,339.340 95,962.960 95,641.320 89,711.870 89,587.730
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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8Table 40: Baseline and Individual level models - EUvox
Dependent variable:
Absolute citizen congruence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 0.194∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028)
Male 0.076∗∗ −0.157∗∗ 0.067 0.379∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.068) (0.062) (0.056)
Education 0.274∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023)
Political interest 0.132∗∗∗ −0.632∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.043) (0.039) (0.035)
Constant 67.345∗∗∗ 65.670∗∗∗ 64.823∗∗∗ 65.458∗∗∗ 62.062∗∗∗ 62.220∗∗∗ 72.422∗∗∗ 67.645∗∗∗
(0.776) (0.781) (0.975) (0.981) (1.704) (1.688) (0.494) (0.514)
Observations 150,382 150,382 150,333 150,333 150,338 150,338 150,379 150,379
Random variance party 17.54 17.38 49.42 49.06 53.64 53.48 23.54 23.42
Random variance country 10.08 10.12 11.58 11.44 54.94 53.32 0.92 1.06
Residual variance 37.70 37.54 130.16 129.90 107.96 107.12 88.38 86.98
ICC party 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.20
ICC country 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.02
Log Likelihood −486,605.500 −486,344.000 −579,581.700 −579,450.300 −565,573.300 −565,005.200 −550,623.400 −549,445.800
Akaike Inf. Crit. 973,218.900 972,704.000 1,159,171.000 1,158,917.000 1,131,155.000 1,130,026.000 1,101,255.000 1,098,908.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 973,258.600 972,783.300 1,159,211.000 1,158,996.000 1,131,194.000 1,130,106.000 1,101,294.000 1,098,987.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 41: Extended individual level models - Countries in both EU Profiler and
EUvox
Absolute citizen congruence
Overall
2009 EU Profiler 2014 EUvox
Age −0.730∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.026)
Male 0.505∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.052)
Education 0.367∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.019)
Political interest 1.006∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.033)
Left-Right self-placement 0.446∗∗∗
(0.056)
EFNP −0.120 0.641
(0.979) (0.512)
Polarization −0.966 −3.465∗∗
(1.133) (1.404)
Disproportionality −1.686 0.785
(1.307) (0.951)
Old democracy 5.380∗∗ −0.173
(2.681) (3.371)
District magnitude −0.867 0.060
(1.012) (0.864)
Niche 1.223 1.270
(1.437) (3.021)
Governmental status 2.929 3.888
(1.932) (3.027)
Right −3.904∗∗∗ 3.191
(1.347) (2.706)
Centre −1.298 1.681
(1.339) (1.687)
Election cycle −2.096 −0.055
(1.456) (0.838)
Governmental status * Election cycle 0.758 1.563
(2.221) (1.452)
scale(LSq):as.factor(niche)1 0.833 0.331
(1.144) (1.411)
Constant 66.040∗∗∗ 60.027∗∗∗
(2.699) (3.256)
Observations 8,025 79,391
Random variance party 14.30 20.86
Random variance country 1.86 1.68
Residual variance 36.26
ICC party 0.22 0.34
ICC country 0.00 0.02
Log Likelihood −27,388.420 −255,284.400
Akaike Inf. Crit. 54,818.830 510,608.900
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 54,965.630 510,794.500
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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